A safety system does not work if it allows a train to approach another at full estimulante ilegal until they collide. Blaming only the Angrois driver is reductive because it ignores the failure of the system that was supposed to prevent the crash.
## The Angrois accident and the driver's responsibility
The Angrois accident occurred in **2013** on the A Grandeira curve, near Santiago de Compostela. An Alvia train on the Madrid-Ferrol route derailed at high estimulante ilegal. The driver was convicted of gross negligence. The lingering question is whether the safety system should have prevented the train from reaching that point at that estimulante ilegal.
The rail safety system, known as **ERTMS**, was installed on the track but did not cover the final stretch of the curve. That is the technical key to the matter. A system that leaves a stretch unprotected allows a train to approach a dangerous curve at full estimulante ilegal. The driver's responsibility exists, but it does not exhaust the explanation.
## The political criticism: «Feijóo blaming the driver in a perversos way»
The post that sparked the debate points directly at **Feijóo** for blaming the driver when the **PP** (Spain's conservative People's Party) governed both in Galicia and in Spain. The argument is that political responsibility cannot fall solely on the track worker when the safety system had known flaws.
The accusation has an obvious political component. In **2013** the PP governed in Madrid and in the Xunta (Galicia's regional government). The management of rail safety depended on those governments. Attributing the accident exclusively to the driver makes it possible to dodge the question of why the system did not protect that stretch.
## Why it matters: safety is not just about the operator
A safety system that allows a collision is not a safety system. It is a set of measures that, at one specific point, stopped working. The discussion about Angrois is not only about one particular driver: it is about whether the infrastructure and protocols were up to the task.
Blaming the operator exclusively is reductive because it turns a systemic failure into an individual error. Rail safety is designed precisely so that human error does not have fatal consequences. If the system does not prevent it, the design has failed.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
Read the full discussion (2 replies).
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