TheEconomist: Diagnosticando la Depresión: diferencias entre recesión y depresión.

Fraga II

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Parriba con los LD boys :D



Pedro Schwartz - La gran depresión - Ideas



ECONOMÍA
La gran depresión
Por Pedro Schwartz







Cunde el temor de que la crisis por la que estamos pasando sea una repetición de la Gran Depresión de la década de 1930. ¿Qué ocurrió verdaderamente en aquellos años? ¿Nos amenaza una catástrofe semejante? ¿Se cometieron entonces errores hoy evitables?






Las preguntas se agolpan angustiosamente. No es posible contestarlas en un breve artículo, ni quizá encontremos jamás una respuesta satisfactoria y definitiva. Sí creo, sin embargo, que vale la pena presentar un esbozo de los hechos e intentar una respuesta provisional a tanto interrogante.

Empezaré por los desplomes de la bolsa, la producción y el paro, que es lo que sobre todo recordamos de aquellos terribles años. La economía americana había empezado a dar señales de enfriamiento en junio de 1929, aunque el índice Dow Jones siguió subiendo, hasta alcanzar –el 3 de septiembre– un máximo de 381. Poco duró la alegría de los inversores. En el Martes oscuro (29 de octubre), el índice cayó de 261 a 230. Siguió el desplome, y así, en primavera del 33 el Dow Jones bajó hasta los 50 puntos. Sin embargo, a finales de este último año la bolsa pareció reanimarse, y el Dow volvió a alcanzar los 190 puntos. Pero ¡qué poco dura la alegría en la casa del pobre! El 27 de agosto de 1937 fue otro martes oscuro, y la bolsa volvió a caer, hasta llegar al perversos 120 de enero del 38.

Hay que aceptar la evidencia: los diez años de crisis bursátil no acabaron hasta que comenzó el rearme previo a la guerra mundial.

La economía real mostró el mismo desmayo. En 1933 la producción de EEUU había caído nada menos que un 30% respecto del nivel anterior a la crisis. Lentamente fue subiendo el PIB durante los tres años siguientes, pero en 1937 sobrevino otra recesión. Hubo que esperar a 1940 para sobrepasar el nivel de once años atrás: el rearme para esa guerra que se haría mundial tras el ataque japonés a Pearl Harbor fue lo que verdaderamente volvió a poner en marcha la economía estadounidense.





Las cifras de desempleo revelan la tragedia humana de la Gran Depresión. En julio de 1927 el paro era mínimo, del 3,3%. Todo cambió tras el primer viernes oscuro: el desempleo alcanzó a un quinto de la población activa de los Estados Unidos. En noviembre del 34 la proporción de parados había aumentado hasta el 23%. Hubo breves momentos durante las presidencias de Roosevelt en que sólo el 9% se encontraba en el desempleo, pero, por término medio, durante todo ese decenio la proporción de parados se mantuvo en el 15%.

Aunque estos datos son conocidos, no han penetrado del todo en la memoria colectiva, pues suele hablarse de tres años de Gran Depresión en EEUU, los que van de 1929 a 1933, cuando en realidad fueron diez. Aún menos cierta es la leyenda de que Roosevelt transformó la situación en 1933 gracias a una política activa de intervención pública inspirada en las ideas de Keynes, cuya Teoría general sólo se publicó en 1936. Para EEUU, la década de 1930 fue, toda ella, una década perdida.

Ahora veamos las posibles causas de tanta tribulación. Las economías capitalistas son cíclicas desde tiempo inmemorial: en vez de comportarse sus principales variables como lo hacen los amortiguadores de un vehículo, que, compensándose, mantienen un cierto equilibrio, todas se mueven en el mismo sentido. Si durante una recesión caen los precios, debería aumentar la demanda de los consumidores; si se reducen los tipos de interés, lo normal sería que creciera la inversión; si se produce un gran aumento del paro, debería seguirse una caída de los salarios que animara a las empresas a contratar más mano de obra. Muy al contrario, todo se mueve en una infernal armonía.

La explicación más corriente de tan desagradable correlación suele ser que falta confianza y que todo se arregla restaurándola. Pero tal explicación no explica nada: ¿por qué ha caído la confianza en primer lugar? Hay razones más profundas. Nuevas ideas, nuevos avances tecnológicos desbancan las viejas formas de producir, que por obsoletas y caras tienen que desaparecer, y los que viven de ellas se resisten a ceder. La destrucción creadora será aún más cruel si una política crediticia laxa ha fomentado inversiones equivocadas. En 1927 había culminado en EEUU un extraordinario ciclo de innovación. Era normal una pequeña recesión. La desgracia es que durante unos meses casi despareció el dinero.






Fueron Milton Friedman y Anna Schwartz quienes, en Historia monetaria de EEUU (1963), destacaron un hecho crucial: a lo largo de once meses de 1931-32, la quiebra de cientos de bancos hizo que la cantidad de dinero en la economía americana se redujera un 26%. ¿Se imaginan el efecto sobre el mercado si, por quiebras encadenadas de bancos, desaparece un cuarto de los depósitos? Un grave fallo del banquero central permitió esa implosión monetaria. A ello se añadió que en 1933 Roosevelt, durante sus primeros cien días de presidente, declaró unas vacaciones bancarias que dejaron la economía sin más dinero que unos pocos billetes de dólar.

La mención de Roosevelt no es a humo de caricias. Él inventó ese truco mediático de los cien días, como si en ese tiempo pudiera hacerse algo serio y meditado para corregir el rumbo de una sociedad inmensa. "¡Hay que hacer algo!", es el grito de los desorientados. "¡Sólo hay que temer el miedo!", fue la contestación de un frívolo presidente.

Durante sus dos mandatos previos a la II Guerra Mundial, Roosevelt volcó sobre el país una lluvia de medidas, la mayor parte de ellas para subvertir más que encauzar el sistema de libertad económica. Amity Schlaes ha publicado hace poco un apasionante relato de la Depresión vista desde abajo, con el título The Forgotten Man. La lista de medidas equivocadas o discutibles es interminable. Durante esos cien días, además de las fatídicas vacaciones bancarias, lanzó una inmensa obra pública, el sistema eléctrico del valle de Tennessee, que creó efímeros puestos de trabajo a costa de semi-nacionalizar la energía; con la National Industry Recovery Act montó un sistema asfixiante de planificación de la industria y de regulación de las condiciones del trabajo; e inmediatamente después fundó el Consejo del Trabajo Nacional, cuyo objeto era imponer la negociación colectiva.

