McGregor: Russia to Partition Ukraine and Enforce Neutrality

Russia to Keep Eastern Ukraine; West Forced into Neutrality

Can a war be won without annexing the invaded country? The growing thesis does not speak of taking Kyiv, but of splitting Ukraine in two and forcing the west to sign its neutrality. Colonel Doug McGregor confirms this: Russia would close access to the sea, advance to the Dnieper River, and leave resistance pockets and the capital for last. With half the territory secured, the other half sits down to negotiate.

What Does the McGregor Scenario Propose?

The sequence is specific: cut off sea access, launch from the east to the Dnieper, then clear the remaining pockets—especially urban ones—behind the lines, leaving Kyiv for last. Exactly the reverse of the initial attempt. The logic is not total occupation, but asymmetric pressure: controlling half the country is enough to force the other half to negotiate.

The underlying argument is cost-benefit. Annexing all of Ukraine would require strong and prolonged repression, which would truly wear down Moscow. Comparisons with the 1970s appear quickly—that type of subjugation is no longer on the table—and with it the conclusion: a reduced, neutral Ukraine allowed to exist.

Why the Dnieper Marks the Fracture Line

The river imposes geography. To keep the entire coast, including Odesa, one must cross it, and crossing becomes complicated from north to south. The objection is significant: there are areas east of the Dnieper that are far from pro-Russian, beyond Crimea and Donbas. These two territories are indeed considered mostly Russian and cited as an established starting point.

Kyiv adds its own problem. The capital is split between both banks, so dividing it requires a laboratory solution: the reference appearing is a Berlin surrounded by hostile borders, or a capital moved west leaving the city in no-man's-land. Where exactly the line falls remains unresolved, and this disagreement is the most honest part of the analysis.

The Two Ukraines Scenario

The model gaining traction among those ruling out full annexation has three pieces: Crimea integrated into Russia, an independent pro-Russian state like Belarus in the east, and a formally neutral but practically pro-European state in the west. The doubt, again, lies in the borders. Breaking down each scenario, friction point by friction point, offers much more substance than the headline.

And a detail almost nobody highlights: the remaining Ukraine will have it tough. It occupies territory claimed by Poland as its own, delivered to it by Stalin at the time. An outstanding dispute that turns neutrality into a truce with an expiration date. If Warsaw demands its historical share, someone will recall the German territories Poland currently occupies: either fait accompli stands, or the roulette keeps spinning.

Northern Flank Closes Its Two Gaps

What changes on the ground is the defensive architecture of Northern Europe. With new partners joining the Atlantic orbit, two defensive gaps disappear, and cohesion on the northern flank no longer relies on good words. The timeline can be debated—not in June, perhaps mid-summer—but the effect is the same: holes through which pressure could be applied without friction are plugged.

There are two readings of the same map. For one, it is a European victory that Europe has not yet digested. For the other, the Alliance is a source of permanent conflict because it has no other objective, and the best outcome would be its dissolution with Russia inside the European space. Very little intersection between the two views.

Who Pays the Energy Bill?

The economic front leaves the uncomfortable part. The bill hits the pocket: electricity, gas stations, and a cost differential that has settled in for good. Some argue the outcome is a European victory that Europe doesn't know it has won; the trace in the cash register is harder to defend. Added to this are tariffs, cross-subsidies, German rearmament, and pressure on the welfare state.

The most repeated thesis has a bitter tone: Americans have dragged Europe into a mess from which there is no exit for decades, collecting the future while the continent ages paying. Higher gas prices first, industrial bills later. And the circular sarracena: if Moscow hadn't let itself be plundered, there wouldn't now be anyone plundering Europe. Not bad.

Given the level of agreement on the result—partition, neutrality, and European cost—one might expect a common policy built on that consensus. What exists is a coalition of good intentions negotiating with itself. Geography, meanwhile, does not wait.