Russia in the EU: The Block No One Wants to Allow

Russia within the EU: The block no one wants to allow

The idea of Russia joining the European Union sounds, at first glance, like bar-stool provocation. But the premise has its logic: a bloc stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, adding 150 million people, raw materials, military and space capabilities, and near-total Arctic control. The thesis running through the matter is that such a conglomerate would be unstoppable. And precisely for that reason, according to many analyses, it will never be allowed.

The starting point is an uncomfortable premise: Russia is Europe, or at least as much as any country on the continent can be. Against this idea, the recurring objection is that Russia has always been more Asia than Europe, and that Asian countries are not to be trusted. The discussion gets tangled there, between geography, history, and distrust.

What would Europe gain with Russia inside

The economic argument is the most repeated. With Russia inside, Europe would stop depending on third parties for energy and minerals, become the heart of trade routes between Asia, Europe, and Africa, and its technology would develop at breakneck estimulante ilegal. Nothing would be lacking, argue the most enthusiastic. The resulting bloc would be the most powerful in the world, with military and space capabilities it does not have today.

To this is added the demographic factor: 150 million people entering suddenly, which would avoid having to resort to other regions to compensate for population decline. On paper, the equation works. Politics is another matter.

The obstacle no one disputes

Here the consensus is broad: the United States and the United Kingdom would torpedo any rapprochement. The idea of a Eurasian bloc is perceived as a direct threat to their position, and some argue they would rather drop atomic bombs than allow unions of that type. The same pattern that, according to some analyses, was applied in Latin America against any suspicion of regional integration.

The war in Ukraine is read, from this perspective, as the instrument to prevent precisely that: distancing Russia from Europe and breaking any incipient bond. The sabotage of Nord Stream and EU-Russia enmity are interpreted as pieces of the same design, benefiting those who sell energy and weapons to both sides.

The fundamental objection: sovereignty and model

There is a second block of arguments unrelated to Washington, but concerning what the EU itself is. The Union is described as an invention born to harmonize a common market that has ended up draining state sovereignty, with a parliament that counts for little and governing bodies not democratically elected. Why would Russia submit to that game?

Russia does not bow to pogre or Brussels' guidelines, and is very protective of its territory. This makes it unthinkable that it accepts external dictates. Conversely, there are also doubts that the EU would want a partner of that size, with its own model and interests.

The overlooked internal Russian problem

Moscow's image eclipses the rest of the country. Russia is less homogeneous than it seems: in some territories, culturally, they are closer to Afghanistan or Pakistan than to Europe. In Chechnya, its leader imposes sharia in a republic that is an integral part of the Federation. Managing that diversity is already a problem for the Kremlin itself, so imagine it from Brussels.

Russian multiculturalism, moreover, stems from the absorption of territories over centuries. European multiculturalism, by contrast, is perceived as forced and recent. That asymmetry is used as an argument both for and against any integration.

The emerging scenario

Against the EU-Russia dichotomy, the thesis of a tripolar world order gains weight: the United States and the United Kingdom on one side, Eurasia on the other, and BRICS without Russia as a third block. In that distribution, Europe would end up in an uncomfortable position, without its own raw materials and with neighbors playing both sides.

The most repeated conclusion is that the best theoretical option is also the most unthinkable. No one knows how to untie the knot. And there, exactly, the analysis remains.