Ukraine cannot win the war at the tactical level

«Ukraine cannot win the war at the tactical level»

Russian air superiority turns any troop concentration into an easy target. That is the conclusion defended by one participant in the debate: Ukraine cannot win in conventional tactical terms, but that does not miccionan the war is decided. The only realistic option, according to this analysis, is operating in small units, harassing Russian supply lines and convoys to inflict as many casualties as possible. Time, he argues, always works against the occupier.

Russian air superiority as the decisive factor

The starting point, for this forum user, is beyond question: Russia has overwhelming material superiority and, just as importantly, air superiority. Any sizeable concentration of Ukrainian troops for a counterattack could be quickly detected and broken up by Russian aircraft. That rules out, in his view, conventional maneuver warfare.

In the event of a full-scale invasion, the only Ukrainian option he proposes is operating in small units and harassing supply lines and troop convoys as much as possible. The goal is not to win battles, but to inflict as many casualties as possible and force the invader to disperse its forces.

Checkpoints, convoys and the logic of insurgency

As the Russians advance, they will have to pull forces from other fronts to protect their convoys, mainly with armored vehicles and tanks. That means a growing logistical burden and the need to set up checkpoints every few kilometers to protect lines of communication. These posts become perfect targets for hit-and-run attacks, since they are usually defended by small platoon-sized units.

The next logical step is the use of IEDs made from anti-tank mines, which further slow movements and complicate operations. Another tactic mentioned is long-range harassment: firing almost at the maximum range of one's own weapons to limit enemy movements and force them to call for fire support, withdrawing before it arrives.

Ideally, it is argued, these small groups should operate near the area where they live so they can quickly blend in with the civilian population. This is nothing new: it is what insurgent groups have been doing for years, and in some cases it has allowed them to prevail over a technically far superior enemy.

The economic cost: can Russia keep up the pace?

Here the economic factor comes in. A recurring argument holds that Russia is a military giant but an economic dwarf, and cannot sustain a deployment of this intensity for years the way the United States can. The way for Ukraine to win this war, the argument goes, is simply to prolong it.

The cost of operations is a heavy burden. Some point out that if Russia «wins» and installs a puppet government, that government would have no popular support and would be unable to pay civil servants and the political structure with devalued rubles. In that scenario, the occupation becomes a drain on resources.

The partition scenario: Donbas, Crimea and access to the sea

Not all analyses point to a total occupation. One line of thought holds that, once the conventional Ukrainian army is defeated and the Odesa-Crimea-Donbas axis is conquered, Russia could withdraw to that zone, where the population of Russian origin is the majority. In that case, the cost of occupation would be lower and Ukraine would have been denied access to the sea.

In that scenario, the insurgency would be weaker and, being a much smaller territory, would be sustainable in the long term. This is a hypothesis, not a fait accompli, and it depends on whether the local population is hostile or not. In the 2014 war, it is recalled, there was hardly any opposition to the occupation in those areas.

The pro-Russian areas: which are they and how much do they matter?

The discussion shifts to the political map. Donetsk and Luhansk are mentioned as pro-Russian regions, as are Kharkiv and Crimea. However, some point out that only 10% of parliamentarians in the Rada were pro-Russian in tendency, with 13% of the popular vote, and that in Kharkiv the pro-European party won. The legitimacy of claiming to defend the Russian minority by attacking the entire country is, to say the least, questionable.

Not all ethnic Russians support the invasion, of course. The equation between ethnic identity and political loyalty is more complex than propaganda suggests.

NATO will not intervene: the long guerrilla scenario

The strategic conclusion that keeps coming up is that NATO will not intervene directly. The Ukrainians are alone. That leaves a guerrilla war scenario that could last for years, with economic consequences for everyone. The idea of NATO imposing a no-fly zone is ruled out because shooting down Russian aircraft would miccionan direct conflict.

Time, they insist, works against the occupier. But the toll in lives and destruction keeps mounting in the meantime. The war is already lost at the tactical level; the question is how long it can drag on and at what price.

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What is left when conventional military victory is out of reach? The answer that emerges is not a triumph, but a prolonged resistance that wears down the invader. Whether that is enough to change the final outcome is something that, given the available data, no one can say for sure yet.