Por ese camino siguió. Al firmar la Ley Nacional de Vivienda, en 1934, intervino en el mercado hipotecario. En 1935 fueron la Ley Wagner, con la que fomentó la sindicación obligatoria, la creación de pensiones públicas y los nuevos impuestos progresivos, que castigaban la reinversión de beneficios en la propia empresa. También persiguió y encarceló a millonarios, y consiguió romper la resistencia del Tribunal Supremo a sus medidas extra-constitucionales con la amenaza de colocar magistrados adeptos. Hubo medidas que no fueron malas del todo, como la ley que le permitía firmar tratados de comercio bilaterales, para paliar el duro proteccionismo del arancel impuesto por el anterior presidente, que tanto daño estaba haciendo a EEUU y al mundo entero.

No sigo. Si todas esas medidas que considero criticables les parecen bien a mis queridos lectores, es que están maduros para apoyar las que, en ese mismo sentido intervencionista, vaya a tomar Barak Obama.













^^ Pensé que echarían más pestes de Keynes.
 

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^^ Me encanta lo fácil que es destapar las MENTIRAS DE LOS LIBERALES:

Libertad Fecal dijo:
[...]

Hay que aceptar la evidencia: los diez años de crisis bursátil no acabaron hasta que comenzó el rearme previo a la guerra mundial.

La economía real mostró el mismo desmayo. En 1933 la producción de EEUU había caído nada menos que un 30% respecto del nivel anterior a la crisis. Lentamente (10% anual es lento??) fue subiendo el PIB durante los tres años siguientes, pero en 1937 sobrevino otra recesión. Hubo que esperar a 1940 para sobrepasar el nivel de once años atrás: el rearme para esa guerra que se haría mundial tras el ataque japonés a Pearl Harbor fue lo que verdaderamente volvió a poner en marcha la economía estadounidense.

[...]

Aunque estos datos son conocidos, no han penetrado del todo en la memoria colectiva, pues suele hablarse de tres años de Gran Depresión en EEUU, los que van de 1929 a 1933, cuando en realidad fueron diez. Aún menos cierta es la leyenda de que Roosevelt transformó la situación en 1933 gracias a una política activa de intervención pública inspirada en las ideas de Keynes, cuya Teoría general sólo se publicó en 1936. Para EEUU, la década de 1930 fue, toda ella, una década perdida.

[...]
En este mismo hilo ya hemos puesto en evidencia estas mentiras:


A partir de 1933 el PIB se vuelve a disparar... alcanzando tasas de hasta el 10% anual.



LIBERALES MENTIROSOS!!
 

Fraga II

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Libertad Fecal, me ha matao x'DDDDDD No deja de ser 'curioso' cómo rajan contra Roosvelt, y de paso tratan de extrapolar su figura y "legado desastre" (sic) a Barack "Doomsday" Obama. Echo de menos que por esos lares hablen de la responsabilidad de Hoover ó Coolidge en el marrón que le tocó enderezar a Roosvelt :rolleyes:
 

Fraga II

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A global depression, or hopes of recovery?


A global depression, or hopes of recovery?



A panel of the country's top fund managers from Shroders, F&C, Neptune, Eclectica and Jupiter give advice to investors





Investors could be forgiven for feeling confused: authorities around the world warned last week that the economic downturn was deepening, while some stockmarket indicators suggested the first green shoots of recovery.

Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, said Britain faced its deepest and most painful economic slide since the second world war — bad news for savers as interest rates are likely to approach zero.

However, stock markets tend to trough before recessions reach their nadir, and there are some reasons for cautious optimism. The Baltic Dry index, which measures the cost of shipping raw materials and is seen as a bellwether for the global economy, has doubled over the past three months after crashing 94% in the second half of last year. Copper and timber prices are also edging up.

There are also tentative signs the credit freeze is easing, with companies issuing $246 billion (£173 billion) of debt in January — the most since the crisis started.

In Britain, house prices rose 1.9% in January and retail sales were surprisingly strong. While many analysts dismissed this as a blip, others say it indicates interest-rate cuts are having the desired effect.

So what are investors to make of these conflicting signals? We invited some top fund managers to The Sunday Times to discuss the outlook.

Kathryn Cooper, Money editor: When we held our last roundtable in the autumn, the US government had just bailed out the country’s mortgage market to the tune of $200 billion. Since then, the UK and the US have had to pump in billions more. Are you still bullish?

Andy Brough, Schroders: What’s changed since then is that interest rates are down to 1%, and investors are going to have to look for somewhere to get a return. Gordon Brown is going to be issuing gilts like crazy to pay for the bank bailouts, which should ultimately make them an unappealing investment. I wouldn’t imagine investors would be prepared to go back into property either. That leaves shares.

In my area of smaller companies, you will get a positive return this year. There will be disappointments, but overall I think companies aren’t in bad shape.

You could see economic growth turning positive as early as the third quarter. Disposable income is going to be up 3%, against 1.5% the previous year and flat in 2007. And all this money pumped into the economy has to come out somewhere.

Julie Dent, F&C: I’d say I was cautiously optimistic. The people who borrowed on their houses to buy 10 buy-to-let flats in Manchester face a tough time, but they are not the majority. Most people are better off — mortgages are down, energy costs are falling. The banks probably need to do more, but the stock market will discount a recovery before it is seen in the real economy.

Felix Wintle, Neptune: I am keen on the US relative to the UK and Europe. It is a more flexible economy. If you need to take action by cutting jobs because your earnings have fallen, you can do that. In Europe, you are restricted by labour laws. The US will lead the rest of world out of recession because it has taken pre-emptive action on cutting rates; it is a good nine or ten months ahead.

Hugh Hendry, Eclectica: Come on, guys, wake up! The problem is everyone here has to sell financial products and as soon as you say you are pessimistic, or bearish, or God forbid you say sell, someone from the hierarchy comes down and tells you to shut up.

On the US — okay you have flexibility, you can cut costs. But you are firing your consumers, so it becomes a vicious circle.

Brough: Recessions have happened before and we’ve come out of them.

Hendry: Yes, this has happened before, it was called the Great Depression. The market fell 12% the first year, 29% the second, 45% the third and 15% the next year.

KC: So go out on a limb for us, Hugh, how long will it take to recover?

Hendry: It is all a fun.ction of society’s willingness to take risks and the best metaphor for that is debt. In the 1920s, our predecessors became, like us, addicted to debt. They took on debt three times the size of US gross domestic product (GDP). And then the crash happened and people regretted it.

