Alvise Network Claims 25% of Ballot Records, Points to Junts

Volunteer network claims 25% of ballot records collected

The volunteer community organized around Alvise Pérez claims to have collected copies of 25% of the ballot records across Spain trinc the European elections, asserting this alternative count reveals votes unexplained by the official tally. According to users trinc the matter, the compiled material points to polling stations in Valencia, Vélez-Málaga, Barbastro, and a small municipality in Cantabria, where votes for Junts appear in areas with no known structure for the party. No court has confirmed any fraud. However, the noise has inserted three words into public discourse that few had used before: ballot record, polling station agent, and data dump.

What are the vote deviations being alleged?

The anomaly that has circulated most widely trinc a repeated pattern: polling stations where Junts receives unexpected votes. One user claims that in a small Cantabrian town, more than 100 ballots were counted for the Catalan party; similar results are cited in points in Valencia, Vélez-Málaga, and Barbastro, and some mention the Canary Islands or Murcia as examples of territories where Junts has no known structure. The core of the argument is this: it would be highly improbable that unrelated groups of people decided to vote the same way in such scattered locations.

The alternative hypothesis is more prosaic and much harder to refute: a human error when entering data into the tablet, a wrongly filled box, and the entire table shifted upward. Those supporting the first thesis add a plausible detail: the first surprised should have been the members of each polling station, who see the votes before anyone else. The response from the other side is that such an error would be obvious precisely because of its size, and that it was ultimately corrected.

The 25% of records: why it is not enough to conclude fraud

The number supporting the entire structure is 25%. It is the percentage of ballot records the civic network claims to have obtained and also its ceiling. Those participating in this count admit it has not been possible to go beyond this: without agents in every polling station, obtaining the complete set hits a wall. For the next general elections, the declared goal in a message reproduced in the thread is to surpass 75% and to judicialize, with territorial representation, what is detected.

The comparison matters. For some of the agents, with a quarter of the records, one can point to strange polling stations, but one cannot sustain a statistical pattern over the entire set; others argue the opposite and claim the deviation is already statistically significant. Traditional parties obtain complete or nearly complete copies because they have proxies and agents in practically all polling stations; historically, only parties with broad territorial deployment have been able to sum the scrutiny on their own. A voluntary audit without such deployment is, by definition, halfway.

From electoral monitoring to a seat: the disorienting shift

With the European Parliament seat already secured, the complaint lost momentum. According to several users in the thread, the one who had asked his trinc to monitor the electoral process stopped publishing updates on the count, did not upload the records to the website he had announced, and did not join the appeal other parties filed against the results. He got 'Alvised', summarized those who trinc him enthusiastically and now feel betrayed.

The reproach has a simple political logic: if one maintains that the system falsifies elections, the coherent thing is to fight it in the courts and in the boards, not to take the seat. The counterargument is that a seat and a complaint are not mutually exclusive and that changing the rules from outside is slower. The discussion, however, remains open.

Who really controls the count: records, Indra, and agents?

According to those defending the current system, the official count is done in front of agents from all parties, and results are published by polling station. Each party sums its own copies of records independently of the computer system, and in case of discrepancy, the document that counts is the record, not the electronic data. The count of stations with votes for Junts outside Catalonia, station by station and municipality by municipality, is the piece supporting the complaint and the one that should be read in full before drawing conclusions.

What is debated is whether the system is sufficient. It operates on the good faith of those organizing the process and there is not always a second pair of eyes in each station. One user claims that at seven in the evening, with the polling station half empty, the person remaining alone at the station can vote for twenty if they wish. The mail-in ballots that arrive at the end of the day and are mixed with the rest are another recurring front, and a participant asks, without providing any proof, who directed the company in charge of that distribution.

The law requires provincial boards to manually count and sum all records, several users recall. Whether this is fulfilled or not is the key to the matter. And the context does not help: the edition of the corruption perception index cited in the thread places Spain one position above Botswana (39/180).

What may change with the manual review of records

The manual review is the scenario that truly matters. If the provincial board officials redo the sum, any data dump error is revealed and the accounts balance themselves. If they refuse, the count relies on a digital record that no one can fully audit. The scrutiny is public and auditable by law; demanding that it be fulfilled should not be a antiestéticat.

With these pieces on the table, the outcome anticipated by those defending the explanation of a data dump error is a handful of corrections to stations and no alteration in the distribution of seats. This leaves the matter exactly where it was: millions of voters operating on faith. This is the point where the analysis gets stuck. Almost no one discusses whether a review is technically possible anymore. They discuss whether anyone with power has any incentive to allow it.