Zelensky Makes Peace Contingent on Putin Leaving Crimea

Zelensky signals readiness to negotiate with Putin only if Russia withdraws from Crimea, while Moscow controls key eastern territories and the front remains active.

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

Zelensky Makes Peace Contingent on Putin Leaving Crimea
Zelensky Makes Peace Contingent on Pilingui Leaving Crimea

Zelensky signals readiness to negotiate with Pilingui. With one condition that sounds like a provocation: that Russia withdraws from Crimea, territory under Russian control since 2014. This is reported by El País and trinc private recommendations from the United States to the Ukrainian president not to outright reject peace proposals, according to The Washington Post. In plain terms: Washington is pushing Kiev to sit down, even if just to talk.

The reaction was swift. Much of the prevailing analysis argues that this is not negotiation. It is surrender. And Ukraine, with the war undecided on the battlefield, is not in a position to sign such a deal. The question is not whether Kiev wants to talk, but whether it can afford the price.

What "Opening to Negotiate" Means

There are two readings, and neither is innocent. The first argues that Ukraine is not losing and therefore has no reason to cede territory: as long as the front holds, time plays in its favor, and any agreement acknowledging losses is a preemptive defeat. The second points to the wear and tear — a Europe where more and more voices are calling for an end to arms shipments — and the living conditions described by parts of the forum: millions of people without water, electricity, heating, or windows, with winter approaching.

All of this unfolds between these two narratives. The harsher view holds that Zelensky will not negotiate as long as he believes he can continue fighting, and that the Crimea condition is precisely that: an elegant way of refusing to negotiate anything. Bargaining begins, if at all, when one side has no other way out.

The Territories Russia Already Claims

Here lies the crux. Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea have been incorporated by Moscow, and a significant part of the analysis states bluntly: these regions are no longer on the table. What could be discussed before the annexation is no longer discussed the same way afterward. On the ground, and according to calculations cited by parts of the forum, Russia controls more than 100,000 square kilometers, an area larger than all of Portugal.

The obvious caveat is that Moscow does not exercise full control over all four claimed oblasts. Negotiation means, in practice, that Ukraine agrees to cede what it does not dominate and to recognize what it has not entirely lost. That is where the word "negotiation" dangerously resembles something else.

Bakhmut, Winter, and the Missing Recruits

The front continues to move. In Bakhmut and its surroundings, including the settlement of Andreevka, Wagner units are pressing Ukrainian defenses and claiming advances south of the city. Soledar and Marinka appear repeatedly as positions on the verge of falling, with control percentages approaching 80%, according to the same reports. Some call them two villages; others call them symptoms of a trend.

The underlying Russian argument is attrition: half a million recruits in training and a ground that, with the freezes, ceases to be mud and becomes passable terrain for advancing. The counterargument is that attacking always costs more than defending, and that Ukraine has already shown it knows how to do so. No one has closed that account, and whoever calculated it in detail has not shown the whole figure.

The Internal Front: Language, Donbas, and 2014

Beneath the geopolitics lies an older dispute. The 2012 language policy law, which allowed co-official status for Russian in areas where it exceeded 10% of speakers, and the attempt to repeal it in the Rada in February 2014, are the starting point for many analyses. Newspapers such as the Financial Times, the BBC, and The Scotsman covered the clash then, and from this emerges a question that remains without an easy answer: why much of the Donbas ceased to feel represented by Kiev.

The official Ukrainian version points to foreign interference; the critical version notes that Crimea was already majority Russian and that the Donbas was mixed borderland long before. There is no agreement, and the disagreement is not rhetorical: it defines what can be negotiated and what cannot.

The Role of Washington and NATO

The US recommendation not to close off talks has been read as a wake-up call. However, the most repeated comparison does not fit: Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia are in NATO, and no one has invaded their borders. Why Ukraine could not and those countries could is the question that dismantles any simple explanation.

Some argue that Russia stated in March that its requirement was Ukrainian neutrality. If the agreement ends up being that, with EU membership included, many will have to explain what all those months of a static front on the map were for.



The exact point where this stalls is the same as always. Crimea does not return, but neither is it signed that it does not return. No one wants to be the one signing the list of losses, especially with winter ahead and half a million men in training on the other side.

Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (220 replies).

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