The process that began in 1929 and ended with the bankruptcy of the US financial system in 1933 wasn’t resolved until 1974, when debt was one times GDP and we had all changed our behaviour. You couldn’t get a mortgage — or you could but it would take nine months. The market didn’t get back to its peak in real terms until 1949. When an economy deleverages (pays of its debts), it takes a long time and it can be deeply damaging. Japan demonstrates that. I would say 10 years is a nice start. Bear in mind this began 10 years ago, another 10 would take us to 20, and then add on another 10. That would be in real terms.



BONDS


KC: You mention Japan, and bonds have been a great investment during their bear market. Does the same hold true here?

Ariel Bezalel, Jupiter: Yes. Confidence in the system has been obliterated and that’s why the government is having to lower interest rates, which is good for bonds (bond prices tend to rise when rates fall as they pay a fixed income, which is more attractive when rates are low). Without doubt, though, default rates on higher-yielding corporate bonds are going to pick up, quite possibly to double-digit territory from 4% now.

KC: Are you as positive on government bonds?

Bezalel: There is a bit of a tug of war right now in government bonds. There are the deflationists like Hugh, who think they will continue to do well as rates come down further, and there are those who antiestéticar huge amounts of issuance in future.


INFLATION’S RETURN



Brough: I think inflation is more likely to be a problem than deflation. An increase in disposable income will first be used to rebuild savings but ultimately lead to an increase in spending. House prices went up in January; it could be the first sign.


Hendry:
We have the rest of our lives to worry about inflation. You have no concept of how weak places such as Taiwan, Korea and Thailand will become. Japanese exports are collapsing (down 15 per cent on an annualised basis in the previous quarter).

And yet I can go into Germany and buy German 30-year at 4.5%, almost 5%.

Brough:
Which do you think will be the first country to leave the euro?

Bezalel: The markets are saying who the prime suspects are — the Irish, the Spanish, the Portuguese.

Brough: I think it will be Germany.

Hendry: Well, they should come out. I would if I was Germany. That’s why you should short German credit. I am long their bonds (buying in the expectation that they go up) but also long credit default swaps (which rise when the risk of default rises) because you have to antiestéticar that Germany will bale out the Pigs.



BANKS


KC: Are you short UK banks, Hugh?

Hendry: There isn’t a positive price where you would lose money shorting British banks. They are insolvent.

And we are at a point where the euro probably doesn’t persist. If it does, it requires inflation in the Pigs (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) to fall between 10% or 20% in the next five years.


The paradox is we have this left of centre party behaving like investment bankers and doing everything conceivable to preserve an obfuscation — the notion that the banks are viable entities, but they are not. The government should have secured 100% ownership, then it could have done whatever it wanted, but we have this pretence that they are a going concern — that’s why we have this debate over bonuses.

Brough:
I disagree with Hugh; I don’t think all banks are bust. In the next three years, on analysts forecast the new Lloyds (which I own) is going to generate a total of £50 billion of pre-provision profits; that means it can absorb a lot of write-offs.

Dent: There was a solution in Japan — it took quite a long time, it took 10 years to repay the debt, but there are still banks in Japan. Nationalisation is one option, but I am not convinced it is the only option.


Hendry: Japan just shows you how tough it is going to be — bonds in Japan have made you 7% a year over the bear market, but every time equities rose investors sold bonds and bought shares and allocated away from what would have made money.

Dent: During the bear market in Japan, there have been companies you would have made a lot of money on — Nintendo, Toyota and Kao Corporation. They are the big global companies and I would similarly recommend big UK blue chips now.


WHAT TO BUY


KC: So where should ordinary investors put their money?

Hendry: I am not a buyer of gold just now — I want to buy it at lower levels. The rest of my portfolio I would split between the US, Japanese and European government bonds. The rest might just be cash, with some in yen because no-one else is buying.

Dent: But what about Mr and Mrs Jones, retired of Edinburgh, who have lost money on RBS and HBOS shares. They have £50,000 in cash, what are they going to do now? They are getting 1%.

Hendry: What I would do is lend to the UK government — buy 18-year gilts and get the 4%, and I think I will be 40% up in the next 12 to 18 months.

Dent: Because you think we are heading for serious deflation? If you’re wrong and inflation and interest rates head up again, there is a big risk to your capital. I like the idea of having a portfolio of decent dividend-paying cash-rich companies.

The likes of Glaxo Smith Kline, Vodafone and BP are yielding 4.7%, 5.7% and 6.4% respectively and I see them remaining strong. But buy blue chips on a bad day.

KC: And what about for the optimists out there. What would you buy if you want out and out growth rather than income?

Dent: I am big supporter of what is going on in China in the long term.

Hendry: You were there in Japan — tell me China doesn’t seem the same.

Dent: Japan is a developed economy, whereas China is in the early stages of an industrial revolution. Central control is key at this stage.

Hendry: The two big shocks this year in terms of expectation — in other words, my two big shorts — are going to be China and (president Barack) Obama. About 40% of the Chinese economy is exports. They are having an industrial revolution like the Victorians — and the Victorians had booms and busts because of the volatility of the cost of building factories. In booms it grows 40%; but with boom comes bust. Then you get Obama coming in and the policy response is remarkably aggressive against the Chinese.

Wintle: There are indeed very high expectations, but I think the bull case for Obama is a very strong one. Compared with Bush, it really is a 180-degree turn in terms of him being more collaborative.

My favourite sector at the moment is healthcare, where many businesses are still showing earnings growth. This is especially attractive now as earnings stability, let alone growth, is hard to find in today’s market.

Our favourite sub-sector in healthcare is biotechnology, which has been remarkably defensive over the past 12 to 18 months.
 
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Salut

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j0j0j0 lo de los PIGS ha calado bien hondo xD

And we are at a point where the euro probably doesn’t persist. If it does, it requires inflation in the Pigs (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain) to fall between 10% or 20% in the next five years.
^^ Creo que Fraga debería haber marcado también el "TO FALL"...

Es decir, para que sobreviva el Euro, la inflación de los PIGS debe caer sensiblemente... a mi más bien me parece una consecuencia: si los PIGS devuelven su deuda, se reduce la masa monetaria en sus paises.
 
