Voting for Spain's PSOE so Sánchez takes the fall for Brussels' cuts

Voting PSOE so Sánchez takes the fall for Brussels

The theory circulates with chess-board logic: if the PSOE wins again, Pedro Sánchez will have to apply the cuts Brussels is demanding, and his own patronage network will end up calling for his head. In other words, you would vote for the PSOE not to sustain it, but to make it crash. The paradox is nothing new in economic policy —voting against something more than for something— but it is rarely stated so bluntly: turning the vote into a four-year trap for the occupant of La Moncloa, the Spanish prime minister's residence.

The starting point of the argument is that Sánchez, after an aggressive campaign, would slip away if he loses, leaving the PP and Vox to swallow the mandatory adjustments from Brussels and the opposition in the streets. The proposed conclusion is to vote en masse for the PSOE. The contradiction is plain to see: votes are being requested for the party people want to see implode.

What happens if the PSOE wins and Brussels turns off the tap?

The scenario being sketched is one of an exhausted Sánchez in office, with his most loyal voters demanding his resignation and a wild split led by the party's regional barons. Some even speak of a government of national unity and a charocalipsis now. The key piece of the reasoning is public debt, which stands close to two trillion euros, and the pressure of the European Commission, which has reportedly already called the prime minister to account.

Some argue that Brussels would not squeeze a new party as hard —one with no structure or patronage network in town halls and regional governments. Operación Tucán —the alias used to refer to Movimiento Sumar— is presented as the authentic protest vote, with the Greek precedent on the horizon. But the objection is immediate: Sumar lacks the PSOE's machinery, and Brussels has directed its demands at Sánchez, not at Yolanda Díaz.

The socialist voter as a sect that never blames the party

Resistance to this plan does not come only from the right. Part of the analysis holds that the socialist voter is the closest thing to a sect member, and that it does not matter if socialism leaves them in misery: they always find an excuse to justify that the fault lies with someone else. Under that premise, the calculation that the party's cronies and patronage beneficiaries will call for Sánchez's head in 2027 collapses. There would be no punishment, only resignation.

Against that reading, it is argued that the PSOE is not voted for, it implodes, and that the exit operation is already underway now that the Spanish parliament has been dissolved. The discussion drifts toward the possibility of Sánchez finding refuge in an international post —the UN, the EU, NATO— and of others taking the fall. The comparison with the Titanic, with passengers relaxing while the stokers are already getting wet, sums up the tone: the massacre is a foregone conclusion, the only question is who controls the lifeboats.

Two trillion in debt and the Greek precedent

The figure that structures much of the conversation is public debt close to two trillion euros. On that number rests the idea that another PSOE term in this context would force the party to sign up to Rubalcaba's results —that is, an austerity package it could not dodge. The reference to Greece is no accident: there, the radical left party ended up implementing the very program it had promised to fight.

The discussion also incorporates the territorial factor. It points to a hot autumn in Catalonia, with Puigdemont's return and the possibility of CDR protesters causing serious unrest, and to a Basque Country where Bildu gains power with an eye on the Lehendakaritza —the Basque regional presidency— within a decade. France and external interests seeking to destabilize Spain are mentioned. These are hypotheses, not accomplished facts, and should be read as such.

Voting "to screw them over": the intelligence of the trap

The most repeated objection is that voting for a party so it crashes is as clever as feeding cakes to a fat person to see if they burst. The simile, inelegant as it is, points to a real problem: the voter does not control the timing of the collapse. With the PSOE in government, many of the factors that would produce the disaster have a higher probability, but that does not guarantee the fallout arrives at the desired moment, or that it lands on the person it is meant to land on.

It is also debated whether the party system can afford such an experiment. The idea of trolling the system with a minority vote —the Frente Obrero is mentioned with the same laughter that Vox once provoked— runs up against the evidence that the PP and Vox are not going to let Vox into government. The pendulum, they say, swings all the same.

The scenario nobody rules out: four more years and elections in 2027

The central hypothesis of the argument is that four more years of Sánchez would force him to stay in office and he would end up exhausted, with wild splits and barons like Page demanding his resignation. It is a scenario of accelerated wear and tear that, however, is not guaranteed. The alternative being considered is that the PSOE holds on and the cuts arrive anyway, with or without him.

And what if the plan works in reverse and the socialist voter, far from punishing, rewards the resistance? The answer is not in the data, it is in the bet. And bets, in economic policy, come at a high price.

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Data of the scenario under discussion:

• Public debt close to two trillion euros.
• Electoral horizon in 2027, with the possibility of an early election in 2026.
• Brussels has reportedly already called Sánchez to account.
• A hot autumn in Catalonia with Puigdemont's return.