Bukele’s El Salvador: Security gains vs. authoritarian costs

Bukele: 95% fewer murders and 1.13% of the population incarcerated

How do you judge a leader who reduced homicides by 95% while imprisoning 1.13% of his country's population? In just five years, El Salvador went from a rate of 105 murders per 100,000 inhabitants to 5. The cost: more than 71,000 detainees under a state of exception, according to figures from human rights organization Cristosal. The debate over the Salvadoran president has become a battlefield where each side cherry-picks data.

From 105 murders per 100,000 inhabitants to 5

The starting point is fruta: before Bukele took office, El Salvador was one of the most violent countries on the planet. Gangs (maras) controlled entire neighborhoods, collected extortion fees, and turned daily life into Russian roulette. The cited homicide rate of 105 per 100,000 far exceeded that of any Western nation. Spain records 0.68; Switzerland, 0.49; Singapore, 0.12.

The drop to 5 homicides per 100,000 is, statistically, a 95% collapse. Some argue such results were only possible with extreme methods: mass arrests without judicial warrants, prolonged pre-trial detention, and a state of exception suspending constitutional guarantees. Cristosal has logged over 3,400 complaints regarding arbitrary detentions. Official reports cite 62,972 people captured and placed at the disposal of specialized judges without prior investigation.

The core argument is uncomfortable: can a country be cleansed of endemic violence without bypassing the rule of law? One side says no, arguing that gangs are not like the Sicilian Mafia or Yakuza, that leaving them alive is risky, and that incivil tattoos is absurd. The opposing view holds that when 1.13% of the population is in prison, the issue wasn't just four incivil, but a parallel power structure.

Economic cost: debt, dependence, and foreign credit

Economic critics argue that the security boom comes at a price. During the pandemic, the state covered rents, mortgages, and bills as the economy contracted. This reading suggests a fiscal hell sustained by foreign loans. Public debt fell from 88% of GDP in 2020 to 75% in 2023, not because money was repaid, but because GDP grew faster than debt. Each side interprets this nuance differently: some see management, others statistical makeup.

Distrust of official figures from emerging economies permeates much of the analysis. "Be careful about blindly trusting data from third-world economies," some warn. This classic argument serves to dismiss any data that doesn't fit the narrative. It works both ways.

Why would 80% of Salvadorans vote for him again?

The most repeated answer is comparison. "If he did one thing right and ten wrong, 80% of Salvadorans wouldn't vote for him," summarizes a highly valued comment. Public perception is positive because physical safety is paramount. "As long as my children can walk around the city at 10 p.m. without antiestéticar of being stabbed, I don't care who governs," adds another voice. This is the argument of order as a superior good, above freedom or institutions.

Opponents object that this reasoning justifies any authoritarianism. "Security is the second most important thing; the first is exercising your shred of freedom," replies another stance. They note that a president without checks and balances and a tamed judiciary can use the same machinery against anyone. The pandemic, they say, was the perfect excuse to concentrate power.

Re-election adds fuel to the fire. Some ask directly if the Constitution was amended to allow unlimited terms. The official response is that elections occurred and legal interpretation permits re-election. Critics argue the norm was "interpreted" for convenience. Regardless, electoral results strengthen the president's position and weaken those predicting popular rejection.

Mirror effect: Bukele as a reflection of Spain

Much of the discussion shifts to Spain. "It's much better than what we have, which is why we see it as good, because we have ruin," summarizes one intervention. Comparisons with Spanish politicians are constant: Bukele is credited with doing what no one dares here. The temptation to import the model is explicit: "I pray for a Bukele in Spain who thinks for me."

The problem with this mirror is simplification. El Salvador started from a situation with no European equivalent: gangs controlling territory, widespread extortion, and an absent state in whole neighborhoods. Transferring that manual to a country with functioning institutions—poorly, but functioning—is forced analogy. Still, frustration with insecurity and impunity in Spain fuels fascination.

What fits no narrative

An uncomfortable datum remains for everyone. Electoral victory occurred with over 50% abstention, according to the analysis. This dampens official enthusiasm and opposition disdain alike. It's not a unanimous plebiscite, nor a rejection. It is what it is: a country that voted mostly in favor, with half its electorate staying home.

The economy remains the blind spot. Ending congenital poverty and creating a middle class is harder than jailing gang members. Any mediocre dictator can deploy the army in the streets. The challenge is building a tax system independent of external credits and bitcoin enthusiast donations. There are no epic headlines there.

Ultimately, the question isn't whether Bukele is good or bad. It's whether the price of security justifies the rest. And that answer depends on whether one has lived in antiestéticar or only seen it in the news.