Russia may win in Ukraine, but governing is another war

Winning the war is one thing; winning hearts and minds is another

According to the narrative that sparked the debate, Russia's invasion of Ukraine began with a textbook script: blitzkrieg, regime change in Kyiv, and an occupation force modeled after Vichy France. On paper, it seemed a matter of days. In practice, the question framing any serious analysis is different. If Moscow secures the territory, can it govern it? Taking over a country is one challenge. Staying in power is a problem measured in decades.

The issue isn't entering, it's staying to govern

History is full of invaders who won the first week and lost the next twenty years. Common examples include Napoleon in Spain, Hitler in Russia, the United States in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and France in Spain. The conclusion is uncomfortable for any army, however large: in guerrilla warfare, the side with more troops often suffers the most. Not because they cannot destroy the enemy, but because every casualty weighs heavily, and partial victories resolve nothing.

The phrase that sums up the situation is simple: you cannot govern a people who do not want to be governed. Some argue that pro-Russian areas in Ukraine could be assimilated without much friction. The rest, far from it. According to this analysis, occupation there would devolve into continuous unrest and armed hotspots costing more than the invasion itself.

Ukraine was already surrounded by NATO: the argument doesn't hold

The claim of immediate military threat clashes with geography. Russia's easternmost point is just over 3,000 kilometers from its western border, with Alaska nearby. In Europe, Russia already shares borders with NATO countries: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania. Allied troops and equipment are stationed there, including Eurofighter jets and tanks deployed to the Baltic region by train. If missiles at the doorstep were the problem, those doors have been open for years.

This raises a question that doesn't answer itself: how does Ukraine differ from a missile in Poland, when either side can devastate the other? The technical difference between a system from sixty years ago and a current one is real, but it doesn't change the essence. The balance of terror recognizes no neighborhoods.

Rejection that survives treaties

The heaviest emphasis falls on memory. Experiences like Iraq with the United States or Poland with Russia leave a residue of distrust that lasts generations. A population can lose a war without losing count. Years of animosity toward the occupier eventually turn into suspicion of anything associated with them, including their propaganda, which is a pillar of power for any regime.

That is the point that ruins the most optimistic scenario. You can install a compliant government, sign an armistice, and declare victory on television. What you cannot sign away is forgetfulness. Without convincing those living in the territory, every treaty is worthless paper. The warning running through this issue applies to both sides: whoever ends up holding Ukraine also inherits its distrust.

Who pays for the aftermath?

The cost doesn't end with the last bullet. Maintaining occupied territory for years consumes military, police, and administrative budgets, compounded by the impact of sanctions. The bill is shared by both sides: a poorer Russia seeking buyers for its raw materials, and the European Union paying for gas that previously arrived via pipeline, while inflation erodes wages and savings.

Some envision the end as a clear-cut victory: Moscow keeps a portion of the country, forces Kyiv out of NATO and to demilitarize, and declares the war closed. Viewed this way, it wins. The doubt lies in the full rulebook. Winning the battle but eating a problem for decades is not winning. It is extending the bill and passing it to the next person.

Where the calculation stalls

No one disputes that an army with vastly superior resources can prevail in conventional warfare. This almost always happens. What remains unwritten is what trinc: guerrilla resistance, attrition, entrenched rejection, and a bill that never stops growing. Winning is the easy part to describe. Conquering and convincing are the parts that don't fit in a headline.

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The detail left out: During the early days of Kyiv's defense, reports mentioned satellite internet terminals delivered to the capital's mayor and a call between the Ukrainian president and Elon Musk to coordinate their use. The anecdote matters less for its technological aspect than for what it reveals: resistance was organized by a population that had no intention of surrendering.