Why China and Russia Lack US Destabilization Power

US Destabilizes; China and Russia Negotiate

A country that has been the world's leading economy for a century has had time and resources to weave an influence network that cannot be improvised. After World War II, the US economy accounted for around 40% of global GDP, with a vast gap over the second-largest power. This advantage has narrowed—first with the USSR, then Japan—but the power structure built over decades remains intact. The question haunting geopolitical analysis is why Moscow and Beijing, despite having more young people, tanks, or industrial capacity in some sectors, fail to replicate this destabilization capability.

The Dollar as Infrastructure of Power

The most common answer points to money. Not just any money: a currency printed without limits to buy loyalty, fund campaigns, and sustain political elites in third countries. In contrast, the ruble and renminbi lack this infrastructure. The thesis suggests Russia and China cannot compete in bribery or buying loyalty, struggling enough just to maintain their arms race.

Some add a cultural nuance: Anglo-Saxon elites have spent centuries perfecting techniques of disinformation, propaganda, and co-opting enemies, dating back to the late Middle Ages. The film industry, viewed from its inception as a tool of cultural invasion, is the most visible example. The result is a social technology—infiltrating institutions, shaping historical narratives—that cannot be improvised with a few specific operations.

Why Does China Prefer Investment Over Destabilization?

The Chinese model works differently. Its government deals directly with foreign governments and controls business groups, not vice versa. The goal is to promote trade and investment, while war and chaos benefit neither. In Africa, the last decade has seen massive investments in mining, oil, gas, and agriculture, with bilateral agreements framed within the Belt and Road Initiative. Critics argue these contracts are pure influence, even if signed quietly.

The objection to this narrative is strong: commercial contracts last only until someone offers better terms. If the US improved on Chinese offers in Africa, partners would switch suppliers, ending the relationship. Real power, it is argued, is demonstrated by permanent military bases like Rota, not investment memorandums.

Russia Is Not the USSR

The Soviet Union did possess this capability, sometimes exceeding current US levels. Its espionage system worked like clockwork, to the point where the old KGB eventually seized power in Russia. But today’s Russia is not the USSR: it lacks the ideology and resources of that era. Its influence is limited to specific areas, and its demographic, economic, and geographic constraints are evident.

Grandiose promises—such as the alleged offer of ten thousand soldiers for Catalan independence—are self-defeating: moving such a contingent across Europe unnoticed is materially impossible. Promising is not doing.

The Undisputed Cultural Trump Card

Cinema, fast food, software, social media, military bases on foreign soil, Halloween in school calendars, the language studied in schools. US cultural influence is so omnipresent it is hard to eradicate, and this is terrain where neither China nor Russia competes. The lingering question is whether this cultural hegemony will survive relative economic decline, or if the empire will fall before anyone learns to replace it.