Russian offensive failed despite territorial gains, says analyst

Yago argues: Russian offensive likely already failed

Is Russia winning the war in Ukraine or losing it for months with no one daring to write about it? The channel Cosas Militares responded with an extensive video where its host, Yago, maintains that the Russian offensive has already failed and criticizes those who argue otherwise. His thesis lands amid a debate made more uncomfortable by time: some look at the map and see Russian advances; others look at declared objectives and see an operation never fulfilled.

Underlying this is an unresolved question: what does winning actually miccionan, and who has the authority to decide?

If Russia controls more territory, why say it’s losing?

The most common argument favoring Moscow is cartographic. If the Russian Federation controls more square kilometers than on February 24 and Ukraine less, Russia is winning. The repeated analogy is a conquest video game: whoever holds territory wins. A nuance is always added: attacking in numerical inferiority, on foreign soil, against a entrenched enemy who knows the terrain and receives NATO material and advice, while holding conquered land months later, is not exactly a walk in the park.

What stands out, according to this reading, is what Ukraine doesn’t achieve: areas where it holds do not translate into net land recoveries. That’s where the victory narrative starts to sustancia ilegal. No one explains what the original Russian plan was, so no one can rigorously say whether current events are a failure or a course correction.

Hitler was also gaining territory in 1944

The sharpest rebuttal comes from military history. Hitler was winning World War II in 1944: controlling more territory than in 1939. Germany was winning World War I in 1918: more territory than in 1914. In both cases, accumulated conquest coexisted with ongoing defeat. The parallel doesn’t prove anything alone, but clarifies that the occupied territories map is a lagging indicator: it measures the past, not the real position in the game.

The objection is completed with a figure. To attack requires a firepower advantage of 1.3 to 1, and the Russian army, traditionally inefficient in such operations, would need up to 3 to 1 superiority to achieve it. Hence the launch of rapid, surprise operations—including paratroopers—rather than frontal assaults.

Helicopters firing upward: no one knows why

The technical detail that sparked discussion was another. Several videos show Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters firing rockets in parabolic trajectories instead of direct fire. The rockets are unguided, and theoretically neither side has systems to correct fire on a curved trajectory, so accuracy is practically nil.

Explanations pile up, none fully convincing: dumping ammunition, appearing to commanders to have attacked a target, or avoiding combat and risk of being shot down. Some call it third-world practice; others note it’s observed on both sides. Without hit data, any conclusion is conjecture.

From Plan A to Plan C without leaving Donbas

Another school orders the narrative by phases. There was a Plan A—triggering the fall of the Ukrainian government—that allegedly failed. A Plan B—the conquest of Donbas—that also fell short. And a Plan C resembling damage control more than a campaign: seeing what can be kept without total disaster. The paratrooper landing at Hostomel airport supports this thesis: troops aren’t dropped behind enemy lines unless linking up within days is expected. It didn’t happen.

Opposing this is volume data. Western material delivered to Ukraine wouldn’t represent even 10% of what NATO could deploy in a conventional confrontation, involving aviation, navy, and tanks. Ukraine didn’t start from zero either: attributed with Europe’s largest army after Russia’s, reinforced for years with instructors and training centers. How much survives without general Russian mobilization remains to be seen.

Even military channels aren’t aseptic

Yago himself got caught in crossfire. He’s been criticized for predicting Russia would take Ukraine in days and surround Kyiv, and conversely for being a NATO mouthpiece spreading unverified news in real-time. The most uncomfortable detail is methodological. His Russian casualty data reportedly come from social media, while Ukrainian casualties—which only Russia publishes—are ignored. Distrust falls on the side, not the sources.

Those claiming to trinc only channels waiting weeks to confirm facts point to the same sore spot: no one is neutral, and those boasting neutrality often sell the most. Some recommend alternatives; others note even cited maps end up tonalidad-coded.

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In the end, the only certainty enduring scrutiny is that the front line moves slowly and each side takes its share. Some will say Russia wins because it occupies more; others, that it lost because it didn’t fulfill promises. Both can be true simultaneously. What doesn’t hold is asking the map to decide something only time decides.