Dual vocational training reshapes industrial employment access

Dual vocational training reshapes industrial employment access

A 16-year-old in work overalls, spending half the week at school and the other half in a factory, earning a wage from day one. This is the portrait of dual vocational training (FP dual), a model that has restructured the entry point to the industrial sector and, according to analysis, has emptied public job postings of technical roles: companies no longer need to advertise vacancies because every year a new batch of candidates arrives from local training centers. The starting thesis is that those who do not go through this route can only access unskilled labor, unless they pursue university.

The contrast with the vocational training of the 80s and 90s is the core of the matter. Back then, it is argued, schools and companies operated separately, many qualifications did not include internships, and many graduates never worked in their field. Dual training, instead, places the student in the company from day one and, according to this reading, eliminates much of the filler coursework.

How dual vocational training differs from traditional models

The German model is the reference cited to explain this leap. In pure dual training, the apprentice does not just do an internship: they apply for a company offer, undergo a selection process, and sign an apprenticeship contract, which requires attending a trade school two days a week for theory. The company trains; the school supports. This architecture, applied here, explains why technical positions are no longer appearing on the open market.

Not everyone buys this narrative. Part of the analysis suggests that access to companies has always depended on factors unrelated to merit: having parents working in the factory where the training takes place is, it is said, the fastest way to stay. Others recall that in the 80s and 90s there were also internships for those who wanted them, and some people moved through five or six companies during their studies, with payments included in some cases. The novelty, they insist, is not the contact with the company, but its mandatory and continuous nature.

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Apprentice wages and the true cost of training

Here comes the data that dampens the enthusiasm. A dual training student works eight hours a day and earns around 800 euros a month, a figure below the national minimum wage (salario mínimo interprofesional). Those who defend it as an opportunity present it as a stage: after two years, the salary rises to about 1,300 euros. Critics respond with the context: these are jobs with constant risk, dirty, noisy, leaving black residue and spiking cancer rates from age 40 onwards. What in Switzerland pays 7,000, here stays at 1,300, and is sold as a reason to celebrate.

The subsistence calculation also doesn't add up. With 800 euros a month, it is argued, after paying rent and food the balance is zero: two years working full-time just to eat and pay for a shared room. The full calculation, with all its items, leaves a margin that refutes the idea of a bargain.

Companies are also uncertain

The other open front is that of the companies. In industrially declining areas, students are described as demotivated because companies do not want to receive them: they see them more as a nuisance than as cheap labor. Only those with highly repetitive jobs show interest. At the other extreme, there are workshops that reject vocational students due to paperwork: registering them costs more than the old type of contract. In Andalusia, it is said, there was a tug-of-war until late December because the administration would not handle the registration and companies said they did not want interns that year due to the hassle with the Social Security (Seguridad Social).

Implementation is no longer voluntary. For years, it was a condition that new training cycles be launched in dual mode; now it extends to all lines. This shift forces companies to join the game, whether they like it or not.

Workshop instructors and the lack of equipment

There is a fundamental problem pointed out from within: workshop subjects are left to temporary teachers, because those with permanent positions prefer classroom subjects—the ones that don't get your hands dirty. The temporary teacher arrives in August without knowing what they will teach and in September finds themselves in a workshop they know nothing about. If they were lucky enough to have completed vocational training before, they might manage; if they come from an engineering background without having touched a machine, the result is what it is.

Added to that is the equipment. The circulating hypothesis is that dual training serves as a way for the administration to save on equipping institutes: if part of the training is done in the company, it is understood that materials and equipment are not needed. And the diagnosis regarding the level is not encouraging: dual students, it is said, graduate less prepared than those from conventional vocational training, and current plans are worse than previous ones.

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Why people say Spain is not Germany

The industrial argument completes the circle. Spain has stopped being competitive in industry, so the model doesn't matter: dual training, traditional vocational training, or university. It is even claimed that without public and European funds, the private sector would not last a year. And the public vocational training sector, it is added, is a waste of two years of life, with teachers lacking private-sector experience and an uncertain result. The summary is blunt: pack your bags or find a spot.

In response, those who see the glass half full point to demographics: companies are desperate to find people with vocational training. An example given is a 2,000-hour healthcare qualification, half of which is internships, with employment almost guaranteed upon completion.

The unsettling fact is not in any official statistic, but on the floor of a workshop: the owner no longer wants vocational students because they have to be officially registered, and before it was cheaper to hire them. When the incentive breaks, the model only exists on paper.