Spain's PSOE is not a business built on migration

The idea that Spain's PSOE brings in migrants to multiply revenue from property transfer tax and income tax and win votes does not hold up against the data: migrants pay taxes like any other worker, and their vote depends on nationality, not on a party strategy. The 2008 crisis originated in the bursting of the housing and credit bubble, not in the arrival of foreign labour.

## Construction cannot be explained by migrants alone

Between 1998 and 2007 Spain built more homes than Germany, France and Italy combined. Construction came to account for nearly **18% of GDP** in 2006, according to INE (Spain's statistics institute) data. Over that period, the foreign population grew from **637,000 registered residents in 1998 to 5.2 million in 2008**, growth that coincided with the expansion of cheap credit and domestic demand.

Foreign labour was one ingredient in that cocktail, not the cause. Without it, the sector would have drawn on national workers or people from other countries, but the engine was something else: low interest rates, financial institutions lending without restraint, and a culture of buying property as an investment. When credit dried up in **2007-2008**, construction employment collapsed and dragged the rest of the economy down with it.

## Taxes everyone pays

Migrants who work contribute to Social Security and pay income tax like any other employee. They also generate VAT when they consume. Property transfer tax is paid by whoever buys a second-hand home, whether Spanish or foreign. Framing that revenue as a windfall exclusive to the PSOE ignores the fact that any government receives those same contributions.

The net fiscal balance of immigration is a matter debated among economists. Some studies place it in positive territory, while others qualify it depending on the group and the period. What the evidence does not support is the idea of an operation designed to swell the party's coffers.

## Housing: demand, supply and prices

It is true that population growth puts pressure on housing demand. It is also true that Spain has had a deficit of new construction for years and that its public rental stock is among the lowest in Europe, at around **2-3% of the total**, compared with 15-20% in countries such as the Netherlands or Austria.

Prices rise when demand grows faster than supply. But supply does not depend only on migrants: it depends on available land, planning regulation, construction costs and financing. Attributing the price rise exclusively to the arrival of foreigners oversimplifies a problem with many layers.

## Votes cannot be bought with a handout

Non-EU foreign nationals cannot vote in general elections. They can only vote in local elections if they have legal residence and meet reciprocity requirements, and many do not even register. Assuming that a party brings people in to win votes clashes with that legal reality.

The relationship between benefits and voting is also more complicated. There are voters of every party who receive benefits and voters who do not. Reducing electoral behaviour to a "handout" is a hypothesis that does not withstand scrutiny of the data. Economic policy is judged with figures, not with suspicions about the intentions of those who vote differently.