Ukraine's Historical Rights Debate

Ukraine's Historical Rights Debate

When did Ukraine exist before 1991? This question, raised amid the conflict, summarizes a centuries-old clash of narratives. One side argues that the Ukrainian state is a Soviet creation without its own roots; the other counters that Kyivan Rus, centered in modern-day Kyiv, is the common origin of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Between these views lies a web of treaties, shifting borders, and shared history that neither side seems willing to concede.

Kyivan Rus: Origin of Ukraine or Russia?

The core disagreement lies in how Kyivan Rus is interpreted. For one school of thought, this medieval state—with Kyiv as its political center—is the matrix of Ukrainian identity. For the opposing view, it was the first Russian state, and calling it "of Kyiv" is merely a nineteenth-century historiographical convention. It is argued that Byzantine and Arab texts designated that territory as Rus, not Ukraine. The debate is not trivial: it determines who can claim what.

Some add that Rus functioned as a confederation of cities, with Kyiv as primus inter pares and Novgorod as the first capital. This detail undermines the idea of a single hegemonic center. It is also noted that Kyivan Rus never controlled Crimea or the Donbas, territories that passed into Russian hands centuries later. An uncomfortable question lingers: if the origin is shared, why do some claim the heritage while others deny it?

What peine to borders and treaties after the USSR?

The second front is legal. Ukraine and Belarus were founding members of the UN in 1945, holding seats as subjects of international law despite being part of the USSR. In other words, the Soviet Union itself recognized Ukraine as a federated state entity. Its post-war borders changed only in 1954, when Crimea was transferred to Ukraine. This fact, frequently cited in discussions, undermines the thesis that Ukraine emerged from nothing in 1991.

The other issue is the alleged verbal agreement on NATO non-expansion. Some take it for granted, placing it before the Soviet dissolution; others respond that the Vienna Convention requires treaties to be written and that, in any case, Ukraine did not exist as a signatory subject at that time. The discussion shifts to whether an unwritten pact can be invoked as law. The prevailing answer in these debates is no: what is not written is not a treaty, and what is not a treaty cannot be claimed as such.

The NATO argument and the 2014 coup

The third line of friction is geopolitical. It is asserted that Ukraine had been negotiating its entry into NATO since 2008, breaking an implicit condition of its independence. The rebuttal is direct: When has Ukraine joined NATO? The question hangs in the air. Meanwhile, the narrative about 2014 splits in two: for some, it was foreign intervention with Russian soldiers on the ground; for others, it was an externally supported coup that triggered the Donbas reaction. Neither version is settled.

Discussions turn bitter when cases are compared. It is brought up that Spain would not tolerate Portugal hosting hostile military bases twenty kilometers from Badajoz. The analogy serves to justify Russia's reaction but also highlights its limits: signed international law is what it is, and those who invoke it for some cases cannot ignore it for others. Here, the argument stalls.

Is Ukrainian a dialect of Russian?

On linguistic and ethnic grounds, it is maintained that Russians and Ukrainians share a common origin and that Ukrainian is merely a dialect of Russian. This assertion is used to deny the existence of a distinct identity. Against this, the objection is that the Ukrainian language has its own literature and norms, and proximity does not erase distinction. The debate gets tangled in whether linguistic similarity implies political unity. It does not, yet the claim is repeated as if it did.

The exact point where analysis stalls

Ultimately, the disagreement is not historical but premised. Some start from the assumption that Ukraine is an artificial state and that its 1991 borders are Soviet gifts without historical right. Others start from the premise that these borders are internationally recognized and that no past grievance nullifies them. There is no bridge between these positions: each piece of data offered by one side is read by the other as proof of the opposite. The conversation ends where it began, with the same question and no answer satisfying both sides.