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Fraga II

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Mirad este artículo de Krugman, a mí me ha dejado ojicuadrado al ver cómo él -keynesiano se supone- también se pone a hablar de la II Guerra Mundial como la 'salvadora' de la economía norteamericana, gracias a la cual EE.UU. salió de la depresión, además de sentar las bases del gran boom de la postguerra. Me sorprende, no sé si dice eso porque realmente así lo cree él, o si bien lo hace a fin de enfatizar, de hacer más evidente la necesidad de un plan de estímulo más ambicioso, que vaya más allá de "4 chapuzas", cosa que no me sorprendería. En no pocos artículos ha criticado a la clase politicastra americana por su "moderación" con el plan de estímulo.








http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/opinion/16krugman.html?_r=2





Op-Ed Columnist
Decade at Bernie’s

By PAUL KRUGMAN
Published: February 15, 2009





By now everyone knows the sad tale of Bernard Madoff’s duped investors. They looked at their statements and thought they were rich. But then, one day, they discovered to their horror that their supposed wealth was a figment of someone else’s imagination.

Unfortunately, that’s a pretty good metaphor for what happened to America as a whole in the first decade of the 21st century.

Last week the Federal Reserve released the results of the latest Survey of Consumer Finances, a triennial report on the assets and liabilities of American households. The bottom line is that there has been basically no wealth creation at all since the turn of the millennium: the net worth of the average American household, adjusted for inflation, is lower now than it wasin 2001.

At one level this should come as no surprise. For most of the last decade America was a nation of borrowers and spenders, not savers. The personal savings rate dropped from 9 percent in the 1980s to 5 percent in the 1990s, to just 0.6 percent from 2005 to 2007, and household debt grew much faster than personal income. Why should we have expected our net worth to go up?

Yet until very recently Americans believed they were getting richer, because they received statements saying that their houses and stock portfolios were appreciating in value faster than their debts were increasing. And if the belief of many Americans that they could count on capital gains forever sounds naïve, it’s worth remembering just how many influential voices — notably in right-leaning publications like The Wall Street Journal, Forbes and National Review — promoted that belief, and ridiculed those who worried about low savings and high levels of debt.

Then reality struck, and it turned out that the worriers had been right all along. The surge in asset values had been an illusion — but the surge in debt had been all too real.

So now we’re in trouble — deeper trouble, I think, than most people realize even now. And I’m not just talking about the dwindling band of forecasterswho still insist that the economy will snap back any day now.

For this is a broad-based mess. Everyone talks about the problems of the banks, which are indeed in even worse shape than the rest of the system. But the banks aren’t the only players with too much debt and too few assets; the same desc.ription applies to the private sector as a whole.

And as the great American economist Irving Fisher pointed out in the 1930s, the things people and companies do when they realizethey have too much debt tend to be self-defeating when everyone tries to do them at the same time. Attempts to sell assets and pay off debt deepen the plunge in asset prices, further reducing net worth. Attempts to save more translate into a collapse of consumer demand, deepening the economic slump.



Are policy makers ready to do what it takes to break this vicious circle? In principle, yes. Government officials understand the issue: we need to “contain what is a very damaging and potentially deflationary spiral,” says Lawrence Summers, a top Obama economic adviser.

In practice, however, the policies currently on offer don’t look adequate to the challenge. The fiscal stimulus plan, while it will certainly help, probably won’t do more than mitigate the economic side effects of debt deflation. And the much-awaited announcement of the bank rescue plan left everyone confused rather than reassured.

There’s hope that the bank rescue will eventually turn into something stronger. It has been interesting to watch the idea of temporary bank nationalization move from the fringe to mainstream acceptance, with even Republicans like Senator Lindsey Graham conceding that it may be necessary. But even if we eventually do what’s needed on the bank front, that will solve only part of the problem.

If you want to see what it really takes to boot the economy out of a debt trap, look at the large public works program, otherwise known as World War II, that ended the Great Depression. The war didn’t just lead to full employment. It also led to rapidly rising incomes and substantial inflation, all with virtually no borrowing by the private sector. By 1945 the government’s debt had soared, but the ratio of private-sector debt to G.D.P. was only half what it had been in 1940. And this low level of private debt helped set the stage for the great postwar boom.

Since nothing like that is on the table, or seems likely to get on the table any time soon, it will take years for families and firms to work off the debt they ran up so blithely. The odds are that the legacy of our time of illusion — our decade at Bernie’s — will be a long, painful slump.

























Otro articulillo:



How Government Prolonged the Depression - WSJ.com



How Government Prolonged the Depression


Policies that decreased competition in product and labor markets were especially destructive.


By HAROLD L. COLE and LEE E. OHANIAN





The New Deal is widely perceived to have ended the Great Depression, and this has led many to support a "new" New Deal to address the current crisis. But the facts do not support the perception that FDR's policies shortened the Depression, or that similar policies will pull our nation out of its current economic downturn



The goal of the New Deal was to get Americans back to work. But the New Deal didn't restore employment. In fact, there was even less work on average during the New Deal than before FDR took office. Total hours worked per adult, including government employees, were 18% below their 1929 level between 1930-32, but were 23% lower on average during the New Deal (1933-39). Private hours worked were even lower after FDR took office, averaging 27% below their 1929 level, compared to 18% lower between in 1930-32.

Even comparing hours worked at the end of 1930s to those at the beginning of FDR's presidency doesn't paint a picture of recovery. Total hours worked per adult in 1939 remained about 21% below their 1929 level, compared to a decline of 27% in 1933. And it wasn't just work that remained scarce during the New Deal. Per capita consumption did not recover at all, remaining 25% below its trend level throughout the New Deal, and per-capita nonresidential investment averaged about 60% below trend. The Great Depression clearly continued long after FDR took office.

Why wasn't the Depression amowed by a vigorous recovery, like every other cycle? It should have been. The economic fundamentals that drive all expansions were very favorable during the New Deal. Productivity grew very rapidly after 1933, the price level was stable, real interest rates were low, and liquidity was plentiful. We have calculated on the basis of just productivity growth that employment and investment should have been back to normal levels by 1936. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas and Leonard Rapping calculated on the basis of just expansionary Federal Reserve policy that the economy should have been back to normal by 1935.


So what stopped a blockbuster recovery from ever starting? The New Deal. Some New Deal policies certainly benefited the economy by establishing a basic social safety net through Social Security and unemployment benefits, and by stabilizing the financial system through deposit insurance and the Securities Exchange Commission. But others violated the most basic economic principles by suppressing competition, and setting prices and wages in many sectors well above their normal levels. All told, these antimarket policies choked off powerful recovery forces that would have plausibly returned the economy back to trend by the mid-1930s.


