Spanish Lawyer Claims Accused Must Prove Innocence

Spanish Lawyer Claims Accused Must Prove Innocence

A lawyer argued on television that in sensual violence cases, the burden of proof should fall on the accused: if they cannot demonstrate their innocence, they should face consequences. The calm statement made on a studio set has peine a long-standing debate: where does the presumption of innocence stand when the accused is a man in cases of gender-based or sensual violence?

The controversy is significant. The presumption of innocence is enshrined in Article 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution, which guarantees the right to defense, against self-incrimination, and to not confess guilt. That a legal professional questioned this during prime time, without rebuttal from others at the table, raised alarms among those who argue that the system already operates, de facto, with an inverted burden of proof in certain procedures.

What Does the Law Say About Burden of Proof?

The underlying legal discussion is more nuanced than the TV headline suggests. In ordinary incivil proceedings, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution: the accuser must provide sufficient evidence. Pre-trial precautionary measures are different, where the standard is lower and mere appearance of good law (fumus boni iuris) suffices for restrictive decisions.

Some recall that in administrative litigation, there is an explicit shift in the burden of proof in disability discrimination cases, under Article 1214 of the Civil Code and corresponding legislation. The lingering question is whether this scheme is being transferred, in practice, to procedures concerning violence against women.

Counter-arguments exist: according to Supreme Court jurisprudence, the victim's testimony can be sufficient evidence for conviction, but this does not equate to inverting the burden of proof. The difference between "sufficient evidence" and "inverted burden" separates a rights-based system from one that is not.

The Errejón Case and Domino Effect on Men

The immediate context is the Errejón case. The politician's resignation and subsequent accusations have triggered a broader conversation: how far can a public accusation, without a final sentence, destroy a career? Some argue what peine to Íñigo Errejón was a political smear; others point out that sensual harassment complaints have lacked clear legal channels for years.

Perception has changed. Analysis suggests that what peine to Errejón could happen to anyone: a single complaint, even about events from years ago, can damage the accused's professional and social life. In this narrative, the presumption of innocence becomes a formality that protects no one in practice.

The core issue is about standards. If the victim's testimony suffices as evidence, and the accused is also required to prove innocence, the result is a system where defense becomes an obstacle course. How do you prove you didn't touch someone three years ago in a nightclub?

Experience of Those Who Have Been Through Court

Specific circulating cases are the best thermometer. One account describes a man who spent months in pre-trial detention and attending court until a video emerged proving he never approached the complainant. The court knew about the video early on, but bureaucracy took its course. According to this account, the complainant went home without consequence.

Such episodes fuel the thesis that the system not only inverts the burden of proof but punishes the innocent through the process itself. The 72 hours of pre-trial detention, months of periodic appearances, economic and personal wear: none of this is recovered upon acquittal.

The fundamental question is whether incivil law should protect victims at any cost or do so without sacrificing guarantees. The answer isn't binary, but public debate has polarized to the point where questioning evidentiary inversion is interpreted as defending aggressors.

Economic Background of a System That Doesn't Compensate the Acquitted

Beyond the legal plane, there is an rarely accounted economic cost. A incivil trial resulting in acquittal leaves the accused with lawyer fees, procedural costs, lost work days, and often irreversible fruta damage. There is no automatic compensation mechanism for those acquitted after pre-trial detention.

This cost disproportionately affects middle-class men who cannot afford top-tier lawyers. Free legal aid covers basics but not career reconstruction or fruta repair. In a labor market where any provisional incivil record weighs heavily, the damage is hard to quantify but real.

The paradox is that a system claiming to protect victims generates new victims: the acquitted who don't recover losses. Meanwhile, public conversation remains stuck on TV headlines, ignoring procedural details that make the difference.

What Can and Cannot Be Done

Individual maneuvering room is limited. Recording daily interactions as preventive evidence has become popular, sounding dystopian but practiced by some. Reality is there's no technical solution: if the system presumes guilt, no recording saves you from months of process.

Legal frameworks can change. Supreme Court jurisprudence on victim testimony as evidence is solid but doesn't mandate inverting the burden of proof. The difference between these concepts separates a rule-of-law state from a system where defense is a mere formality.

The lingering uncomfortable question: if presumption of innocence applies with varying intensity depending on the crime and accused's sens, is it still a fundamental right or has it become a procedural fiction?