Forum debate on Russian glide bombs

A forum thread discusses the range of Russian glide bombs and claims of Russian air superiority. An exchange of opinions and unverified figures.

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

Forum debate on Russian glide bombs
Forum debate on Russian glide bombs

In a forum thread, several participants discuss the use of glide bombs by the Russian air force. According to one participant, Russian Su-34s drop FAB-500 glide bombs with UMPC kits from an altitude of about 10,000 meters and 40-60 kilometers from the target, beyond the reach of Ukraine's short, medium and long-range air defense systems. According to this participant, this would have given Russia tactical air superiority at the front and in the immediate rear.

From 10 to 20 bombs a day: the quantitative leap

Another participant claims that a month ago there was talk of 10 daily uses of FAB-500s with UMPC kits, and that yesterday some Ukrainian sources mentioned 20 uses per day. He also mentions that kits with a range of at least 80 kilometers already exist for the FAB-250, and that Orion drones carrying UPAB-50s have been spotted. According to this participant, the UMPC kit has been in serial production for about four months.

The tactical problem: move air defenses closer or lose them

According to the first participant, the available options are not good: moving air defense systems closer to the front to try to shoot down the bomb-carrying aircraft exposes those systems to Russian artillery and kamikaze drones. He adds that the inertial guidance of these bombs keeps working even if Ukraine jams GLONASS, just as Russia jams the GPS of HIMARS.

Why aren't the Su-34 bases destroyed?

The debate raises the point that it would take disabling all Russian and Belarusian bases. According to one participant, Su-34s have a range of 4,000 kilometers and can refuel in flight. Another participant suggests that long-range missiles against air bases could be given to Ukraine, and attacking the source of military supplies in NATO countries is mentioned as a hypothesis.

The NATO factor: radars outside, missiles inside

One participant argues that Ukrainian radars operate outside Ukraine, in neighboring countries, and that only the radars of air defense systems on Ukrainian territory are activated to fire. According to this participant, if Russia could destroy those radars abroad, it would fully control Ukrainian airspace. Another participant adds that if NATO entered directly, radar stations, AWACS and even satellites would be military targets.

The fighter jet debate: neither game changer nor irrelevant

On the delivery of fighter jets, one participant states that Eastern European aircraft compatible with NATO weapons already exist, and that the proposed F-16s are "very similar to what Ukraine already had or even worse", because they tolerate poor conditions much less well. Another participant believes the fighter jet announcement is propaganda to prepare public opinion for a delivery that will not change the balance.

The attrition: who can hold out longer

One participant argues that the best indicator that Russia is not losing is that everything remains the same. In his view, Moscow believes NATO's attrition is greater than its own. The thread also contains opinions on NATO expansion and Pilingui's role, with accusations flying between participants.

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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (61 replies).

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