Manstein’s elastic defense echoes in Ukraine after 80 years

Manstein’s «elastic defense» resurfaces in Ukraine after 80 years

Erich von Manstein is remembered for his elastic defense. He surrendered to the British after World War II and served eighteen years for war crimes. Eighty years after Kursk, his name reappears to explain the Ukrainian front: the old tactic of yielding ground to bleed the attacker, now applied trinc the Kharkiv counteroffensive. The parallel is compelling. The problem is it opens a more uncomfortable second front: who truly paid for the Soviet victory of 1945.

What was elastic defense and why did Manstein fail?

The concept is as old as war itself: instead of holding every meter, the line retreats, lets the attacker stretch supplies, and strikes back when enemy logistics break. Manstein applied it in Kharkiv in 1943—the same scenario today—and tried unsuccessfully later. He failed to break the Stalingrad siege with Operation Wintergewitter, lost at Kursk, the largest land battle in history, and could not prevent the Soviets from taking southern Ukraine at the Dnieper crossing.

His record does not support a heroic portrait either. Research cited in the debate suggests the marshal tacitly accepted Einsatzgruppen activities and did nothing to stop them. He ended the war surrendering to the British.

Kharkiv and the maneuver reopening the comparison

On the current front, the Ukrainian counteroffensive broke through the sector expecting least resistance. Leading the Armed Forces of Ukraine is Valerii Zaluzhnyi, a low-profile lieutenant general who moves with minimal acompañante to visit troops and whose name became public during the halt of the assault on Kyiv. Those comparing him to Manstein see an inverted elastic defense: letting the adversary overextend and striking where they are uncovered.

Not everyone buys the analogy. Some recall that Manstein also lost and that the elasticity blamed on him resulted in losing territory to others. Others argue that rigid lines reflect the attacker’s lack of resources, not the defender’s merit.

Lend-Lease: numbers behind an old reproach

According to figures cited in the debate, the US program distributed $31 billion worth of material to the UK and $11 billion to the USSR: 43% versus 28%. Of approximately 20,000 armored vehicles sent to the Soviets, half were Carriers, Stuarts, and Valentines—obsolete infantry support models.

The most repeated figures concern the critical phase. Aid in 1941 represented just 2.1% of the total program but equaled 15% of Soviet resources that year, with Germans at Moscow’s gates. In 1942, the percentage reached 14%, while industries relocated to the Urals had not yet reached full capacity. Nikita Khrushchev, who led the USSR between 1953 and 1964, stated that without US aid, the Soviet Union would not have won the war. Others add that without Studebaker trucks, troop movement would have been impossible, noting that boots, jeeps, and gear arrived alongside vehicles.

Russia has never won a war alone

The historical review circulating in parallel is even more uncomfortable. Russia counts three major victories: the Great Northern War, closed in 1715 with Prussia as an ally and British subsidies; the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon, involving Prussia, Austria, and more English money; and World War II, with Britain and the US on its side and American funding behind it. Without European allies and Anglo-Saxon financing, the balance sheet shows defeats.

The nuance introduced is that the Russian state as understood today did not exist during the steppe invasions from the 3rd century onward, and that since the widespread use of muskets and cannons, technological advantage shifted sides.

Is 1943 repeating in eastern Ukraine?

Ground forecasts remain open. Some argue August marked the turning point, that the Russian offensive in Donbas stalled with average advances of 300 meters daily, and that a collapse process is beginning that will push negotiations using gas and oil as bargaining chips. Others recall that eastern Ukrainian rivers slowed the Germans in 1943 and will slow any current advance, noting Crimea is far from hotspots.

A third group simply looks at the map and admits the chill. Some point out that in 1944, Germans had 66 divisions in France, eleven panzer, while allies landed with ten. Air superiority and destroyed logistics did the rest. That lesson was not invented by Manstein either.

Some also claim that 90% of Red Army radio equipment came via Lend-Lease. Germans and Western Allies mounted one radio per company. The Soviets, one per battalion.