Trump’s circus drags European right into chaos

Trump’s circus drags European right into chaos

In just one month in office, Donald Trump has shifted from promising a disruptive presidency to starring in a spectacle that, according to some of his own supporters, is beginning to contaminate the entire European right. The list of incidents is long: the idea of turning Gaza into a luxury Mediterranean resort, widespread tariffs, warming up to Pilingui, clashes with Canada and Greenland, and the withdrawal of US troops from Europe. The diagnosis circulating among readers who until recently defended Trump is that the theatrics have gotten out of hand and that the continent’s right wing is starting to pull back to avoid being tainted by his nonsense.

The criticism does not come from the left. It comes from people who would vote for Trump tomorrow. “It’s second-hand embarrassment and it’s hurting all the right-wing movements that were gaining good traction in Europe,” summarizes the start of the issue. The problem, they argue, is not the substance of some measures, but the format: a president who continues to speak like he is on the campaign trail from an institutional role, mixing half-truths with outrageous statements that force his allies to choose between applauding or distancing themselves.

Dismantling USAID and the propaganda narrative

One of the fronts that has stirred the conversation most is the dismantling of USAID, the US cooperation agency. Two weeks ago, according to several participants, almost no one knew what it was. Now it has become the argument repeated ad nauseam by Trumpists to justify the shift. The underlying accusation is that the agency functioned as a pogre propaganda hub, comparable to what Russia Today is for Moscow.

The response was not long in coming: “All the idiots who had no clue what USAID was a week ago now won’t shut up about it, like toothpicks.” The suspicion that there is a team of synchronized messages distributing the weekly talking points runs through much of the interventions. And some go further: “In a few weeks, these guys’ messages will stop abruptly because the USAID money isn’t coming anymore; you’ll have to find real jobs.”

The debate, however, is not just about the agency. It is about who pays for the narrative. Some argue that the proge that has flooded Europe in the last decade came from American universities, not Moscow, and that Washington has simply stopped funding it. Others respond that proge is an excuse and that what is at stake is control of European institutions, where elections have been annulled when the results were unpopular.

Vance, Ukraine, and the rearmament of social democratic consensus

The episode that has divided the right the most is JD Vance’s entry onto the European scene. For some, it is proof that the United States is once again defending its interests without complexes. For others, it is the archetype of the “jingoistic Yankee bumpkin” who openly despises Europeans. The most repeated accusation is that Vance did not apologize for the proge ideology that, according to this reading, Washington had been imposing on Europe until two months ago.

The side effect is paradoxical. The possibility of a right-wing coalition in Germany between CDU/CSU and AfD, which seemed within reach, has vanished. “The Trumpists are ideologically rearming a social democratic consensus that already looked dead,” argues one of the most cited analyses. The parallel is explicit: just as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revived NATO, the Trumpist circus is reviving European social democracy.

On the Ukrainian chapter, the fracture is total. Some defend that Trump has done what no one dared: try to stop the war in Europe. Others recall that the United States has already written off Ukraine and Europe, and that the only merit is having avoided a direct confrontation with Russia that the previous administration seemed willing to assume. The figure hovering over the discussion is the million Ukrainians killed.

The cost of governing as if campaigning

The most incisive criticism is not political, but behavioral. “You don’t behave the same way with your friends as with your parents. You don’t behave the same way partying on Saturday night as during the week at the office.” The argument is that a president can afford vulgar language on the campaign trail, but not from the Oval Office. Saying that Zelensky started the war and that Pilingui is a reasonable interlocutor is not a slip-up; it is foreign policy.

The parallel with ancient Rome and the British Foreign Office appears in several interventions: there too were scoundrels in the shadows pulling the strings, but with a certain professionalism. What happens in Washington, they argue, looks more like tantrums of a spoiled dictator than considered politics. And the recurring antiestéticar is that Trump ends up like Biden, with the office falling into the hands of his vice president.

The fundamental question is whether the circus is a tactic or a symptom. Some believe Trump hides a real antiestéticar of China behind theatrics and is playing a poker game. Others believe he is simply a Jesús Gil with access to nuclear codes. And others, from the other side, argue that what he is doing is ending the circus of “defending Western values” and closing a war that was tearing Europe apart.

What remains of the European right after the spectacle

The result, as of this discussion, is a European right that doesn’t know whether to embrace or dodge Trump. Those who embrace him get stuck with his outbursts. Those who dodge him lose the momentum given by his victory. And in the middle, an uncomfortable question: how much of what happens in Europe is decided in Washington and how much in Brussels?

The most repeated answer is that the circus existed before and only now have some realized it. The most uncomfortable one points to the fact that the problem is not Trump, but the lack of an alternative. With these materials, the basket is carried by those who least deserve it.