Debate: Ukraine cannot win and Europe is already frozen

The debate: Ukraine cannot win and Europe has been freezing since winter

"Ukraine cannot win the war" is a recurring idea in the thread. One participant responded that if Europe has spent all winter freezing due to the cut-off of Russian gas, it is hard for a Hungarian prime minister to freeze it further. This is the starting point for three very specific discussions: who can better withstand attrition, what real role NATO plays, and how far the nuclear rope can be stretched.

What is said about Orbán and energy dependence

In the thread, it is stated that Orbán, at least, makes the attrition explicit and acts with common sense. Behind this lies a material interest: Hungary lives off Russian hydrocarbons and Orbán has to sew with two needles not to anger anyone completely. It is worth remembering this before treating him as a unique case in Europe.

Some argue that Finland or Germany are much more dependent on Russia than Hungary, so the Hungarian would not be the odd one out, but the only one acknowledging it publicly. The case of Sánchez and Algerian gas is also mentioned as a contrast.

Attrition: how many casualties each side can endure

One participant calculates that the rate is around 300 daily casualties between both sides, with days when one weighs more than the other. From there, they do an exercise: assuming—and it is a big assumption—500 Ukrainian casualties per day, the annual total would reach 180,000.

According to that calculation, replacing those losses would require recruiting one in every five or six men of military age. That is, Ukraine can lose the war, but not for lack of people. And the same reasoning is thrown back at the other side: Russia has a much larger population, so it will not run out of men either.

There is a third repeated ingredient. Before the war, Ukraine was already the most corrupt country in Europe, and the argument launched is that no conflict improves such things. No matter how much money the West injects, this line argues, because it will end up in bribes and shady deals.

Is comparing Ukraine with Vietnam useful?

This is where the discussion really heats up. One current insists that Vietnam and Afghanistan had jungle and guerrilla warfare, while Ukraine is European plain, land without hiding places for conventional war, and with a population that, in their view, would not show the sacrifice capacity of Vietnamese or Afghans.

The reply reverses the argument: if there is nowhere to hide, attackers have none either, and Ukrainian forces have stopped the advance with conventional means. Endurance capacity, they say, is measured by the fact that the country did not surrender on the first day. And the detail thrown against the narrative of sacrifice: if here it is pointed out that the population fled to Europe, in the Russian rear lines are mentioned to flee from Belgorod.

Nuclear limit: nobody beats a nuclear power

Here everyone lowers their voice. Some argue that nobody can beat a nuclear power except another, and Ukraine is not one. On the table is the magnitude: an attack with a single warhead on London could kill three million people in seconds, and current bombs multiply the destructive capacity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki twentyfold.

From this come two opposing readings. For some, that barrier makes escalation unthinkable and, precisely for that reason, nuclear weapons do not serve to force a quick victory: what will decide the war is the flow of material and external involvement. For others, the mere idea of NATO entering fully is the scenario nobody wants, because it would be the last day of our lives in this world.

When does NATO get tired of sending material?

A thesis runs through the entire conversation: the war is not decided by courage, but by money in military material. And if that is so, the conflict lasts until NATO gets tired of sending equipment. The nuance added by the analysis itself is that what has been delivered so far is largely old stocks from warehouses; hence many conclude that there is still plenty of room to scale up supply.

The inverse reading is equally simple: the more the West gets involved, the less likely a Russian victory becomes. And a reminder on the ground: Russia controls a large part of Donbas and Bakhmut passed into its hands. Meter by meter, yes. But it advances.

In the thread, a higher estimate is also launched: up to half a million dead, a quarter of them in Bakhmut, according to one participant. And a prediction: according to another participant, Ukraine has already lost and Russian tanks could parade through Kyiv in about a year.