The most damaging policies were those at the heart of the recovery plan, including The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which tossed aside the nation's antitrust acts and permitted industries to collusively raise prices provided that they shared their newfound monopoly rents with workers by substantially raising wages well above underlying productivity growth. The NIRA covered over 500 industries, ranging from autos and steel, to ladies hosiery and poultry production. Each industry created a code of "fair competition" which spelled out what producers could and could not do, and which were designed to eliminate "excessive competition" that FDR believed to be the source of the Depression.

These codes distorted the economy by artificially raising wages and prices, restricting output, and reducing productive capacity by placing quotas on industry investment in new plants and equipment. amowing government approval of each industry code, industry prices and wages increased substantially, while prices and wages in sectors that weren't covered by the NIRA, such as agriculture, did not. We have calculated that manufacturing wages were as much as 25% above the level that would have prevailed without the New Deal. And while the artificially high wages created by the NIRA benefited the few that were fortunate to have a job in those industries, they significantly depressed production and employment, as the growth in wage costs far exceeded productivity growth.

These policies continued even after the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935. There was no antitrust activity after the NIRA, despite overwhelming FTC evidence of price-fixing and production limits in many industries, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 gave unions substantial collective-bargaining power. While not permitted under federal law, the sit-down strike, in which workers were occupied factories and shut down production, was tolerated by governors in a number of states and was used with great success against major employers, including General Motors in 1937.

The downturn of 1937-38 was preceded by large wage hikes that pushed wages well above their NIRA levels, amowing the Supreme Court's 1937 decision that upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. These wage hikes led to further job loss, particularly in manufacturing. The "recession in a depression" thus was not the result of a reversal of New Deal policies, as argued by some, but rather a deepening of New Deal polices that raised wages even further above their competitive levels, and which further prevented the normal forces of supply and demand from restoring full employment. Our research indicates that New Deal labor and industrial policies prolonged the Depression by seven years.

By the late 1930s, New Deal policies did begin to reverse, which coincided with the beginning of the recovery. In a 1938 speech, FDR acknowledged that the American economy had become a "concealed cartel system like Europe," which led the Justice Department to reinitiate antitrust prosecution. And union bargaining power was significantly reduced, first by the Supreme Court's ruling that the sit-down strike was illegal, and further reduced during World War II by the National War Labor Board (NWLB), in which large union wage settlements were limited by the NWLB to cost-of-living increases. The wartime economic boom reflected not only the enormous resource drain of military spending, but also the erosion of New Deal labor and industrial

By 1947, through a combination of NWLB wage restrictions and rapid productivity growth, we have calculated that the large gap between manufacturing wages and productivity that emerged during the New Deal had nearly been eliminated. And since that time, wages have never approached the severely distorted levels that prevailed under the New Deal, nor has the country suffered from such abysmally low employment.

The main lesson we have learned from the New Deal is that wholesale government intervention can -- and does -- deliver the most unintended of consequences. This was true in the 1930s, when artificially high wages and prices kept us depressed for more than a decade, it was true in the 1970s when price controls were used to combat inflation but just produced shortages. It is true today, when poorly designed regulation produced a banking system that took on too much risk.

President Barack Obama and Congress have a great opportunity to produce reforms that do return Americans to work, and that provide a foundation for sustained long-run economic growth and the opportunity for all Americans to succeed. These reforms should include very specific plans that update banking regulations and address a manufacturing sector in which several large industries -- including autos and steel -- are no longer internationally competitive. Tax reform that broadens rather than narrows the tax base and that increases incentives to work, save and invest is also needed. We must also confront an educational system that fails many of its constituents. A large fiscal stimulus plan that doesn't directly address the specific impediments that our economy faces is unlikely to achieve either the country's short-term or long-term goals.







Mr. Cole is professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Ohanian is professor of economics and director of the Ettinger Family Program in Macroeconomic Research at UCLA.
 
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Manda narices con esta peña intoxicadora:

This was true in the 1930s, when artificially high wages and prices kept us depressed for more than a decade,
A ver si se meten en la mollera que el New Deal empezó a aplicarse a partir de 1933, y que fue entonces que se alcanzaron crecimientos de dos dígitos.

¿Que tal vez alguna parte del programa estuviera mal aplicada? ¿Que tal vez se pasaron de bestias con las subidas de salarios? ¿Que de no aplicarse se podría haber llegado a niveles de 1929 en 1936 en vez de 1937? Pues segurísimo... nadie es perfecto en este mundo!

Pero de allí a echarle la culpa a Roosvelt de "toda una década de depresión"... ¡¡¡por favor!!! Si durante los 4 primeros años (los más duros) ni siquiera gobernaba!!!!!!!!
 

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RECESION: tu pareja te pide pasta para un capricho superfluo pero como ya te conoces el cuento, te presiona con el sesso y vuelves a CEDER, RECEDES.

DEPRESION: cuando te quedas sin pasta para CEDER a sus caprichos y te deja cual PAGAFANTAS, entras en DEPRESION.
 

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http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliaria/burbuja-inmobiliaria/81944-yuri-09-10-08-5-512-a.html

Me parece que la contaminación con tóxicos no se soluciona echando más agua al rio...

Esto ha sido una medida política, no económica, y claro, los del interbancario han dicho "yunguevo voy soltar yo la gallina para que se la coman las astutas".

Mi única recomendación económica responsable a medio plazo es que estas navidades pongáis cubierto de plástico en las cenas familiares. Y no es porque sea barato.


(El Día de acción de gracias en EE.UU. cruzan el Delaware y apedrean “The White House”)


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The Economist is Watching you. Y les gustan mis coñas. :cool:
 

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The collapse of manufacturing | The Economist



The economy
The collapse of manufacturing


Feb 19th 2009
From The Economist print edition



The financial crisis has created an industrial crisis. What should governments do about it?



$0.00, not counting fuel and handling: that is the cheapest quote right now if you want to ship a container from southern China to Europe. Back in the summer of 2007 the shipper would have charged $1,400. Half-empty freighters are just one sign of a worldwide collapse in manufacturing. In Germany December’s machine-tool orders were 40% lower than a year earlier. Half of China’s 9,000 or so toy exporters have gone bust. Taiwan’s shipments of notebook computers fell by a third in the month of January. The number of cars being assembled in America was 60% below January 2008.

