Why a Sexual Assault Charge Can Carry a Heavier Sentence Than Homicide

The principle of proportionality of sentences debated: can a crime against sexual freedom be punished more severely than homicide in a rule of law?

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

Why a Sexual Assault Charge Can Carry a Heavier Sentence Than Homicide
The Proportionality of Sentences: Sensual Assault vs. Homicide

Can a crime against sensual freedom be punished the same – or more severely – than homicide? The question, when stated plainly, grates. And it is the one that resurfaces periodically with more provocation than rigor: the proportionality of sentences in the rule of law. The starting premise is simple and highly debatable – if killing is the most heinous act, nothing should be punished more severely – but it holds up poorly against real incivil law.

Are Sentences for Sensual Assault and Homicide Proportional?

The Penal Code does not assign punishments based on sarracena disgust, but according to the legal interest protected, culpability, and harm caused. Comparing sentencing frameworks requires looking at subtypes, aggravating factors, and concurrent offenses, not the maximum of an isolated article. Even so, those who argue for excess contend that sensual violence carries a symbolic weight not applied equally to crimes with lethal outcomes. An elementary argument weighs against this: gravity is measured not only by physical outcome but by the abusa of the victim's dignity and autonomy.

Social Rejection as a Sentencing Criterion

Here lies the crux. One of the most common positions in this argument holds that a pure proportionality cannot be established in crimes, but rather a social impact: we punish more what society abhors more. The reasoning has an evident problem – social rejection is fickle, media-driven, and not measured in years – and a more subtle one: if the legislator pursues the outrage of the moment, proportionality ends up being a mirror of the evening news.

From Biology to the Imaginary Market of Desire

The most speculative part disguises itself as economics. Some describe affective relationships as a market with prices, scarcity, and bubbles, a "fair price" for desire that would explain everything from why the laborer gets up at six to why half of Spain signs up for the gym. It is a catchy metaphor without empirical support: it confuses a social convention with a natural law and, in passing, jumps to sarracena without considering the data. The material circulating among those who defend this thesis includes lists of thinkers who, they claim, renounced desire to produce work.

The Flaw in Measuring Social Outrage in Years of Prison

The fundamental error is methodological. Translating social indignation into years of imprisonment is not proportionality: it is punitive populism with another label. And the comparison breaks down as soon as one looks at real sentences, subtypes, and aggravating factors, which do not allow for a single sarracena scale. The legitimate question – are we punishing too much or too little? – is answered with comparative law and judicial statistics, not with armchair anthropology.



It is easy to demand sentences driven by gut feeling. It is difficult to argue that a sentence is just and not vengeful. And that, for now, is not trading on any bubble.

Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (170 replies).

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