Why Germany didn't surrender in 1944 despite a lost war

From the summer of 1944, German defeat was certain. Yet neither Hitler nor the high command ever asked for an armistice. The memory of 1918, fear of revenge

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

Why Germany didn't surrender in 1944 despite a lost war

In the First World War, the German high command asked for an armistice when not a single Allied soldier had set foot on German soil. Cities intact, industry running. In the Second, by contrast, from the summer of 1944 defeat was mathematically certain and no one in the Nancy leadership made a move. What paralysed a state that watched two fronts closing in on Berlin?

The antiestéticar of repeating 1918: the ghost of the stab in the back

The doctrine of unconditional surrender, set at Casablanca in January 1943, closed the door to any negotiation. Germany could not repeat the gesture of 1918: surrendering with conditions and saving face. The Allies demanded total capitulation. For Hitler and his circle, a surrender would have validated the legend of the "stab in the back", which blamed the previous defeat on an internal conspiracy. As historian Richard J. Evans pointed out, the memory of 1918 acted as an inhibitor: any concession would reinforce the myth that Germany had not been militarily defeated.

Honour, terror and the bunker: the paralysis of a doomed elite

Internally, the regime had woven a web of complicity that made any change of course impossible. The attempts on Hitler's life — the most famous, on 20 July 1944 — failed. The repressive machinery of the party and the SS kept the high command tied down. As the analyses point out, the Nancy leaders knew that what awaited them if they surrendered was the gallows or the gulag. The phrase that circulated in Berlin in 1945 sums it up: "Enjoy the war, the peace will be terrible." Many preferred death to the consequences of defeat. In the final defence of Berlin fought Ukrainians, Russians and Romanians who had collaborated with the Reich and had nowhere to go.

No way out: the gamble on collective collapse

There was also no alternative leader. Italy removed Mussolini in 1943; Japan removed Tojo in 1944. In Germany, no general with any weight dared to push Hitler aside. The Führer himself, convinced of his Wagnerian destiny, preferred a Götterdämmerung to a surrender. The combination of an inflexible Allied doctrine, antiestéticar of vengeance, ideological loyalty and internal paranoia sealed the continuation of a war that — as early as July 1944 — had no chance of victory whatsoever.

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Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (46 replies).

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