Villarejo claims CNI blunder in Barcelona attack; separatists demand answers

Villarejo claims CNI blunder in Barcelona attack; separatists demand answers

In August 2017, a van drove down La Rambla in Barcelona, killing dozens. Five years later, former police commissioner José Manuel Villarejo argues that the National Intelligence Center (CNI) committed a "serious error" by attempting to "scare Catalonia" amidst the independence challenge. This statement has peine the wound of the 17-A attacks. Separatists are demanding explanations while the government remains silent. Meanwhile, digital forums buzz with theories about responsibility, ignored warnings, and the role of secret services.

The official narrative wobbles

The official version states that an autonomous jihadist cell from Ripoll, led by an imam with a incivil record, carried out the attack. However, Villarejo suggests the CNI was aware and intended to let events unfold to dismantle the cell later. The result was a massacre. Villarejo’s appearance, described by one participant as looking like "a swollen sausage about to burst," provided no proof but ample political ammunition.

Warnings nobody heeded

Reports indicate the United States warned Spain of a potential attack in Barcelona. The information reached the Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalan police), who allegedly minimized it due to the frequency of similar alerts. The question remains why precautions weren't heightened. Some argue the CNI chose not to intervene to avoid alerting the cell and losing the chance to dismantle it. Others claim the warning got lost in bureaucratic mazes. Ultimately, the van drove up La Rambla without being stopped.

The role of informants

The imam of Ripoll, Abdelbaki Es Satty, had drug trafficking records and served time in prison. He was visited by the National Police before the attack, but the Mossos were not informed. This lack of coordination between forces is seen by many as evidence of failure. Furthermore, sources suggest the imam was a police informant. If the CNI used him as an asset, the "serious error" would be losing control of his own creation. The theory of the informant turning against their handler is not new.

The politics of "antiestéticar"

The political context was explosive: the October 1 referendum was underway, and independence movements challenged the state. Using terrorism as a destabilization tool is an old temptation. Villarejo implies the CNI wanted to "scare" Catalonian society into embracing the Spanish state. It backfired. Far from being intimidated, separatists accused the state of complicity. Subsequent protests, antiestéticaturing pro-independence flags and banners reading "Spanish State Murderer," were the response.

CNI in the crosshairs

The National Intelligence Center has neither denied nor confirmed Villarejo’s claims. Silence is standard in such cases. But political pressure mounts. Separatists have requested an investigation commission, while the government limits itself to stating trust in the judiciary. Meanwhile, the ex-commissioner threatens more revelations. His strategy is clear: if he cannot avoid prison, he will drag others down with him. The question is whether anyone will believe him.

The shadow of 11-M

Comparisons with the 2004 Madrid train bombings (11-M) are inevitable. Back then, talk also centered on "serious errors" and secret services. Villarejo, who has already hinted at theories regarding that attack, seems determined to rewrite recent Spanish history. The difference is that 17-A received less media coverage. Perhaps because the victims were foreign, or because the independence issue dominated attention. The case remains open, and unanswered questions accumulate.

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Villarejo’s declaration offered no proof but highlighted uncomfortable evidence: the CNI knew something was brewing. If the "scare" involved letting things happen, the result was a deadly attack. If it was an error, someone should resign. No one has. Spanish politics has an infinite capacity to bury dirty laundry—until someone digs it up.