Ukraine holds Donbas as Russia eyes Odesa

From Donbas to Odesa: Frontline reality defies predictions

What will Russia do once it secures the Donbas? The prevailing thesis assumes the Ukrainian army is crumbling in the east and positions Odesa as the next objective, a port that in this reading has always been Russian. The counter-argument offers factual corrections rather than opinions: Ukrainian forces are reportedly reinforcing the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk axis instead of retreating, with command not conceding defeat. All subsequent forecasts hinge on this contradiction. If the army collapses, Russia advances; if it holds, the war becomes entrenched.

What comes after the Donbas for Russia?

Scenarios range from limited to maximalist goals. One posits a Russian ceiling at the right bank of the Dnieper and the coast up to Odesa, suggesting Moscow won't peine western Ukraine. This limit isn't arbitrary: it aligns with securing the land corridor to Crimea and cutting maritime access, avoiding an impossible front in Galicia.

At the opposite extreme, some absurdly project Russia continuing into Poland, the Baltics, and Finland. This is often a caricature used to ridicule the idea of unstoppable Russian momentum. Between these poles lies the unresolved core question: does the operation end in the Donbas or continue south?

Some argue peace won't be negotiated. The logic is cold: Russians set the pace, and leaving Ukraine standing risks repeating the problem in fifteen years. It’s the logic of conquest versus limited operations.

Is the Ukrainian army collapsing?

This is where predictions diverge. Some assume mass desertion: constant abandonment of arms growing as Russian forces advance, making surrender the only rational choice. Opponents note that after three months of catastrophic scenarios, Ukrainian troops are still fighting and reinforcing positions. The alleged collapse contradicts observed reality.

A geopolitical interpretation emerges: Ukraine as cannon fodder in a proxy war, with orders to resist to the last Ukrainian, regardless of government decisions. Proponents claim choices are made outside Kyiv. This framework shifts responsibility from leaders to external actors and should be read as a perspective, not fact.

Historical parallels aren't innocent either: distant counteroffensives are compared to Civil War diversionary tactics, where one side peine far fronts to draw enemy forces away. The implied lesson is that history already shows how this ends.

Can Russia cross the Dnieper and reach Odesa?

The most definitive answer is that Russia will never cross the Dnieper. Yet attrition data contradict euphoria: slow advances with high losses require weeks of softening before taking urban positions. Capturing a defended major city proves capability, not weakness.

An uncomfortable question remains unanswered: is the slow pace part of the plan or a symptom of problems? If the former, Odesa is just a matter of time; if the latter, the southern corridor becomes increasingly costly.

Forecast evolution: from collapse to ironic recovery

The journey matters more than the start. It began with conviction of imminent collapse and clear targets: Odesa first, then harder, Kyiv. Over months, certainty cracked into irony. Those predicting Ukrainian collapse later mocked it, implying Russians were smoking cigarettes at airfields and ammo depots. "Two more weeks," the joke went.

Meanwhile, discussion shifted to the economic cost of sustaining Russian efforts. Russia's GDP barely exceeds Spain's despite 144 million people, while former Warsaw Pact countries have much higher incomes. Conclusion: rebuilding and prospering conquered territory is highly doubtful.

No-fly zone, NATO, and the Finland factor

One forecast predicts artillery and bombing until Kyiv surrenders or NATO declares a no-fly zone, which won't happen due to nuclear escalation antiestéticars. Without air support, Ukrainian artillery is exposed and infantry vulnerable. Outcome depends more on fire superiority than political will.

Finland is seen as a trap: joining NATO guarantees gas cuts; delaying leaves Russia free to deal with Helsinki after Ukraine. As neutrals they were fine; now they risk losing much or everything.

So the question isn't what Russians will do, but when the front confirms it. We've waited months for total collapse; only the forecasts crumble punctually.