Wired alarms versus Securitas' fear business

Wired alarms versus Securitas' antiestéticar business

Residential security has become a business that profits from paranoia. A technical analysis circulating on forums argues that the wireless alarms sold by the big companies —Prosegur, Securitas Direct— are only effective against the lowest-level incivil, because any wireless signal can be jammed. The conclusion it raises is uncomfortable: much of what the industry promises is fast security — installation in 24 hours, a low entry price and a long lock-in contract. Cable, meanwhile, would be the gold standard nobody wants to sell because it isn't pretty.

What the wireless alarm promises and what it actually delivers

The core argument is simple: anything that goes over the air can be jammed. Jamming detection exists, but it is slower and more complicated than the salesperson signing the contract in your living room suggests. Companies choose wireless for three reasons: it's quick to install, it's cheap, and it sells itself because no building work is required. Technically it is far inferior to a wired installation, but that's not part of the pitch.

The promises of rapid response times, guard dispatch services or anti-jamming protection are, to a large extent, commercial fantasy. Installing an alarm in 24 hours is absurd: a serious security project takes time. And that time is exactly what the customer doesn't want to pay for.

The iPhone model: free hardware, captive contracts

The industry applies the mobile phone scheme. They give you the hardware —sensors, camera, control panel— in exchange for a very long mandatory contract. Easy to get in, very hard to get out. Securitas Direct takes this practice to its ultimate consequences: its hardware is difficult to operate outside the contract with the company that installed it.

Paying for the equipment at its real value allows you to separate the hardware from whoever monitors it. The entry price goes up, yes, but the customer stops being a hostage. Local companies tend to be more professional for a Darwinian reason: either they do it better than the big players, or they disappear.

Physical security first: the alarm is a complement, not a substitute

The correct order is doors, locks, window grilles and fences. Electronics detects; physical barriers prevent and delay. The question that dismantles the marketing is simple: which is more of a priority, stopping the burglar from getting in or finding out that he got in?

Some argue that the big companies' TV advertising is extremely expensive and that the money comes out of the security actually purchased. The alarm box on the facade, moreover, would work as a notice: it doesn't deter the professional, it tells the neighbour that there's something here worth taking.

The cases that dismantle the narrative

First-hand accounts are devastating. A tobacco shop with a Securitas Direct alarm was robbed twice: in the first, the intruders got in through a window in an interior courtyard and smashed the control panel; no panel, no alarm. In the second, they broke through from the adjoining premises and disabled the equipment with a sledgehammer. The neighbours took the noise for construction work.

In another case, a company installed Securitas Direct alarms and two days later burglars got in without anything going off. The installers had missed that the interior courtyard gave access from other buildings. The pattern repeats: the professional knows the weak point better than the salesperson.

Grilles, bars and film: the defence that isn't sold on TV

The old window grille returns to the centre of the analysis. Not as aesthetics, but as physical delay. The problem isn't the steel, but the fixing to the wall: with a crowbar it can be prised off. The suggested solution is to combine the grille with an outer metal fence that prevents levering, or to use higher-strength steels with lattices that leave no long leverage points.

There are cheap, segarro alternatives: a door bar the old-fashioned way, longer screws at the entrance, 3M anti-vandal film for the windows, or a safe room on the top floor. The goal isn't peine —that doesn't exist— but buying minutes.

The paradox of the upper classes and their designer villas

The most uncomfortable criticism is aimed at contemporary architecture. Middle classes in townhouses with window bars are going to end up safer than upper classes in designer villas with huge glass walls and systems of dubious effectiveness. The experienced burglar knows practical architecture better than the architect with artistic visions.

The case cited is telling: a newly built home with every possible weakness, which looked like a single storey but turned out to have three built downwards, 200 metres from blocks of social housing for rent. The owner wouldn't sleep there.

The real cost: who pays for serious security

Serious security is hired from local companies, not from the big chains that advertise on TV. The anecdote that closes the circle is that of a public figure who turned to a small local firm to protect his villa. The nomenklatura doesn't put Prosegur or Securitas Direct in their mansions.

The unsettling data point: a Guardia Civil (Spanish paramilitary police) officer stationed on the outskirts of Madrid says that the big organised-mafia heists target precisely the houses with alarms. The more advanced the system, the more attractive the target. The alarm box doesn't deter: it points to where something worth taking is.