Spain's Military Faces Critical Gaps: 1970s Howitzers and Limited Missiles

Spain's Military Faces Critical Gaps: 1970s Howitzers and Limited Missiles

An inventory of material deficiencies in the Spanish Armed Forces, broken down by system, depicts an army with more gaps than capabilities. The starting point is a list ranging from rocket artillery—non-operational since the Teruel system was retired in 2011—to naval aviation, where Harriers face end-of-life without confirmed replacements. In between lies a litany of obsolescence measured in decades for some cases: the self-propelled M109 howitzers arrived in Spain in 1970 and remain in service, with around 90 units.

This is not a problem confined to one branch; it affects all three. The resulting debate concerns less the catalog itself than the uncomfortable question: what is the use of buying equipment if there is no will to deploy it?

Artillery, Missiles, and Armor: An Inventory That Falls Short

The review begins with rocket artillery. Since the withdrawal of the Teruel system in 2011, Spain has nothing in this segment. The purchase of the Israeli PULS was planned but suspended. In self-propelled artillery, the fleet of M109s—nearly 90 units—has been in service for over half a century since the first examples arrived in 1970.

In cruise missiles, the inventory is reduced to 39 Taurus, with a range of approximately 500 kilometers that the analysis itself considers insufficient by current standards. Some suggest a domestically produced alternative offering greater relative range per cost, designed for mass employment.

Troop transport concentrates much of the trouble. Hundreds of TOA M113s and BMR 6x6 vehicles remain operational with limited protection. Their replacements—the VAC and the DRAGON 8x8—are accumulating delays: no units have been received for the former, while the latter has faced development issues due to its size. Meanwhile, Leopard 2E and Pizarro armored vehicles lack active protection systems like Trophy or Iron Fist.

Drones, Air Defense, and the Fifth-Generation Gap

In attack drones, Spain possesses four armed Reapers. There is nothing equivalent to Lancet-style suicide drones or fiber-optic guided FPVs. Anti-drone defense is described as nonexistent, recalling how TB2s shifted the balance in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Air defense mixes outdated systems with geographic dispersion: veteran Patriots, a small number of NASAMS batteries, obsolete HAWKs, and short-range Mistral. Much of these assets are deployed outside Spanish territory, in Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, and the Baltic states.

In the air, Spain has no fifth-generation stealth fighters; the only option on the table is the F-35. Training F-5Ms await replacement by the Turkish Hürjet. And since the retirement of the Reina del Espectro (Electronic Warfare aircraft) in 2015, there has been no electronic warfare plane. Anti-submarine aviation lost its P-3 Orions in 2022, and the planned successor, the C295, offers less mission endurance. The scenario drawn: if Segarro acquires submarines, maritime communication with the Canary Islands would be compromised. There has never been AWACS capability.

The Navy: Frigates with Fewer Cells and Counted Submarines

In the Navy, the F110 frigates under construction will replace the F80s but arrive with 16 missile cells compared to the 48 of the F100s. The F100s also require mid-life upgrades. Ships lack point defense against missiles and drones.

Regarding submarines, two are in service—the S71 and S81—and three S80s are under construction. Plans exist to expand the series to six or eight units and equip new ones with land-attack capability. The sole intelligence vessel, the Alerta, was launched in 1985. The Marine Infantry operates 19 tracked AAV amphibious vehicles and 39 wheeled Piranhas, all near the end of their useful life.

From Shopping Lists to Unanswered Questions

The inventory quickly shifts toward something more uncomfortable. Part of the analysis argues that the problem is not equipment but the political will to use it: a country that disintegrates, it is argued, defends nothing even if it has means. Another stream reduces the list to three items—submarines, air defense, and missiles—and dismisses the rest. Others focus on ammunition and troops as the truly basic elements.

Suspicions of corruption arise in programs like the 8x8, alongside ideas for a national drone and rocket factory, and warnings that buying weapons from suppliers who can veto their use in conflict is a miscalculation. The most repeated conclusion is not technical: a sense of nationhood is missing.

The unsettling data is not in the catalog. It lies in the fact that, given this inventory, the discussion revolves not around what to buy, but whether anyone would actually use it.