Germany reopens coal plants while Russian supply looms large
Germany is restarting coal-fired power plants to cut its reliance on Russian gas, yet nearly half of the coal it imports also comes from Russia. Prices have already…
English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published
Germany reopens coal plants with half the supply in Russian hands
The paradox is textbook: Germany announces the reactivation of coal-fired power plants to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, yet almost half of the coal it imports also comes from Russia. The figures in the analysis of the announcement are stubborn: of the 31.82 million tonnes of coal imported in 2020, around 50% came from Russia, according to the Coal Importers Association. The United States and Australia trinc behind. The detail that keeps recurring in the breakdown: some 18.2 million tonnes of Russian coal went to electricity generation and 2.3 million to other uses.
The German decision reads like a plot twist. For years, German energy policy was built on the promise of switching off coal and closing nuclear plants, with Russian gas as the supposed clean transition. Now, the emergency forces it to switch on what it had demonised. And the problem is not only sarracena: it is logistical and about price.
Why is Germany going back to coal if it depended on Russian gas?
The official reasoning is simple: if Russia cuts off the gas, something else has to be burned. Coal is what there is. But the fine print dismantles the logic. Coal has multiplied its price fivefold, and that was before Europe announced the mass reopening of thermal plants. Some project a tenfold increase by the end of the year. As cheap energy, coal no longer works; as an emergency stopgap, it does.
The other leg of the argument is capacity. Germany barely imported any coal at the start of the century: with the mines of the Ruhr and the Saar it could supply itself. The first string of the pipeline that would change that peine in 2008. Before, gas arrived by ship. Now, according to the most widely repeated analysis, coal cannot be brought in from elsewhere because the infrastructure and contracts are tied to Moscow. The result is a dependence disguised as independence.
The Spanish coal that was shut down and the business that walked away
Spain appears in the conversation by contrast. Here the thermal plants were closed and facilities were demolished while Germany kept them in reserve. Domestic coal — anthracite, among the best quality alongside Polish — was left underground. The question hanging in the air: who benefits from Spain giving up a resource that is now rising in value? The answer being pointed to is uncomfortable: the same people who sold the transition as a business.
The technical detail that sneaks into the discussion is CO2 quotas. If Germany burns coal, how much does it pay to emit? Have those quotas been lifted for thermal plants? The answer is not settled. What is known is that the cost of building a Volkswagen ends up absorbing every energy surcharge.
The ozone layer, the car and the lost coherence
The German U-turn exposes a contradiction that affects the ordinary citizen. If coal is coming back, why is the person with a diesel or petrol car penalised? The logic of selective decarbonisation — tough on the individual, soft on industry — is laid bare. One more year of coal will not make a huge difference to the ozone layer, but it will to the credibility of the rules imposed on households.
Some go further and propose burning coal to make synthetic petrol through CO2 capture. The technology exists: direct coal liquefaction was the method that fuelled 90% of German planes, tanks and ships in the Second World War. It has not been used again since 1945, apart from experiments in China. The question is whether anyone dares to revive it.
The calculation nobody wants to make public
The full breakdown of costs — transport, quotas, the international price of coal, port capacity — yields a surprising difference. It is not just that coal is expensive: it is that the green alternative is not ready to cover the peaks. Solar and wind are advancing, but storage and hydrogen remain in limbo. Without them, the only way to get through a winter without Russian gas is to burn something.
The discussion drifts towards storage. Five portable regasification plants are expected within three months to a year, and two permanent ones later on. With that infrastructure, Russian gas would be living on borrowed time. Until then, coal is the wild card. And the wild card comes, in large part, from Russia.
The question is not whether Germany can afford to burn coal. It is whether it can afford not to. And if the coal it burns comes from the same place as the gas it says it wants to avoid, what is the gesture worth?
The paradox is textbook: Germany announces the reactivation of coal-fired power plants to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, yet almost half of the coal it imports also comes from Russia. The figures in the analysis of the announcement are stubborn: of the 31.82 million tonnes of coal imported in 2020, around 50% came from Russia, according to the Coal Importers Association. The United States and Australia trinc behind. The detail that keeps recurring in the breakdown: some 18.2 million tonnes of Russian coal went to electricity generation and 2.3 million to other uses.
The German decision reads like a plot twist. For years, German energy policy was built on the promise of switching off coal and closing nuclear plants, with Russian gas as the supposed clean transition. Now, the emergency forces it to switch on what it had demonised. And the problem is not only sarracena: it is logistical and about price.
Why is Germany going back to coal if it depended on Russian gas?
The official reasoning is simple: if Russia cuts off the gas, something else has to be burned. Coal is what there is. But the fine print dismantles the logic. Coal has multiplied its price fivefold, and that was before Europe announced the mass reopening of thermal plants. Some project a tenfold increase by the end of the year. As cheap energy, coal no longer works; as an emergency stopgap, it does.
The other leg of the argument is capacity. Germany barely imported any coal at the start of the century: with the mines of the Ruhr and the Saar it could supply itself. The first string of the pipeline that would change that peine in 2008. Before, gas arrived by ship. Now, according to the most widely repeated analysis, coal cannot be brought in from elsewhere because the infrastructure and contracts are tied to Moscow. The result is a dependence disguised as independence.
The Spanish coal that was shut down and the business that walked away
Spain appears in the conversation by contrast. Here the thermal plants were closed and facilities were demolished while Germany kept them in reserve. Domestic coal — anthracite, among the best quality alongside Polish — was left underground. The question hanging in the air: who benefits from Spain giving up a resource that is now rising in value? The answer being pointed to is uncomfortable: the same people who sold the transition as a business.
The technical detail that sneaks into the discussion is CO2 quotas. If Germany burns coal, how much does it pay to emit? Have those quotas been lifted for thermal plants? The answer is not settled. What is known is that the cost of building a Volkswagen ends up absorbing every energy surcharge.
The ozone layer, the car and the lost coherence
The German U-turn exposes a contradiction that affects the ordinary citizen. If coal is coming back, why is the person with a diesel or petrol car penalised? The logic of selective decarbonisation — tough on the individual, soft on industry — is laid bare. One more year of coal will not make a huge difference to the ozone layer, but it will to the credibility of the rules imposed on households.
Some go further and propose burning coal to make synthetic petrol through CO2 capture. The technology exists: direct coal liquefaction was the method that fuelled 90% of German planes, tanks and ships in the Second World War. It has not been used again since 1945, apart from experiments in China. The question is whether anyone dares to revive it.
The calculation nobody wants to make public
The full breakdown of costs — transport, quotas, the international price of coal, port capacity — yields a surprising difference. It is not just that coal is expensive: it is that the green alternative is not ready to cover the peaks. Solar and wind are advancing, but storage and hydrogen remain in limbo. Without them, the only way to get through a winter without Russian gas is to burn something.
The discussion drifts towards storage. Five portable regasification plants are expected within three months to a year, and two permanent ones later on. With that infrastructure, Russian gas would be living on borrowed time. Until then, coal is the wild card. And the wild card comes, in large part, from Russia.
The question is not whether Germany can afford to burn coal. It is whether it can afford not to. And if the coal it burns comes from the same place as the gas it says it wants to avoid, what is the gesture worth?
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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (99 replies).
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