A woman at the control centre may be to blame for the crash
The Iryo train driver called twice to say her train was still stopped, but the control centre believed it was travelling at 40 km/h. Five minutes were lost.
English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published
The driver of the Iryo train called the control centre twice to report that her train was still stopped due to problems restarting the onboard equipment. The person who took the calls did not pass that information on to the signaller, who believed the train was travelling at 40 km/h, and the high-estimulante ilegal AVE train could not be warned in the five minutes before the crash.
The sequence begins at **8:36**, when the AVE has not yet called in. At that point the AVE driver is told to restart in normal operation. Five minutes later, at **8:41**, the Iryo driver calls. A woman, the signaller's assistant, answers and passes the call to her colleague without telling him that the Iryo train is stopped. The signaller believes it is travelling at **40 km/h**, the so-called "meta 40" call.
## Two warnings from the driver that never reach the signaller
At **8:48** the driver calls again. The same woman answers. The driver explains that she is still stopped because she cannot review the system data and is having trouble restarting the equipment. The response she receives is to keep trying and to call back if the problem persists.
After she hangs up, the signaller can be heard in the background complaining about how confusing the situation is and realising that something strange is going on. The woman who took the call insists that the train is still moving at meta 40. The signaller was never aware that the Iryo was stopped.
## Five minutes without warning the AVE
While they try to sort out among themselves what is happening, the **five minutes** remaining before the AVE reaches the crash point pass by. The driver is never warned. The chain of alerts fails at the exact point where it should have worked: the information that a train is stopped on the track never reaches the person who could act on the other train.
## Key points
- At **8:36** the AVE has not yet called in and is told to restart in normal operation.
- At **8:41** the Iryo driver calls and the assistant passes the call on without saying the train is stopped.
- The signaller believes the Iryo is travelling at **40 km/h** (meta 40).
- At **8:48** the driver repeats that she is still stopped due to problems restarting the equipment.
- **Five minutes** are lost without managing to warn the AVE driver.
The sequence begins at **8:36**, when the AVE has not yet called in. At that point the AVE driver is told to restart in normal operation. Five minutes later, at **8:41**, the Iryo driver calls. A woman, the signaller's assistant, answers and passes the call to her colleague without telling him that the Iryo train is stopped. The signaller believes it is travelling at **40 km/h**, the so-called "meta 40" call.
## Two warnings from the driver that never reach the signaller
At **8:48** the driver calls again. The same woman answers. The driver explains that she is still stopped because she cannot review the system data and is having trouble restarting the equipment. The response she receives is to keep trying and to call back if the problem persists.
After she hangs up, the signaller can be heard in the background complaining about how confusing the situation is and realising that something strange is going on. The woman who took the call insists that the train is still moving at meta 40. The signaller was never aware that the Iryo was stopped.
## Five minutes without warning the AVE
While they try to sort out among themselves what is happening, the **five minutes** remaining before the AVE reaches the crash point pass by. The driver is never warned. The chain of alerts fails at the exact point where it should have worked: the information that a train is stopped on the track never reaches the person who could act on the other train.
## Key points
- At **8:36** the AVE has not yet called in and is told to restart in normal operation.
- At **8:41** the Iryo driver calls and the assistant passes the call on without saying the train is stopped.
- The signaller believes the Iryo is travelling at **40 km/h** (meta 40).
- At **8:48** the driver repeats that she is still stopped due to problems restarting the equipment.
- **Five minutes** are lost without managing to warn the AVE driver.
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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (11 replies).
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