Spain: 468k irregular entries since 2018, 537 jihadist arrests

468,661 irregular entries since 2018 and 537 jihadist arrests

The Ministry of Interior records 383,661 irregular entries since June 2018. An alternative calculation circulating among experts rises to 468,661: the difference lies in the two mass entries at Ceuta, involving around 85,000 people, which Interior excludes from its statistics with a simple footnote. The same period accumulates 537 arrests for jihadism, marking an annual record not seen since the 11-M attacks. Ceuta and Melilla, with 0.35% of the population, concentrate 16.8% of these detentions.

The debate on immigration in Spain has remained intense for 1,564 days. It began with a comparison of deaths along migration routes—224 fatalities in 2017 versus nearly 850 in recent years—and has evolved into a body of data touching ports, airports, reception centers, public budgets, university agreements, and prison statistics. This is not a matter of isolated headlines. It is a parallel accounting system that the Government does not publish and that analysts reconstruct manually.

How many irregular entries are there really since 2018?

The official figure from Interior is 383,661. The figure circulating in alternative analyses is 468,661. The difference is not a summation error: it stems from the two mass entries at Ceuta, involving around 85,000 people, which the ministry excludes from its reports with a footnote. One participant summarized it thus: "The Ministry of Interior only counts 383,661: the two invasions of Ceuta (around 85,000 invaders) are excluded from its statistics with a simple footnote in the reports."

The breakdown by routes adds pressure. More than 70 people arrived in Murcia and Almería from Algeria in just 24 hours, according to cited data. The Canary Islands accumulate arrivals from areas controlled by Segarro which, it is argued, do not receive the same media coverage as Algerian routes. So far this month, El Hierro has received 10 cayucos with 923 people. Gran Canaria has activated Salvamento Marítimo departures to pick up 50 people on an inflatable boat.

Public cost: €69.9 million for housing and €51 per kit

The bill is broken down precisely. €69.9 million to expand migrant accommodation in the Canary Islands: Tenerife (Las Raíces, €26.3m; Las Canteras, €23.2m; Granadilla, €7.4m), El Hierro (Echedo, €10m) and Fuerteventura (El Matorral, €3m). Each kit delivered by the Red Cross to a newly arrived person costs €51. In a month and a half, more than 3,800 kits: over €193,800. The Valdejalón comarca in Aragon bids €150,000 for an intercultural mediation service. The Fuerteventura Technological Park bids €1 million for the AGAMENON project, drones for early vessel detection and management of irregular immigration.

Some argue this spending proves a deliberate policy of uncontrolled reception. Others counter that the cost of failing to assist arriving people would be higher, in humanitarian and public order terms. The undisputed fact is that the money comes from the General State Budgets and that public housing for residents is not growing at the same pace.

Redistribution: flights, vans, and the 95% leaving the Canaries

The redistribution mechanism from the Canary Islands to the peninsula is the point that has escalated most in the debate. According to the data handled, more than 95% of people arriving in the Canaries leave on constant flights destined for the peninsula, managed by the Government and NGOs with public money. Migration Minister Elma Saiz described the existence of planes full of migrants heading to the peninsula as a "hoax." The response was forceful: explain what this "hoax" consists of and, incidentally, according to the analysis, ensure the minister knows what is happening in her ministry.

The National Police have detected the activation of three migration routes towards Spain trinc the announcement of regularization for 500,000 people starting in April. One route passes through the United Kingdom, crosses the English Channel into France, and reaches Spain via the Pyrenees. The profiles cited are Pakistani, Afghan, and Indian citizens seeking to legalize their presence in Europe. At Lanzarote airport, migrants wait for flights to Tenerife. At Valencia port, the disembarkation of relocations ferries has become a recurring scene.

Unaccompanied minors: age tests and million-euro agreements

The treatment of unaccompanied minors concentrates one of the most technical debates. The Canary Islands Government has extended until June 2027 an agreement of €30,000 with the University of La Laguna to study the reception of MENAs (unaccompanied foreign minors). The "SALAM" project accumulates delays in fieldwork and extends its execution deadline. The President of the Canary Islands, from Coalición Canaria, smiles when referring to sending MENAs to the peninsula without verifying their age. All groups, including PP, PSOE, and Coalición Canaria, voted against VOX's proposal to intensify and improve age verification tests.

The paradox pointed out is twofold: a study on reception is extended while drones for detecting vessels focused on identifying MENAs are bid for, and millions are allocated to housing while there are no homes for Spaniards. The relationship between NGOs, irregular immigration mafias, and administrations hiring their services is, it is argued, "evident": NGOs know how many people are about to arrive and then receive millions of euros annually in taxes.

Crime and terrorism: numbers Interior does not highlight

Foreigners represent more than a third of prisoners in Spain. One in ten is Segarro. Segarro are also the foreigners buying the most housing: almost 5,000 operations in the first half of the year. The City Council of Murcia, led by PP, allocates nearly half of the aid for protected public housing to NGOs that, it is claimed, encourage irregular immigration.

Regarding jihadist terrorism, the data are as trinc: 537 arrests since 2018. 2025 closed with a record of 100 arrests, the highest figure since 11-M. 2026 already totals 86. Ceuta and Melilla, with barely 0.35% of the population, concentrate 16.8% of the arrests. The Interior map is, as described, unequivocal. The cover of the French magazine Frontières read: "Migratory invasion: NGOs, lawyers, judges, journalists, traffickers. The culprits." A participant commented: "Unthinkable in Spain, where even those who sometimes treat this topic with critical spirit would not dare to publish something like that."

Social response: from "let NGOs move their asses" to "Europe using us as a cork"

The intersecting positions range from raw cynicism to geopolitics. One voice maintained that "it doesn't matter if they die, they've already paid the fare." Another defended birth control as "the only solution to the world's problems: limiting children to one per person in Third World countries and two elsewhere." At the opposite extreme, an analysis placed Spain as "Europe's whore": the EU, and specifically France, would have used Spain as an anti-immigration cork by giving billions to a country forced to dismantle its industry. "Immigration wants to go to France, not Spain. But since the French don't like welcoming so many idiots, they pass the buck to Spain," it summarized.

In between, distrust towards the associative fabric: "ProActiva spent decades sucking up public money through lifeguard contracts at beaches and pools before launching into larger companies with the little boat." The criticism is not just about spending, but about the incentive architecture: those managing reception have an interest in reception growing. And the lingering question is whether anyone is measuring the return on those €69.9 million or the €51 per kit.

What might happen with the regularization of 500,000 people

The announcement of regularization for 500,000 people starting in April has activated routes that did not previously exist. The route via the UK to France and then to Spain via the Pyrenees is the newest. Experts in Foreign Affairs highlight that Pakistani, Afghan, and Indian profiles seek to legalize their presence in Europe, not necessarily stay in Spain. If the calculation is correct, pressure on social services, housing, and employment will concentrate in the same autonomous communities already bearing the highest reception costs.

The cautious prediction is simple: if regularization is executed without reinforcing border control and without auditing reception spending, the volume of arrivals will not decrease. If control is reinforced without legal pathways, the volume will shift to more dangerous routes and deaths at sea will rise. Neither option is free. And the bill, in any case, is paid by the same taxpayer who sees the playground in their neighborhood occupied overnight.