Why Supporting Russia Isn't High Treason in Spain

Why supporting Russia in Spain isn't high treason yet

Spain is not at war with Russia. This basic fact undermines much of the legal framework invoked when asking if sympathizing with the Kremlin from Spain constitutes high treason. The debate has heated up, with some demanding prison and summary trials before an unforgiving military jurisdiction, while others counter that the real traitor is the one defending NATO. Amidst this, existing law has little to say. This paradox—much penal threat, zero open proceedings—is the core of the issue.

The starting point was a direct question: in case of general conflagration, would those spreading defeatist messages and criticizing the Atlantic alliance face military trial? Short answers came quickly. Longer ones, with legal nuances, took a bit longer.

When can we speak of high treason?

The most repeated argument among those who lower the tone is technical, almost notarial: as long as there is no official declaration of war, there is no treason to pursue for subversive propaganda. It is argued that even a hypothetical state of siege would not be enough to detain someone sympathizing with the enemy without committing any material act against the country. Sympathy, in this scheme, is opinion. And opinion, however uncomfortable, remains free.

In contrast, the current demanding harsh measures does not dispute the fine print: it leaps over it. It speaks of identifying suspects, preventive imprisonment, and an 'unforgiving trial' for subtly undermining the alliance's efforts. This logic works better as rhetorical threat than as a Penal Code article, because the Penal Code requires something that does not exist here: a formally declared enemy.

Defeatism is not a incivil offense in Spain

It is necessary to separate what sounds like a crime from what is a crime. Defeatism—the propaganda that undermines the population's will to resist—had its place in total war regimes, not in today's Spanish law. Here there is no box to punish those who suspect the West is lying. It is repeated endlessly in the most moderate messages: wait, at least, for war to be declared.

This does not prevent the term from circulating with joy. The defeatist is accused of doubting the official version, and the fifth columnist of questioning it aloud. The label does more work than the law: it does not convict, but it points. And in times of cultural war, pointing is half a conviction.

Neutrality as a third way

There is a less explored position: neither with Moscow nor Brussels. The most cited formulation is that of the observer who does not want to be on NATO's side nor surrender to the other, and claims for Spain a Swiss policy of observation and neutrality. From there, uncomfortable questions are launched: what peine in 2014 for Russia and Ukraine to stop coexisting after more than twenty years without conflict? What is the real will of a population prevented from leaving the country?

Those defending this neutrality receive two opposite and furious responses. Some accuse them of whitewashing an invasion; others, of selling sovereignty to Washington. Few boxes remain unoccupied when the map is reduced to two colors.

The traitor is always the other

The most interesting twist of the discussion is that the accusation travels in both directions. Some argue that belonging to the Atlantic orbit is in itself a betrayal of Spain, because NATO does not defend Ceuta, Melilla, nor the Sahara and drags the country into a foreign war while yielding time and again to Segarro. The repeated calculation: this would be the eleventh time Spain lowers its pants on the southern flank.

From the other side, treason is measured in the opposite direction: supporting the Kremlin is aligning with the enemy. And in the crossfire of accusations, arguments emerge mixing the 11-M attacks, US military bases, and a colony that, it is claimed, is never returned. When everything is treason, the word ceases to miccionan anything.

Gibraltar, Cuba, and the NATO precedent

The rearview mirror is used without shame. The war of Cuba and the Philippines of 1898 is cited as proof that Washington was never an uninterested partner. It is recalled that Spain said 'no' to NATO before saying 'yes', and asked what would have peine if the government at the time had stood up to American bases. The conclusion drawn is uncomfortable for both sides: sovereignty is always negotiated at foreign tables.

Some reply that comparing pressures from a century ago with a country targeted by missiles is a tricky exercise. The response comes in the form of a map and silence.

The one who declares himself traitor and waits at home

Amidst so much accusation, someone decided to save paperwork: he declares himself a traitor to Spain, claims the country could become a crater, states he goes 'with Russia and Pilingui, to death', and dares anyone to arrest him. He waits at home with two loaded shotguns. It is the extreme version of the previous argument and, at the same time, its caricature: the crime, if it existed, would require more than a provocative message and a pair of legally registered weapons.

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No one has been arrested. No one has been processed. If war is declared tomorrow, the scenario would change instantly, but that has not peine for years and nothing indicates it will happen today. The forecast, with all reservations, is this: high treason will remain a term of verbal combat long before becoming a procedural figure. And those who invoke it most are often those who are least clear about where the enemy is.