The destructive global power of the financial crisis became clear last year. The immensity of the manufacturing crisis is still sinking in, largely because it is seen in national terms—indeed, often nationalistic ones. In fact manufacturing is also caught up in a global whirlwind.

Industrial production fell in the latest three months by 3.6% and 4.4% respectively in America and Britain (equivalent to annual declines of 13.8% and 16.4%). Some locals blame that on Wall Street and the City. But the collapse is much worse in countries more dependent on manufacturing exports, which have come to rely on consumers in debtor countries. Germany’s industrial production in the fourth quarter fell by 6.8%; Taiwan’s by 21.7%; Japan’s by 12%—which helps to explain why GDP is falling even faster there than it did in the early 1990s (see article). Industrial production is volatile, but the world has not seen a contraction like this since the first oil shock in the 1970s—and even that was not so widespread. Industry is collapsing in eastern Europe, as it is in Brazil, Malaysia and Turkey. Thousands of factories in southern China are now abandoned. Their workers went home to the countryside for the new year in January. Millions never came back (see article).


Factories floored


Having bailed out the financial system, governments are now being called on to save industry, too. Next to scheming bankers, factory workers look positively deserving. Manufacturing is still a big employer and it tends to be a very visible one, concentrated in places like Detroit, Stuttgart and Guangzhou. The failure of a famous manufacturer like General Motors (GM) would be a severe blow to people’s faith in their own prospects when a lack of confidence is already dragging down the economy. So surely it is right to give industry special support?

Despite manufacturing’s woes, the answer is no. There are no painless choices, but industrial aid suffers from two big drawbacks. One is that government programmes, which are slow to design and amend, are too cumbersome to deal with the varied, constantly changing difficulties of the world’s manufacturing industries. Part of the problem has been a drying-up of trade finance. Nobody knows how long that will last. Another part has come as firms have run down their inventories (in China some of these were stockpiles amassed before the Beijing Olympics). The inventory effect should be temporary, but, again, nobody knows how big or lasting it will be.

The other drawback is that sectoral aid does not address the underlying cause of the crisis—a fall in demand, not just for manufactured goods, but for everything. Because there is too much capacity (far too much in the car industry), some businesses must close however much aid the government pumps in. How can governments know which firms to save or the “right” size of any industry? That is for consumers to decide. Giving money to the industries with the loudest voices and cleverest lobbyists would be unjust and wasteful. Shifting demand to the fortunate sector that has won aid from the unfortunate one that has not will only exacerbate the upheaval. One country’s preference for a given industry risks provoking a protectionist backlash abroad and will slow the long-run growth rate at home by locking up resources in inefficient firms.


Nothing to lose but their supply chains


Some say that manufacturing is special, because the rest of the economy depends on it
. In fact, the economy is more like a network in which everything is connected to everything else, and in which every producer is also a consumer. The important distinction is not between manufacturing and services, but between productive and unproductive jobs.

Some manufacturers accept that, but proceed immediately to another argument: that the current crisis is needlessly endangering productive, highly skilled manufacturing jobs. Nowadays each link in the supply chain depends on all the others. Carmakers cite GM’s new Camaro, threatened after a firm that makes moulded-plastic parts went bankrupt. The car industry argues that the loss of GM itself would permanently wreck the North American supply chain (see article). Aid, they say, can save good firms to fight another day.

Although some supply chains have choke points, that is a weak general argument for sectoral aid. As a rule, suppliers with several customers, and customers with several suppliers, should be more resilient than if they were a dependent captive of a large group. The evidence from China is that today’s lack of demand creates the spare capacity that allows customers to find a new supplier quickly if theirs goes out of business. When that is hard, because a parts supplier is highly specialised, say, good management is likely to be more effective than state aid. The best firms monitor their vital suppliers closely and buy parts from more than one source, even if it costs money. In the extreme, firms can support vulnerable suppliers by helping them raise cash or by investing in them.

If sectoral aid is wasteful, why then save the banking system? Not for the sake of the bankers, certainly; nor because state aid will create an efficient financial industry. Even flawed bank rescues and stimulus plans, like the one Barack Obama signed into law this week, are aimed at the roots of the economy’s problems: saving the banks, no matter how undeserving they are, is supposed to keep finance flowing to all firms; fiscal stimulus is supposed to lift demand across the board. As manufacturing collapses, governments should not fiddle with sectoral plans. Their proper task is broader but no less urgent: to get on with spending and with freeing up finance.
 

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La capacidad industrial ociosa es un claro síntoma de depresión... y un claro síntoma de posibilidad de bajar los tipos de interés y/o elevar el déficit público sin por ello tener inflación.
 

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Cada vez más estadounidenses temen una nueva Gran Depresión según encuesta | Economía


EEUU-ECONOMÍA
Cada vez más estadounidenses temen una nueva Gran Depresión, según encuesta



Washington, 17 mar (EFE).- El número de estadounidenses que piensan que la recesión podría convertiste en otra Gran Depresión los próximos años ha aumentado en los últimos meses, según una encuesta elaborada por CNN.

"¿Podría la 'gran recesión' convertirse en otra 'gran depresión?'", un creciente número de estadounidenses cree que sí, señaló el director de la encuesta Keating Holland.

El 45 por ciento de los consultados aseguran que es probable que Estados Unidos viva otra Gran Depresión en los próximos años, siete puntos porcentuales más que en diciembre del pasado año cuando a la misma pregunta el 38 por ciento consideró que el país podría vivir otra crisis como la de 1930.

La encuesta describe la "Gran Depresión" como un momento en el que aproximadamente uno de cada cuatro trabajadores perdió su empleo, los bancos colapsaron en todo el país y millones de estadounidenses se quedaron temporalmente sin hogar y sin poder alimentar a sus familias.

Para nueve de cada diez personas las actuales condiciones económicas en el país ya son pobres y sólo el 11 por ciento consideran que son buenas.

La encuesta indica que los estadounidenses creen que se necesitará tiempo para recuperarse de la recesión, que comenzó a finales de 2007, uno de cada cinco opina que el país tardará más de cuatro años en recuperarse.

La encuesta, elaborada por CNN / Opinion Research Corporation, se llevó a cabo vía telefónica la semana pasada con una muestra de población de 1.019 adultos y el margen de error es del tres por ciento.

















Gran Bretaña se enfrenta a una grave depresión según el banco emisor | Economía




R.UNIDO-CRISIS
Gran Bretaña se enfrenta a una grave depresión, según el banco emisor



Londres, 16 mar (EFE).- Gran Bretaña corre el peligro de hundirse en una grave depresión económica agravada por el alto nivel de endeudamiento de muchos hogares, advierte el Banco de Inglaterra en su informe trimestral.

