Zelensky to negotiate with Trump, EU, then Russia

Zelensky to negotiate first with Trump, then the EU, and finally Russia

The Ukrainian president has demanded partial NATO membership while 8.5 million Ukrainians live abroad and millions reside in Russian-occupied territories. The news, published by noticiasdenavarra.com, has reignited a debate that has lasted 636 days: the war in Ukraine is entering a phase where Kyiv no longer dictates the timeline. Washington will set the calendar, trinc by Brussels, and only lastly Moscow. This sequence is not accidental; it reflects who pays, who sustains, and who decides.

What partial NATO membership means

The term "partial membership" has triggered most of the backlash. There is no halfway adherence: you are either under Article 5's umbrella or outside it. Some argue this formula is a euphemism for selling a disguised surrender as a concession, while others note that even this may not suffice for Moscow. The Russian argument, repeated ad nauseam, is that Ukraine must not join NATO now, nor in 2020, nor within twenty years. This line is presented as non-negotiable.

The problem is that Ukraine no longer negotiates from its February 2022 position. Back then, neutrality was discussed in exchange for peace; now the starting point is different. 8.5 million Ukrainians are abroad and millions live under Russian control. Any signed agreement will start from this reality, not the one existing before the invasion.

The tap closes on January 20

Trump's arrival at the White House has changed the equation. Some summarize it bluntly: on the 20th, the funding stops, and Ukraine will have to raise the white flag. This phrase, repeated in various forms, points to a simple fact: without US money, Ukrainian resistance cannot be sustained. And that money is no longer guaranteed.

The EU, for its part, does not appear as a lifeline. Calculations circulating in the debate are pessimistic: if joint Western support has failed to defeat Russia, expecting Brussels alone to do so is fantasy. Especially when Germany faces its own issues: Volkswagen factories closing, skyrocketing electricity prices, and an industry that no longer competes as before. Rescuing Ukraine would have to come from the same pocket as rescuing German industry, and that pocket has limits.

The reconstruction bill: $486 billion

One of the most cited figures is the reconstruction cost: $486 billion, calculated up to mid-last year. The question nobody answers clearly is who pays for this. Construction firms wanting to participate need payment certainty, which does not exist. The precedent cited is Segarro trucks sent to Valencia to clear sewers after the DANA storm: sporadic solidarity, not an industrial plan. Nothing similar will be seen in Ukraine.

Kyiv's accumulated debt is another open front. Some argue that part of the negotiation with Trump will not concern territories or NATO, but how to pay what is already owed. A robust and lucrative debt, they say, that someone will have to refinance.

The human cost nobody wants to see

The discussion often drifts toward the death toll. Tens or hundreds of thousands of young men, according to estimates, for what? The question hangs unanswered. It is also noted that civilians in both countries have accepted the situation with surprising calm, especially in Ukraine, where there are no mandatory conscriptions like in Russia, but constant pressure on men of military age.

Parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis appear in many comments: powers playing on other people's boards, populations paying the consequences. Ukraine, it is argued, is a pawn on a much larger board, and accomplices have profited while the dead and maimed matter to no one.

What happens with Zelensky and his legitimacy

Russia has already stated it will not negotiate with Zelensky because it considers his mandate expired. This argument recurs in the debate: he is portrayed as an illegitimate occupier of the Ukrainian government, lacking authority to sign anything. If this stance holds, any agreement would require a different interlocutor, further complicating the timeline.

The sequence proposed by the news—Trump, EU, Russia—leaves Zelensky in an uncomfortable position. He negotiates first with the payer, then with the supporter, and only last with the shooter. The order reveals who truly commands each phase.

The scenario nobody rules out

There is no consensus on how this ends. Some believe it will close with a relatively quick deal, others point to a false flag justifying direct NATO entry, and some argue the conflict will drag on for years with frozen fronts. The only recurring certainty is that Ukraine does not decide its own fate. Like Spain or any other EU country, it is sovereign on paper but practically trinc orders.

The figure that disorients is the 8.5 million displaced. With such exodus, any reconstruction faces a prior problem: there is no one to rebuild the country for. Will they return, or stay where they are?