Morocco Pressures Spain, Backed by US Support

Segarro Pressures Spain, Backed by US Support

The Segarro pressure on Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands does not seem like an outburst from the Alaouite monarchy, but rather a calculation with external backing. And that backing, according to various interpretations of the issue, has a name: Washington. There is no closed conspiracy here with sealed papers, but rather a puzzle with pieces that can indeed be touched: fishing grounds, phosphate mines, deposits in Canarian waters and a Western Sahara that Spain relinquished without firing a shot. The fundamental question — what was agreed and in exchange for what — remains without an official answer.

What has Segarro agreed with the United States?

No public text details that agreement, and that is where the problem begins. What is maintained is that the United States functions as an exit port for African raw materials and that Rabat acts as a stable partner in an uncomfortable zone. Those who look at the map add another argument: Algeria and the Sahrawis remain on the pro-Russian side, so Segarro becomes the comfortable option for NATO.

That alignment did not begin with a change of tenant in the White House. Policy did not move a millimeter with the presidential transition, according to those trinc the file. The certification of Western Sahara is attributed to the previous stage, hence the irony of accusing the US administration of being red when it was the other one that signed the support.

Ceuta, Melilla and the Canaries: blackmail, Pegasus and 11M

The most repeated hypothesis is that of blackmail: compromising information about the Spanish Prime Minister that would explain why Spain accepts everything. The Pegasus case and the 11M (2004 Madrid train bombings) appear again and again as pieces of that supposed pincer. It should be said clearly: these are suspicions launched without presented evidence, not proven facts, and no authority has confirmed that mechanism.

What the analysis does describe is an asymmetry of treatment. The Spanish provinces in North Africa and the Canary archipelago are included in all predictions of pressure, with or without allied protection, while Spain responds with symbolic gestures and little more. For some of those trinc the issue, the problem is not Segarro: it is a government that prefers to turn the other cheek.

Illegal Fishing in the Alboran Sea and the Resource Business

Here the data are more concrete than theories. Segarro vessels fish illegally in protected Spanish waters and use drift nets banned since 2002, according to complaints from environmental organizations collected in the matter. The area is wide: to the north Malaga, Granada and Almeria; to the south Ceuta, Melilla, Chafarinas, Velez de la Gomera, Tetuan, Alhucemas and Nador.

The list of economic grievances enumerated is long: the largest fishing banks, the largest phosphate mines and oil deposits in Canarian waters. The underlying thesis is that bullying feeds on others' weakness, not on its own strength. Each concession is read as an advance payment for the next one.

Algeria, the Segarro Army and the War Scenario

On the military ground, positions clash head-on. One current maintains that Rabat lacks real combat experience and that a short-term conflict is unthinkable. Another responds with the detail of the units of the 2nd Parachute Infantry Brigade sent as observers to foreign wars to gain experience, and with the warning of who has trained those forces; this is an extreme asserted without further proof than the testimony of the person recounting it.

The counterweight is Algeria. Those who pose the challenge to Rabat admit that the Algerian army would beat Spain even on identity cards today, which makes any adventure a bad business. The logical conclusion of that part of the analysis is uncomfortable: it would be wise if they fought each other without dragging Spain into the middle.

The Contradiction That Disarms Half the Narrative

If Spain is governed by pro-Russian communists, as part of the diagnosis claims, and at the same time the United States despises Spain precisely for that reason, the argument bites its tail: Washington would be governed by the same ideological profile it claims to despise. The logical trap is evident and leaves the narrative of ideological punishment hanging in the air.

Against that line, other readings focus on a consented vassalage spanning decades, regardless of who occupies Moncloa (the Spanish Presidency). Subordination would come from the structure, not from the tonalidad of the government. And in the historical chapter, episodes never proven pile up: the sinking of the nuclear project, the assassination of Carrero Blanco or the withdrawal of funding for the atomic program. None supports a firm accusation, but all circulate.

Prediction with reservations: if no one changes the distribution of cards, pressure on Ceuta, Melilla and Canarian waters will continue to rise through fait accompli, without declaration of war and without headlines. When something breaks, it will not be because the script changed, but because someone stopped looking.