One participant launched this thesis bluntly: Ukraine will not recover either the Donbas or Crimea, and it is time to accept that. What sounds like provocation has been filled with figures, millions of refugees counted, bleeding demographics, oil changing hands, and a counteroffensive advancing slower than expected. Today, the idea that Ukraine has lost the war is defended with data, not slogans.
And it is rebated with data. The problem here is not a lack of numbers, but that they point in two directions at once. Each side has its own accounting, and neither fully closes the file.
What is claimed when saying Ukraine has already lost
The core argument is territorial and demographic. Neither Crimea nor the Donbas return, and each month consolidates on the ground what began as a military operation. Added to this is the reading that the Ukrainian offensive has fallen far short of expectations.
One school of analysis stresses that the offensive advances slowly even according to its proponents, who are deploying reserve units that previously defended Kyiv and Odesa, and that mobilization of men aged 18 to 59 is now general. It is also repeated that ammunition requests have become urgent. For this view, the picture depicts an agony, not a counteroffensive.
The debate's demography: 33 million vs 144
Here, figures are put on the table. According to the data used, about 8 million Ukrainians left for European countries after the large-scale invasion, and around 2 million went to Russia. The original population was 43 million; the current estimate within the country hovers around 33 million. Russia maintains 144 million inhabitants.
The ratio calculation is fiercely debated. Some claim Russia triples Ukraine's population, while others correct it upward to six times, a correction rebutted by noting that 144 divided by 33 is not six. For this view, the exact figure matters less than its consequence: no war of attrition is won with fewer people on one's side. The bet thrown into the mix—€100,000, raised to €200,000, that Ukraine wins—shows how much this is a clash of positions.
Russian oil returns to Europe as Indian diesel
The economic front appears sooner rather than later. It is argued that Russia sells crude at a discount and that refineries in India and China are making a fortune selling diesel made from that crude to Europe. The result, for those defending this thesis: Russian revenues from oil and derivatives plummet, fuels continue arriving without shortage risks, and a barrel of diesel is paid at a price deemed decent amidst the disaster.
The distribution of profits is also debated. For some, China is the absolute winner; India would be a lesser beneficiary; Russia does not win, it survives. Meanwhile, Europe pays more for the same and tries to balance a plan that sought to strangle the seller without running out of gasoline.
Bakhmut, empty arsenals, and the ten-year scenario
For part of the analysis, the war was decided in Bakhmut: since then, neither the Ukrainian offensive nor its allies have regained the initiative. Opposed are the data the other side considers decisive: Russia manufacturing military equipment at full capacity, deals with Turkey for drone purchases, understandings with China, and an economy said to be restructuring towards autarky. Hence the forecast, attributed to a participant, that the conflict will last ten years without excessive wear.
It is useless, they argue, that each cycle brings a new weapon. First HIMARS, then Western tanks, now talk of F-16s. The question posed is why there isn't the same insistence on Western attack helicopters. And above all: NATO arsenals are exhausted, according to statements from the organization itself, while allied countries are criticized for sending armament in dribs and drabs.
Predictions that did not come true
Because none of the initial predictions have fully come true. It was announced that Russia had fuel for three days, that it would run out of missiles, that its soldiers would fight in sneakers. According to those holding this view, none of that peine, and the debunking has undermined the credibility of much of the early narrative.
Conversely, some warn against confusing resistance with victory. Others recall that the real goal for some actors is not for Ukraine to win, but for the military industry to reactivate and European markets to change suppliers. When business mixes with strategy, the question of whether Ukraine has lost the war answers itself.
In the thread, it is taken for granted that refugees do not return and those who went to Russia do not count. From this, it is concluded that a displaced population of that magnitude is not replenished in a generation, so the accounts of who wins will continue to be made over a smaller map. There, the analysis stalls: no figure brings anyone home.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
Read the full discussion (125 replies).