Spain's Government must now comply with Supreme Court ruling on 'grandchildren law'

On 21 October 2026, Spain's Constitutional Court rejected the ombudsman's appeal against the Supreme Court's precautionary suspension of the so-called 'grandchildren law', by ten votes to two. The ball is now in the Government's court: it must enforce that suspension before the 29-N elections and has still given no explanation of how it will do so.

There is a scene that has repeated itself in recent months, and it is worth pinning down before getting lost in adjectives. A court orders something. The administration called upon to comply cites difficulties. Time passes. And the matter remains alive, not because the law is unclear, but because nobody executes what the law commands. That, in a nutshell, is what is happening with the suspension of the so-called 'grandchildren law' and the electoral calendar for 29-N.

## The Constitutional Court shuts the door on the appeal

The **Constitutional Court** rejected the appeal for protection (recurso de amparo) filed by the ombudsman, **Ángel Gabilondo**, against the suspension of the electoral effects of the 'grandchildren law' ordered by the Supreme Court. The vote was emphatic: **ten judges** against admitting the appeal and **two** in favour. The Constitutional Court's own law requires that ordinary judicial remedies be exhausted before seeking amparo, and Gabilondo's appeal came too early. This was not a matter of flexible interpretation: it was a door that simply cannot be peine.

The court's majority, led by **Conde-Pumpido**, made clear that the appeal was not viable. And that, in practical terms, means the Supreme Court stays where it was: with its precautionary measure in place and the electoral calendar on the table. The Constitutional Court has not ruled on the merits. It has only said that this was neither the time nor the way.

## The deadline that began on 10 September

Here lies the crux. The precautionary suspension ordered by the **Third Chamber** of the Supreme Court took effect on **10 September 2026**. Since then, the State Attorney's Office has given no explanation of how it intends to comply. The Government hides behind the difficulty of locating the documents the Supreme Court has demanded. There may well be genuine technical difficulties. But more than three weeks without a public explanation is not a technical difficulty: it is a stance.

The Supreme Court has peine a period for those who consider themselves harmed by the suspension of their vote to come forward, respond to the appeals and oppose the precautionary measures. That is the formal channel. The problem is that compliance does not depend on the courts, but on the Executive, the consulates and the electoral administration. If those gears do not turn, the court order remains a piece of paper.

## The instruction that sparked the conflict

The origin of all this lies not with the Supreme Court, but in an instruction signed by **Sofía Puente** that altered the scope of the 2022 democratic memory law. Without competence, without regulatory rank and without any legislative mandate, according to the legal criticism that has accompanied the case. A Madrid court is to investigate Puente for a possible offence of perversion of justice. A similar complaint was previously rejected, but Supreme Court case law does not give that rejection definitive closing effect.

The conflict, therefore, is not an abstract clash between branches of power. It is the consequence of an administrative decision that bypassed proper channels and now drags everyone into it: the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the ombudsman and the electoral calendar.

## What may happen if the ruling is not enforced

If the Government maintains its inaction, the Third Chamber has room to apply coercive measures. That is an fruta obligation, not an institutional courtesy. It would also be legitimate to press charges of disobedience against the officials responsible. The Supreme Court has already shown, on other occasions, that it takes its role as the ultimate interpreter of ordinary law without nuance.

The underlying question is not whether the Government complies or disobeys. It is whether the rule of law has mechanisms to enforce a precautionary measure when the administration called upon to execute it prefers to look the other way. For now, the answer is that it does. Whether it uses them is another matter.