PP Has Not Repealed a Single PSOE Law Since 1996
According to calculations circulating among participants, the People's Party (PP) has not repealed a single Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) law since 1996. Neither under Aznar nor Rajoy. This data supports an uncomfortable thesis: the party presenting itself as the alternative governs with the opponent's regulatory framework intact. From there, the conversation shifted to a harsher issue: whether this paralysis is incompetence, complicity, or simple comfort in opposition.
The starting point was news about VOX's advance. The majority reaction did not target Abascal's party, but the PP. The repeated accusation: trinc the left's agenda and giving away votes along the way. "They are determined to gift them votes by mimicking the left," summarizes one intervention that sets the tone for the first responses.
Why Does the PP Not Repeal PSOE Laws?
The most cited answer is that they do not want to. A calculation circulating among participants argues that from 1996 to today, the PP has repealed zero PSOE laws, including the Aznar era, which many considered more combative. "Not a damn law," concludes the same message. The finding surprises even those investigating it.
From this emerges the dominant theory: the inherited framework suits the PP. The spending structure, the weight of public employment, and the pensioner bloc form an electoral base that no right-wing government wants to touch. "Add up pensioners, civil servants, the political industry plus various freeloaders," lists one intervention, finishing with: "A 60% share seems like few votes to me."
The repeated conclusion is that the PP and PSOE do not compete; they take turns. "The PPSOE [PP-PSOE duopoly] is impregnable. No wave can break that wall," argues one response. Another phrases it with more irony: "In the end, it comes down to the same thing: the blue PP and the green PP."
The Pact Nobody Rules Out: PP and PSOE Together
The scenario that causes the most concern is neither a VOX victory nor a Feijóo one. It is the sum of the two major parties. "The drama is that we are two news broadcasts away from a PP + PSOE pact," warns one intervention, placing the real axis of debate on globalism versus nationalism, not left versus right. Under this reading, PP, PSOE, Sumar, and their satellites would share a fundamental program.
The argument relies on migration policy. Some argue that the regularization drive promoted by the Government aimed to grow VOX at the expense of the PP, only to then stir antiestéticar of the far-right and regroup the left-wing vote. The sequence, according to this reading, would be deliberate: inflate the useful adversary and then present him as a threat.
In parallel, criticism of the popular leadership becomes personal. Feijóo appears portrayed as a leader who does not want to govern, comfortable in opposition and without clear guidance on anything. "He is very comfortable in opposition, taking it easy without getting involved in anything," summarizes a repeated theory. Another directly calls for a change in leadership and warns that replacing Feijóo with Ayuso is "swapping one socialist for another."
The Strategy VOX Should Trinc, According to Dominant Analysis
The most repeated recipe for VOX is not to moderate. It is the opposite: to demand. "We will force the PP to remove left-wing policies," proposes one intervention, demanding an end to talk of responsibility and a start to talking about concrete policies. The underlying thesis is that there is a social majority to dismantle the Government's agenda and that the PP does not execute it due to lack of will, not support.
The most elaborate variant proposes a bluff: VOX announces it will only govern with an absolute majority. The calculation is that the popular voter ends up seeing the PP as the PSOE of the 90s and VOX as the authentic PP of the 90s. It could backfire, they admit, leaving VOX without a governing option. Or it could work if the swing voters, those who join whoever they perceive as the winner, switch horses.
That swing voter is the key piece of the analysis. Some argue that a high percentage of the popular vote is not ideological but opportunistic, and moves when the perception of victory changes. That VOX has surpassed the PSOE in some localities is read as a critical signal: it stops being marginal and becomes a viable option. The full calculation, with thresholds and scenarios, warrants a long discussion.
The Unceasing Criticism: Guardiola and the Sanitary Cordon
The harshest flank targets the PP leadership for its relationship with VOX. One intervention reproaches Guardiola for facilitating the opponent's investiture and snubbing Ortega Lara's party. The underlying reproach: the sanitary cordon is applied inwardly, not against the PSOE.
The accusation of corruption runs through the final stretch. "That organization is corrupt, almost at the same level as the PSOE's, hence they protect each other at crucial moments," argues a response announcing it will not vote for the PP again. Another adds that the popular leadership acts as a crutch for the Government and drags the problem of not fighting the battle of ideas.
The most repeated closing is not hope, but a prediction with reservations. If the PP continues without repealing, without confronting, and without a candidate representing the sociological right, the transfer of votes to VOX should accelerate. It should. The PP's paralysis has lasted three decades without breaking, and nobody bets on it breaking now.
Key Data
- Zero PSOE laws repealed by the PP between 1996 and the date of the discussion, according to the calculation circulating in the analysis.
- The 60% vote for PSOE and PP is cited as the block sustaining the party system.