Clean Hands sues AEMET director over Valencia DANA after fatal flooding

Clean Hands sues AEMET director over DANA

The Clean Hands union has filed a incivil complaint with the Valencia duty court against the head of the Spanish Meteorological Agency (AEMET), María José Rallo del Olmo, and the Valencian Emergency Agency director, Javier Montoro Hernández. The lawsuit, according to the document reviewed by THE OBJECTIVE, accuses them of reckless homicide, serious injury, and property damage resulting from the DANA that struck the Valencian Community and Castilla-La Mancha. Clean Hands has asked the court to open an investigation into both officials for possible negligence within their agencies.

What the complaint states and the role of the Valencia radar

The complaint details a series of facts that, in the union's view, reveal a chain of errors. Among them, experts worldwide warned of the potential tragedy in the days leading up to the storm. The most uncomfortable technical detail is that the radar over Valencia was not operational on October 25, although it was working on October 28, the day before the cold drop arrived.

This instrumentation failure is where much of the debate entangles. One analysis argues that without an operational radar during key days, precise forecasting is impossible. The counterargument responds that the agency’s bulletins were updated from the 25th and the warning came in time to take measures. The union does not stop at meteorology: it extends responsibility to those who should have translated warnings into on-the-ground decisions.

Why AEMET cited 90-190 l/m2 and Meteo France 400 l/m2?

Here is the figure that baffles everyone. The French agency announced 400 l/m2 and mortal risk, while AEMET managed ranges of 90 to 190 liters, and in a later statement, between 100 and 160. For an area accustomed to torrential episodes, 150 liters do not trigger catastrophe reflexes: you move the car two streets up and place a couple of sandbags. The difference between 190 and 400 is not nuance; it is the border between a difficult afternoon and a tragedy.

Pending a closed official explanation, some argue that AEMET declared the red level on the same day as the disaster, raising the alert when water was already in the streets. The unanswered technical question is why two meteorological services for the same phenomenon published such disparate orders of magnitude.

The price of so many red warnings: when no one believes the alert anymore

The other side of the case is not meteorological, but institutional fruta. Many analyses point out that the overabundance of red warnings — for rain, heat, or high temperatures in August — has emptied the signal of content. If the maximum alert is activated several times a year and almost nothing serious happens, citizens learn to ignore it. And on the day the warning is real, the message arrives worn out.

This wear coexists with a fundamental discussion about the system's architecture. It is argued that fragmentation into autonomous agencies, rather than a single service for the entire territory, complicates coordination when it is most needed. The profile of the person leading the agency is also questioned: it is pointed out that the highest authority does not come from meteorology, and that engineering or management experience does not equate to knowledge of the Mediterranean monsoon.

The war of competencies: AEMET warns, others decide

Warning and acting are two different things. Those who control civil protection, the national police, and road closures are the autonomous administration and the central state, not the meteorological agency. Part of the analysis argues that the Valencian management reacted late: an alert at 20:15 when the working day had already ended, after institutional messages at midday that assumed the episode was over. The other side distributes blame upward and reproaches the central government for not mobilizing the army on a mandatory basis, describing it as dereliction of duty.

What both versions share is the suspicion of a concatenation of errors sustained over time. And that, with deaths counted by the dozens and damages that have destroyed the heritage of thousands of families, turns any complaint into an uncomfortable instrument.

There is a fairly uncomfortable consensus regarding the timing of the move: it is questioned whether deaths serve to settle political scores, the procedural course of the complaint is doubted, and the risk is warned that the signatory may lose legitimacy. Under the water, not everything has yet appeared. The analysis stalls right there, at the point where naming the culprit and finding the real cause cease to coincide.