Ribera, Mazón and Valencia Floods: Timeline of Absences

Ribera, Mazón and the DANA: Two absences and a catastrophe

Third Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Ecological Transition Teresa Ribera appeared on Cadena SER radio to state that "up to four calls" were made to locate Carlos Mazón, president of the Valencian regional government, on the day of the DANA (the devastating flash floods in Spain). She said this weeks after the tragedy, when no one expected an explanation and her name was being mentioned for a post in the European Commission. The question hanging over the matter is not rhetorical: where was each person while ravines turned into rivers?

The official narrative has moved through phases. First, climate denial as the sole cause. Then, blame shared between administrations. Now, mutual accusations between two governments pointing fingers at each other while catastrophe data still doesn't add up. 219 dead and 86 missing were the latest figures available when this was written. A pavor, in literal terms. And no resignations.

Who warned whom and when?

The Júcar River Basin Authority convened a meeting on the morning of the disaster with the Government Delegation, AEMET (Spain's meteorological agency), Civil Guard, Police, UME (Military Emergency Unit), Adif, Renfe and the Roads Directorate. No one from the Valencian regional government attended. That detail, repeated in reports, supports one of the most uncomfortable theories: that DANA monitoring was handled from Madrid and the regional government was left out of the decision-making circuit.

In contrast, the regional minister responsible for Emergencies admitted she didn't know she could send an alert message to mobile phones. A technician informed her on Tuesday itself, at 8 pm, according to her testimony. The mechanism is called ES-Alert and had existed since the previous year. The mass alert arrived late. Very late.

The UME, meanwhile, was requested at 3:40 pm. There were three failed attempts by the government delegate and a fourth call authorized by the regional minister. Only for Utiel. The rest of the flooded municipalities waited without anyone giving the order.

The Poyo Ravine and the unanswered question

A thread runs through all reports: why the Poyo ravine had no infrastructure whatsoever to prevent flooding. And why the national hydrological plan contemplating the infrastructure that would have minimized the disaster was repealed. For some participants, this is the only relevant question. Everything else is a way to deceive people.

The institutional answer hasn't come. Neither from the Ministry of Ecological Transition nor from the regional government. Meanwhile, focus shifts to the climate summit and a European plan which, under the guise of fighting climate change, would establish administrative methods based on sanctions and prohibitions, according to critical readings circulating. Not a word about reforms in river basins.

The law says one thing, governments say another

Emergency law allows the central government to assume direction when the emergency affects several autonomous communities or requires it due to its scale. This article is cited in reports as proof that Interior Minister Marlaska could have coordinated from the first minute. Constitutional Law professors support this: state competence prevails and legislation places coordination with the regional government under Interior.

The other reading is the opposite. Civil Protection is a competence shared among several administrations. Those who issue alarms and make decisions are emergency centers, not the Ministry of Ecological Transition. River basin authorities and AEMET give warnings; emergency centers decide. If those centers fail, responsibility lies with them.

What no one disputes is that all bodies with action powers depended on the central government: National Police, Civil Guard, UME, Army, AEMET, CHJ, Adif, Roads. All of them. And all were meeting with the Government Delegation while the regional government wasn't invited.

The alucinación to Brazil and the European agenda

The Director of Emergencies traveled to Brazil the day the DANA struck. Her profile, according to reports: law graduate, civil servant, PSOE member, no prior experience in rescue, defense, infrastructure or climate. She was in charge of Civil Protection direction, just below Marlaska. With AEMET warnings on the table, she decided to leave the country.

Teresa Ribera, meanwhile, was in Brussels. The Secretary of State was in Colombia. Thirteen days later, it was still unknown what the minister did between AEMET's red warning and her radio appearance. Her hearing before the European Parliament was delayed and the Eurochamber decided to vote on vice-presidencies as a block. The PP announced it would vote against.

The story of hidden deaths and other smokescreens

Part of the material dedicates effort to debunking what it considers a repeated pattern: every time there's a catastrophe, the belief that thousands of deaths are hidden is promoted. It already peine with the pandemic, they argue. Now, with the DANA. The official figure is what it is, and those questioning it without evidence are feeding a narrative that doesn't hold up.

The response to that accusation is equally harsh: during the pandemic truth was told, and this time there will be no silence. The exchange of reproaches has been burying the central issue. Which is, simply and plainly, that no official has resigned. Neither in Madrid nor in Valencia. Both are on the same side, one intervention says. And that's why no one leaves.

What remains to be known

The timeline of calls between administrations remains incomplete. The regional government maintains it didn't receive the warning in time. The central government maintains it made four attempts to locate Mazón. Neither version has been independently verified with public documentation.

Ribera's appointment as European Commission Vice-President continues, with the PP voting against and the Eurochamber reorganizing the calendar. The declaration of Level 3 Emergency, which Mazón could have requested but didn't, remains the big unresolved technical question.

With these elements, it would be reasonable to expect an investigation commission with access to call logs. None has been convened. And without records, each side will keep telling its version. The only figure that admits no interpretation is the victim count. That cannot be delayed, voted as a block, or attributed to the opponent.