El banco teme los efectos que puede tener sobre la economía un proceso creciente de deflación ya que el costo de las deudas de los hogares, que son fijos, podría aumentar así en relación con el resto de los precios.

Mientras que la inflación facilita el pago de la deuda, la deflación tiene el efecto contrario, lo cual es particularmente grave en el caso de los hogares británicos.

La deuda privada de los ciudadanos del Reino Unido alcanza actualmente la suma astronómica de 1,46 billones de libras (1,60 billones de euros), es decir más que el producto interior bruto (PIB) anual.

El endeudamiento privado ha crecido un 165 por ciento desde 1997, año en el que los laboristas llegaron al poder, de forma que cada familia debe actualmente una media de 60.000 libras (66.000 euros).

Los consumidores se ven además perjudicados por los elevados intereses que cobran los bancos por sus préstamos y ello a pesar de los esfuerzos del Gobierno por estimular la concesión de créditos con medidas de rescate del sector financiero.

En un intento de mitigar los efectos adversos de la crisis, el Banco de Inglaterra inyectó este mes más liquidez en el sistema, medida extraordinaria destinada a impedir una situación que algunos comparan ya con la Gran Depresión de los años treinta del siglo XX.

El banco emisor ha recortado los tipos de interés a un 0,5 por ciento y se ha comprometido a crear 150.000 millones de libras (165.000 millones de dólares) de liquidez para comprar tanto deuda pública como de las empresas.

El primer ministro británico, Gordon Brown, que oficiará de anfitrión de la próxima reunión londinense del G20 - países industrializados y emergentes- tratará de conseguir un acuerdo internacional en torno a una estrategia coordinada globalmente para el rescate de la economía.
 

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David Cameron warns of full-scale depression - Telegraph


David Cameron warns of full-scale depression

David Cameron has said that the economic downturn could lead to a full-scale depression and warned that a Conservative government would focus on driving down debt ahead of tax cuts.



By Rosa Prince, Political Correspondent
Last Updated: 7:22PM GMT 19 Mar 2009




In a hard-hitting speech in London, the Tory leader painted a picture of the problems facing the country in the current recession, predicting that economy could shrink by as much as 10 per cent - the technical definition of a depression.

Britain has not experienced an economic meltdown on such a scale since the Great Depression of the 1930s.


On the day that public debt was revealed to have reached £8 billion, Mr Cameron warned that an incoming Tory government would not have the luxury of delivering tax cuts.

Formally breaking with his plan to "share the proceeds of economic growth," Mr Cameron said: "We are not dealing with some average deficit, on a par with our peers. Just this morning, we saw the worst set of public finance figures in our peacetime history.

"According to some forecasters we are set to have the largest budget deficit of any G20 country this year. It could be more than 10 per cent of our GDP.

"Let's be clear about what will now have to happen over the next few years. I am a Conservative who believes in lower taxes.

"But in today's fiscal circumstances, the priority must go to debt reduction. Put simply, our overriding objective will need to change from sharing the proceeds of growth, to paying down our debt.

"To achieve this, we need clear plans for controlling public spending, in both the long term and the short term.''

Instead of tax cuts, Mr Cameron promised a full-scale review of public spending, to cut out waste and inefficiency, including slashing high salaries earned by "quango-crats" running public bodies.

The drive against debt would not, however, prevent a Conservative Government from introducing measures to heal what the leader described as "broken Britain".

Paying off debt would be coupled with a focus on "socially responsible" spending measures, such as improving schools and hospitals, which would have economic benefits in the long run.

Mr Cameron went on: "We are not going to behave like flint faced turbo-charged accountants, slashing spending without regard to the social consequences.

"We are going to behave like progressive Conservatives, pursuing our aims of a fairer society, an opportunity society, a safer society and a greener society in all that we do.

"But we will pursue these progressive aims through Conservative means - including proper control of public spending.''




















Britain showing signs of heading towards 1930s-style depression, says Bank - Telegraph


Britain showing signs of heading towards 1930s-style depression, says Bank


Britain is showing signs of sliding towards a 1930s-style depression, the Bank of England says today for the first time.




By Edmund Conway, Economics Editor
Last Updated: 8:23AM GMT 16 Mar 2009


The country is displaying early symptoms of being trapped in a so-called “debt deflation trap” where families find themselves pushed further and further into the red every month, according to a Bank report published today.

The stark warning will cause serious concerns, since it was this combination of falling prices and soaring debt burdens that plagued the US in the 1930s.


The Bank is using its Quarterly Bulletin to highlight the threat posed to the economy by deflation – where prices fall each year rather than rise.

Although inflation is currently in positive territory, it is expected to become negative in the coming months.

The Bank is worried that this may combine with high levels of indebtedness to squeeze families further.

It says that families with high debts could fall prey to the debt deflation trap. This means that the cost of their debts, which are fixed, would rise compared to average prices throughout the economy. While inflation erodes debts, deflation makes them relatively higher.

The Bank’s paper suggests that Britain is particularly at risk because there is a high proportion of families with significant levels of debt, and many of them are on fixed mortgage rate, which means they will not benefit from rate cuts.

Britons’ total personal debt – the amount owed on mortgages, loans and credit cards – is, at £1.46 trillion, more than the value of what the country produces in a year.

Total personal debt has risen by 165 per cent since 1997 and each household now owes an average of about £60,000.

The Conservatives claim this is the highest personal debt level in the world.

The Bank’s paper also says that consumers were suffering as banks keep the cost of borrowing high, despite Government attempts to get them lending again.

Alistair Darling, the Chancellor, and fellow finance ministers used their pre-G20 meeting this weekend to warn that more drastic action was necessary to help bring the world economy back from the brink of a possible repeat of the 1930s.

The Bank’s report puts pressure on Gordon Brown, who this weekend faced further calls to apologise for the recession, to secure agreement on an effective international rescue strategy when he hosts the G20 leaders at a summit in London at the start of April.

It comes as figures this week are expected to show the number of people unemployed will reach the two million mark.

The Bank’s report says: “This configuration of falling asset prices and depressed economic conditions in the face of an adverse demand shock is consistent with recent and prospective macroeconomic developments in the United Kingdom and internationally”.

It helps explain why it took such dramatic action earlier this month to pump extra cash into the economy.

