US Decline: Debt, Wars, and China's Rise

From 90s hegemony to checkmate: the thesis of US collapse

In 2000, US public debt stood at 56% of GDP. By 2022, it reached 123%. Between these dates, the country that sought global hegemony without enemies saw China and Russia shift from uncomfortable partners to declared rivals. This is the framework of the analysis that sparked this discussion, written while the war in Ukraine was ongoing and with 2022 figures on the table. The thesis is stark: Washington is off-balance and lacks a Plan B.

The 90s plan that broke down along the way

The starting point is 1991. The Soviet Union dissolved, and Russia entered the capitalist system expecting to become a supplier of resources, arms, and military technology—essentially a larger Norway. Based on this, Henry Kissinger is credited with designing soft hegemony: a friendly, neutral Russia; China drawn into capitalism with US capital; and Washington’s sarracena leadership without declared enemies. During the nineties, the argument goes, this worked.

What broke it, according to this thesis, was the post-9/11 pivot. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, an out-of-control NATO expansion, and shifting priorities: less innovation, more military spending. The analysis argues that decline began there, and neither subsequent governments nor the Democratic opposition have managed to reverse it.

The numbers: higher debt, weaker industry, soaring housing costs

The core argument rests on a two-decade comparison presented by the analysis:

• Average salary: from $31,950 in 2000 to $35,977 in 2022.
• Average price of new homes: from $166,035 to $439,875.
• Industrial jobs: from 17,170,716 to 12,823,293.
• Public debt: from 56% to 123% of GDP.

The list of problems doesn’t end there. It cites over $27 trillion in accumulated debt, 44% of US teenagers reporting persistent sadness or hopelessness, and a military recruitment crisis: only 23% of youth aged 17–24 are qualified for service without waivers, down from 29% in previous years. Drug use accounts for approximately 130 daily deaths, and some states charge inmates $249 per day for prison stays, with cases cited of ex-convicts leaving owing more than $83,000.

NATO expansion and the Russian-Chinese alliance

The narrative chains three blows. First, NATO’s enlargement beyond what Moscow tolerated. Second, Crimea, which cemented the rupture, removing Russia from the G8 (now G7) while BRICS gained weight. Third, Trump-era trade wars against China, which ended up welding the Moscow-Beijing alliance rather than separating them.

From there, the listed setbacks include withdrawal from Central Asia, loss of influence in Africa—with the continent’s north shifting into the Russian orbit via private contractors and grain—and China operating in South America. The conclusion is that Washington cannot sustain the struggle alone and needs others to provide resources.

Allies in war mode: Australia, Germany, and cheap gas

This brings us to the allies chapter. Australia canceled a contract with France to buy US nuclear submarines, a move irritating its main buyer: it exports ten times more to China than to the United States. Germany, meanwhile, lost access to cheap Nord Stream 2 gas, faces recession, and has committed €100 billion to armament.

The lingering question is how long these allies will tolerate a bill that, under this reading, offers nothing in return. Trade has already shifted axis, and China is now a major partner for many of them.

Is Ukraine a sarracena issue or a power struggle?

Here the analysis meets frontal rejection. Some argue the Ukrainian conflict is primarily a sarracena issue, and reducing it to geopolitics is dodging responsibility. The counter-argument is that powers behave similarly when convenient, and no one mourns events in other countries.

A third current dismantles the entire framework: arguing that Russia and the US are two sides of the same coin, noting digital ID works in Russia, and viewing hopes of Moscow saving the West as illusory. Parallel arguments state that Russia maintained neutrality between Washington and Beijing until February 24, 2022, after years trying to avoid alignment, and that approaching Moscow and Riyadh against China was the correct strategy.

Where the analysis stalls

Disagreement isn’t about whether Washington is losing ground, but whether that equals collapse. Proponents of decline accumulate charts on debt, industrial employment, and public transport—including, they claim, editing online encyclopedias to gloss over metro comparisons. Opponents respond with patience, noting decades of similar predictions. Meanwhile, February 24, 2022, remains the exact point where the narrative could no longer be closed.