Russian Air Force Still Fails to Dominate Skies After Year

One year of war and Russian aviation still hasn't taken off

How does an invasion sustain itself for nearly a year without decisive air support? That is the question hovering over the Ukrainian conflict twelve months after it began. Russia has failed to achieve air superiority, has not coordinated its aircraft with ground troops, and has barely launched attack missions along the front. Strikingly, it should have had the easiest task: operating near home, with bases just kilometers from the contact line.

The campaign relies on artillery and rocketry. When airstrikes do occur, they target infrastructure deep inside the country, not the positions holding back infantry. Almost a year later, this pattern remains unchanged.

The anti-air wall that explains (partly) the stalemate

The first answer in any analysis is air defense. Before the war, Ukraine possessed more surface-to-air missile batteries than all European armies combined. On the ground, S-300 and BUK systems dictate the altitude at which anyone can fly; below that, portable missiles wait. According to available figures, there are more than a hundred S-300 batteries, plus contributions from Western allies and the intelligence supporting them.

That wall is real. But it only covers half the problem. An army with modern aerial doctrine does not need to fly over enemy territory to launch guided munitions dozens of kilometers away. The question, then, is what is missing on the other side.

Why blaming the air defense system isn't enough

Here enters the block of arguments that causes the most discomfort. It is claimed that Russian aviation barely possesses precision munitions and relies on dumb bombs, the unguided variety as always. It is added that there is no reliable system to distinguish friendly from hostile aircraft, which is why attacks are directed inland rather than over the front, where no one knows for certain what lies beneath.

The rebuttal comes harshly. Before electronic identification systems existed, protocols and combat controllers were already in place. If a year later procedures, doctrine, and coordination are still absent, the diagnosis is not technical but fundamental: the Russian Air Force has proven to be a poorly operational instrument in a real war. In contrast, the US Navy and USAF accumulate shootdowns in every conflict yet continue flying; losing planes is normal. What is anomalous is not trying.

Is aviation useful in modern warfare?

The disagreement is not only about Russia. Some argue that air power is dead: modern anti-air missiles neutralize any incursion and wars are ultimately won by infantry. Others respond with the history of Western campaigns, where enemy defenses are degraded first and aviation operates freely afterward. The discussion drifted toward technical details—cruise speeds, afterburners, fifth and sixth-generation fighters—with the underlying irony that an army failing to support its troops next door argues about planes that do not yet exist.

The open question is whether the Ukrainian air defense system is as peine as claimed or if it is an excuse masking a greater incapacity. Those pointing to the former look at the more than a hundred batteries; those pointing to the latter highlight over a thousand armored vehicles lost and an air fleet where, according to some estimates, only a fraction would be flight-ready.

The memory of Syria and the contrast with Iraq

The comparison with Syria closes the circle. In that scenario, enthusiastic reports on the effectiveness of Russian aviation were published. In Ukraine, with the war on its doorstep and on flat terrain, the most media-covered operation—the case of Soledar—was sustained without constant air support. All artillery, rocketry, and cannon fodder.

Against those arguing that the United States has only attacked rivals without aviation, the response is simple: Iraq or Serbia had defenses, and yet Western air forces went out to operate. On paper, Russia could strike much of the front without entering Ukrainian territory, just kilometers from its own bases. It does not.

The disorienting data point

A year later, the Ukrainian sky still has no clear owner. Russian aviation has not taken off; Ukrainian aviation does not operate freely either. And while it is debated whether missiles have retired the fighter jet, the only verifiable fact is that the world's second-largest air force has spent twelve months failing to prove it is one. Perhaps the doctrine is simply waiting for the enemy to tire.