The bank slashed interest rates to just above zero and pledged to create £150 billion worth of cash with which to buy up government and corporate debt.

This so-called quantitative easing is regarded as a radical measure to help prevent a repeat of the conditions associated with the Great Depression.

Many experts believe that the US authorities’ initial reluctance in the 1930s even to cut interest rates was partly responsible for causing the worst economic slump in Western history.

The Chancellor acknowledged at the G20 meeting that the economic situation was “grave” but pledged not to allow a repeat of the Depression years. The ministers promised to pump more cash into their economies if necessary in the next few months.

However, some have expressed concern that the meeting failed in its aspiration to reach a specific agreement on the amount of cash countries need to spend in the coming year. Others have warned that it does not set a clear enough agenda for the much-anticipated full G20 summit on April 2.

Some speculate that the Prime Minister may use the G20 as a justification for a series of further tax cuts and spending increases in the Budget next month, though many economists have warned that despite the scale of the recession faced by the UK the Treasury has little capacity to borrow more.

Mr Darling has signalled that the meeting must not be allowed to mirror a 1933 summit in London which failed to halt the Great Depression. He said failure to agree co-ordinated action then meant that the Depression continued for years when it “need not have done so”.

Writing in The Sunday Telegraph George Osborne, the Shadow Chancellor, said Mr Brown must use the G20 as “the moment to send the clearest of signals that, unlike in the 1930s, this banking crisis will not send the world spinning into a protectionist spiral.”

He said that “ministerial promises” had failed to deliver any real benefits to struggling home owners or desperate businesses.
 

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The Great Recession versus the Great Depression - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com



March 20, 2009, 4:35 pm
The Great Recession versus the Great Depression







Reading this article about the global manufacturing plunge, I wondered: how does the current slump stack up against the early stages of the Great Depression? The US has consistent industrial production data back to 1919, so it’s a fairly straightforward exercise. Below is the change in industrial production, measured in logs, from the previous peak in 1929-30 and 2007-9.






At first, the current recession didn’t hit industrial production all that hard. But the pace accelerated dramatically last fall, so that at this point we’re sort of experiencing half a Great Depression. That’s pretty bad.

Clarification: Those are natural logs — sorry, economists use them so frequently I forgot to explain. So basically multiply by 100 to get the percent change.


















Curioso artículo de "Literatura Depresiva" (igual habría que ir escribiendo un "Los Ladrillos de la Ira" a modo de contribución hispanistaní a la nueva ¿depresión?)


Books From the Great Depression - WSJ.com



Books From the Great Depression

Peter Conn selects unsurpassed novels about the Depression





1. Now in November
By Josephine Winslow Johnson
Simon & Schuster, 1934


A fictional account of one family's experience on the land, Josephine Winslow Johnson's best-selling novel won the Pulitzer Prize before sinking into undeserved obscurity. The Haldmarnes leave an unnamed city for the countryside when Father loses a good job in a lumber mill and with it any hope of financial security for his wife and their three daughters. The mortgaged farm to which the family moves yields little: The novel's central section is a day-by-day reckoning of the land's collapse into baked and cracking clay during the killing drought in the Great Plains of the 1930s. "Now in November" is one of the most convincing and hair-raising depictions of the Dust Bowl in the literature of the Depression. Unfortunately, history would find room for only one Dust Bowl novel, John Steinbeck's "The Grapes of Wrath."




2. The Big Money
By John Dos Passos
Harcourt, Brace, 1936


Norman Mailer often said that John Dos Passos had written the great American novel in the three volumes of the "U.S.A." trilogy. "The Big Money" was the final volume in the series, and its success put Dos Passos on the cover of Time magazine. The novel deploys several narrative techniques in an effort to tell the whole story of America's march toward the Crash. Long conventional storylines alternate with stream-of-consciousness monologues, brief biographies of famous and infamous Americans, and "newsreels" made up of newspaper headlines, popular songs and advertising slogans. "The Big Money" opens at the end of World War I and concludes in the early years of the Depression. The final scene presents a vagrant trying to hitch a ride: The open road to American opportunity has become a dead end. Dos Passos's sustained, bitter and often funny exposé of Roaring Twenties excess is the best fictional explanation ever written of how Americans got themselves in the biggest economic mess in their history.




3. Appointment in Samarra
By John O'Hara
Harcourt, Brace, 1934


John O'Hara's first and best novel tracks the final three days in the life of a young man named Julian English. He is 30 years old, charming and good-looking, married to an attractive woman, and successful as the manager of a Cadillac franchise in a town called Gibbsville. Julian is also a dangerous drunk and a moral trifler, filled with envy and insecurity, a man with no discernible convictions. His rapid decline in the course of the novel is an emblem of moral exhaustion. "Appointment in Samarra" is set in 1930, after the Crash but before the advent of the New Deal. O'Hara always insisted on the precision of that date: His failed hero registers the sense of impending and general collapse.




4. The Good Earth

By Pearl S. Buck
John Day, 1931




A Pulitzer Prize winner, Pearl S. Buck's "The Good Earth" was also the best-selling novel in the U.S. for both 1931 and 1932. The book would shape American perceptions of China for two generations. The main characters, a poor farmer named Wang Lung and his wife, O-lan, are recognizable human beings, not mere Oriental stereotypes, who do their best to survive in a punishing world of famine, bandits, war and plague. Why did a book about an obscure rural family in a distant land sell so well in the early Depression years? To begin with, Buck was a fine storyteller, and her images of the Chinese countryside are memorably vivid. Beyond that, the novel resonated with the realities of Depression America: The portraits of suffering but resilient Chinese farmers spoke eloquently to Americans trying to make sense of their own diminished circumstances.





5. The Day of the Locust

By Nathanael West
Random House, 1939



The best novel ever written about Hollywood appeared in the last years of the Depression. A young artist, Todd Hackett, has come to the West Coast to paint the legions of bored and lonely men and women who migrate to California in pursuit of a dream they never find. The studios' celluloid fantasies mock the deprivation of the country throughout the 1930s, providing escapist entertainment in the midst of despair. The novel is punctuated with scenes of violence -- drunken brawls, bloody cockfights, sensual assault -- that unfold in the glow of Southern California's legendary warmth and sunshine. In the climactic scene, a murderous riot provoked by a movie premiere provides a "real" counterpart to Todd's painting, "The Burning of Los Angeles."







Mr. Conn's "The American 1930s: A Literary History" has just been published by Cambridge University Press.