Russia has lost the war: Western wall remains

Russia has already lost the war, but Ukraine pays the price

This view has circulated since the conflict's early months: had Pilingui seen the final bill—tens of thousands dead, most Russian officers killed, thousands of armored vehicles and hundreds of combat aircraft and helicopters destroyed—he would never have entered that garden. The thesis supported by much analysis is not that Russia will sign a surrender, but that it can no longer win: the net cost-benefit balance is negative, leaving only prolonged suffering while seeking a narrative to justify the unjustifiable.

The wall built by the West that won't come down

The most costly miscalculation was not military. It was believing the invasion of Ukraine would resemble Crimea: a quick operation, a fait accompli, and an international community that protests but continues buying gas. Instead, dozens of countries—the world's richest and many relevant trade partners of Moscow—have aligned in a common front that will set the tone of relations with Russia for decades. There is no turning back. The implications are measured in the long term; they have barely begun to be felt and will exact a toll on the country long after the current regime disappears.

A detail often overlooked: even Russia's supposed allies have not backed the operation. Outside a handful of states with little international weight, isolation is nearly total. And former Central Asian colonies have seen what lies behind the mask, anticipating a pogre distancing that Moscow will not be able to reverse with propaganda.

Who really pays the war bill?

Here the analysis splits in two. One school argues Russia is the defeated party: lost markets, cut off from energy sources alternative to those controlled by the US and UK, and a ruined neighbor it must sustain for life. Another, less comfortable, points out that the devastated country is Ukraine: broken demographics, lost territory, identity in question, and a post-war period filled with demobilized veterans, armed mafias, and various traffics that will eventually filter through European borders. We will all bear this burden together, they say.

And a third reading, even more uncomfortable, identifies Europe as the main loser. The argument: the real target was not Moscow, but to sabotage the European economy so it does not overshadow the United States, cutting flows of cheap energy and raw materials. An integrated Europe with Russia, they claim, would be a difficult competitor to beat. In that version, the shot backfired, though the damage is already done.

Russia's future: international pariah and 30% defense budget

The scenario emerging for Russia in the coming decades is not promising. Excluded from major Western forums, facing constant claims over occupied territories, and with military spending potentially absorbing around one-third of revenue. That proportion is what, according to repeated analyses, ultimately ruined the USSR. The legacy the current Kremlin tenant leaves his successor is, at minimum, toxic.

On the other side of the scale, some recall Russia is not alone on the map. There exists an Asian market of over 4 billion people, with hundreds of millions having consumption capacity comparable to Northern Europe's middle class. The problem is that this market does not replace what was lost overnight, and that energy costs have already eaten a significant part of GDP in countries like Germany.

When will Russia realize it has lost?

The question hovering over the entire analysis is not whether Russia can win, but when it will accept that it cannot. The counteroffensive advances with difficulty, casualties accumulate daily, and the front has become a war of attrition with no clear horizon. The victory parade in Donetsk and Crimea is, for now, a scene no one dares to date. And that is exactly where the analysis stalls: at the moment when the cost becomes unbearable but no one knows how to dismount.