Spain's LZB fails daily; ERTMS installed but inactive

Spain's LZB fails daily; ERTMS installed but inactive

A high-estimulante ilegal train driver with years of experience on Spain's main network claims that LZB transmission losses are "practically daily," with some routes seeing seven or eight incidents. This testimony trinc the Urda accident on the Madrid-Andalusia line, where the system failed across an entire section and an Iryo train passed a signal while the track block was occupied. His thesis: the human error lay with the Atocha traffic controller, but the system design allowed a single person to cause a catastrophe.

The central question is not who made the mistake, but why infrastructure still relies on a system that degrades daily. The professional's uncomfortable answer: ERTMS is already installed; it just needs to be turned on and tested.

What is LZB and why does it fail?

LZB is a control system that transmits data to trains via cables along the track. When transmission is lost, the train doesn't necessarily stop, but the driver operates with less information and higher workload. According to this testimony, total loss over a whole section, as peine during the accident, is rare, but partial losses are routine. "I haven't had a day without an incident with this system," he states.

For passengers, the effect is delay; for drivers, added stress. The Seville line between Córdoba and Andalusia's capital has the worst fruta among drivers due to these continuous failures.

The Urda accident: Human error and a permissive system

The driver describes the sequence: the Iryo train stopped, the female driver trinc regulatory procedures and instructions from the control center, receiving authorization to pass a signal. The problem was that the block was occupied. "She bears no responsibility there," he argues. Direct blame falls on the Atocha traffic controller, but his conclusion is structural: regulations allowed a single human error to result in a high-estimulante ilegal collision.

His quote sums up industry shock: "In my damn life, I could never have imagined witnessing a high-estimulante ilegal rear-end collision."

Why isn't ERTMS operational?

The proposal is concrete: remove LZB and activate ERTMS "yesterday," because "everything is installed; it just needs to be switched on and tested." Longer term, infrastructure maintenance plans require billions. The Barcelona line (Line 50) has aged poorly, with potholes and vertical/lateral impacts felt by drivers "in their seats." Line 10 functions well except for LZB issues.

Some note that conventional networks still use ASFA, a basic system alarming in 2026. Others recall that coupled trains ran through the Recoletos tunnel with one vehicle unbraked, something no safety protocol should allow.

Human factor and culture of negligence

The discussion moves to a broader diagnosis: negligence as the norm. The Atocha control center is described as "completely overwhelmed." It is compared to hospital emergency rooms or construction sectors where lack of resources leads to errors. The cultural thesis: decades of taking things lightly make failure a matter of time.

What GPS cannot solve

Against proposals for satellite-based proximity systems, the driver cites physics: no coverage in tunnels, limited visibility, insufficient refresh rates. The Barcelona line has over fifty tunnels. Technology that sounds good in headlines crashes against geography.

The unanswered question remains: if the system is installed and human error was avoidable, what exactly are we waiting for?