Tiene muy mala solución porque nadie en su sano juicio dejará el dinero en manos de los corruptos bancos y gobierno.
Bank run como en los US en el siglo XIX.
Chipre está perecid.
al menos los usanos en un bank run sufrían deflación por lo que dolía menos, nosotros con una inflación de sustancia ilegal
voy a recordar un texto del Forero
hugolp
http://www.burbuja.info/inmobiliaria/3029631-post5007.html
resalto lo más interesante
The national banking system was ensconced after the Civil
War. The number of banks, national bank notes, and deposits all
pyramided upward, and after 1870 state banks began to boom
as deposit-creating institutions. With lower requirements and
fewer restrictions than the national banks, they could pyramid
on top of national banks. The number of national banks
increased from 1,294 in 1865 to 1,968 in 1873, while the number
of state banks rose from 349 to 1,330 in the same period. Total
state and national bank notes and deposits rose from $835 mil-
lion in 1865 to $1.964 billion in 1873, an increase of 135.2 percent
or an increase of 16.9 percent per year. The trinc year, the
supply of bank money leveled off as the panic of 1873 struck
and caused numerous bankruptcies.
As a general overview of the national banking period, we
can agree with Klein that
The financial panics of 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907 were in
large part an outgrowth of . . . reserve pyramiding and
excessive deposit creation by reserve city and central reserve
city banks. These panics were triggered by the currency
drains that took place in periods of relative prosperity when
banks were loaned up.144
And yet it must be pointed out that the total money supply,
even merely the supply of bank money, did not decrease after
the panic, but merely leveled off.
Orthodox economic historians have long complained about
the “great depression” that is supposed to have struck the
United States in the panic of 1873 and lasted for an unprece-
dented six years, until 1879. Much of this stagnation is sup-
posed to have been caused by a monetary contraction leading to
the resumption of specie payments in 1879. Yet what sort of
“depression” is it which saw an extraordinarily large expansion
of industry, of railroads, of physical output, of net national
product, or real per capita income?
As Friedman and Schwartz
admit, the decade from 1869 to 1879 saw a 3-percent-per-
annum increase in money national product, an outstanding
real national product growth of 6.8 percent per year in this
period, and a phenomenal rise of 4.5 percent per year in real
product per capita. Even the alleged “monetary contraction”
never took place, the money supply increasing by 2.7 percent
per year in this period. From 1873 through 1878, before
another spurt of monetary expansion, the total supply of bank
money rose from $1.964 billion to $2.221 billion—a rise of 13.1
percent or 2.6 percent per year. In short, a modest but definite
rise, and scarcely a contraction.
It should be clear, then, that the “great depression” of the 1870s
is merely a myth—a myth brought about by misinterpretation of
the fact that prices in general fell sharply during the entire
period.
Indeed they fell from the end of the Civil War until 1879.
Friedman and Schwartz estimated that prices in general fell
from 1869 to 1879 by 3.8 percent per annum. Unfortunately,
most historians and economists are conditioned to believe that
steadily and sharply falling prices must result in depression:
hence their amazement at the obvious prosperity and economic
growth during this era. For they have overlooked the fact that
in the natural course of events, when government and the bank-
ing system do not increase the money supply very rapidly, free-
market capitalism will result in an increase of production and
economic growth so great as to swamp the increase of money
supply. Prices will fall, and the consequences will be not depres-
sion or stagnation, but prosperity (since costs are falling, too)
economic growth, and the spread of the increased living stan-
dard to all the consumers.145
Esto es de "History of Money and Banking in the USA from the Colonial Era to de IIWW" de Murray Rothbard (el que citaba el artículo que publicó KarlosZorro el otro día).
Los datos que usa son de:
Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the
United States, 1867–1960 (New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1963), pp. 33–44. On totals of bank money, see Historical
Statistics, pp. 624–25.
Debido a las regulaciones bancarias aprobadas por Lincoln al final de la guerra civil estadounidense, se centralizó el crédito alrededor de los bancos de New York. Eso permitió expansiones de crédito que fueron provocando los diferentes pánicos. Lo interesante de la época es que al no haber banco central, era una centralización de crédito muy débil (por decirlo de alguna manera) y de las recesiones se salían por la vía deflacionaria, o al menos no inflacionaria.
Milton Friedman teorizaba que para que una economía funcionara se necesitaba que los precios fueran estables, pero según sus propias investigaciones en esta época los precios bajaron y la economía creció y además mucho. Nunca lo explicó y lo dejó como una curiosidad (!!!!).
En 1970 se ve como empieza la típica expansión de crédito bancaria, que como teorizan los austriacos da lugar a distorsiones en el tejido productivo (burbuja) y acabó petando en 1973. Al no poder inflar a saco, las compañías más especulativas son castigadas. En esta crisis la familia Cooke, una de las más ricas y poderosas del momento, se arruinó completamente ya que estaban totalmente sobre-expuestos. Ni rescates ni banana. Es por eso que luego vinieron otras teorías a justificar rescates y inflación como si fueran buenos para "el pueblo". A los ricos no les gusta arriesgarse a perderlo todo.
por cierto, sabéis algo de él después de su paso por libertad digital??