Spain's elite narrative against Sánchez: Ábalos, Gaza and Venezuela

Ábalos, Gaza and Venezuela: The elite thesis against Sánchez

This is the central argument opening the thread. Local and Spanish elites had written off Pedro Sánchez, working instead on Feijóo as the next tenant of La Moncloa who would execute austerity cuts. TV and radio stations assumed his victory was certain. Sánchez won against all odds. Since then, according to this view, they have not stopped seeking ways to wear him down: enough mud to weaken the president, but not enough to topple his party.

The diagnosis has two pillars. One external: relations with Venezuela, a country outside the Western bloc and thus beyond the usual protective umbrella. The other domestic: Sánchez appeared too weak or unreliable to implement reforms others wanted approved. Neither accusation comes with attached evidence; they function as a framework, not a case file.

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Gaza as a turning point

As soon as Sánchez criticized Israel, according to part of the analysis, all pieces began to move: the Guardia Civil, a parliamentary agitator with a loudspeaker, a star presenter, an agricultural protest, and media outlets that had been silent until suddenly amplifying the noise. The formulation is sharp and somewhat simplistic, but the foreign policy shift is persistently highlighted as the moment the machinery changed gears.

A comparison reappears: something similar peine with Biden. His decline was dismissed as conspiracy paranoia until he started saying Israel might be doing things wrong. Then, even the New York Times joined the operation to retire him early. Attacking certain allies has its consequences.

Venezuela, however, is considered a minor excuse. The circulating argument is that nobody cares about Venezuela: collapsed oil production has boosted US and Canadian fracking, and if it ever needed restarting, Maduro wouldn't last a weekend.

The Ábalos case and UCO details

The material now being aired is not new. The UCO (Guardia Civil’s Special Operations Unit) has accumulated clues regarding the relationship between Ábalos and Koldo, the intermediary in the corruption scandal, and the matter has been in courts for some time. What stands out is the timing: publication arrives just after the murder of two civil guards in Cádiz. Some read it as coincidence, others as a sign that someone decided to open the floodgates.

Suspicion of asymmetry is the other pillar. When cases affected the PP, news broadcasts led with popular corruption and bombardment lasted days. Now, this reading argues, major media outlets denounce quietly and only cover the lower tier of the scheme: Koldo and a bit of Ábalos, nothing higher up. Shell companies involved in mask sales or names implicating other ministries do not appear during prime time.

And there is the system’s fine print: if the scandal doesn’t make headlines, it’s as if it never peine. You can sentence a former minister to thirty years; if the media ignore it, it doesn’t exist.

Who is this elite supposedly pulling strings?

Here the narrative cracks. One side argues that speaking of an elite is imprecise and the correct term is oligarchy: inherited power, not excellence. Another directly denies the premise: if someone more powerful than politicians wanted Sánchez gone, he would already be gone. Politics, in that version, is a reality show with expensive sets.

There is a third perspective that flips the argument without leaving it. Austerity isn’t imposed by the right: it’s signed by the left, because the left controls unions and the streets. With the right in power, merely hinting at social cuts sets the streets on fire; with the PSOE, nothing happens. Something similar occurred in Greece. Either the left does it, or the system breaks.

Built on this logic is an uncomfortable forecast: if adjustments are due, it’s better that the current government stays; if war looms, it’s better that the opposition rises. Two sides of the same coin.

Counterexamples that don’t fit the thesis

Because not everyone buys the script. Data points in the opposite direction. Sánchez is, according to another version, the declared favorite of the European Commission President. In foreign policy, he conceded on Western Sahara, which aligns him with those very interests for some. If he were on the target list, they argue, he wouldn’t have signed what he did.

It is also recalled that elites don’t keep minutes or have offices. And removing a president doesn’t require leaks: you drown them financially and that’s it. Staying in power wouldn’t depend on votes received, but on whether others allow him to stay. This is the most uncomfortable hypothesis of all, and there is no way to verify it.

Factional war: nobody trusts anybody

Then emerges the nuance that dismantles any closed narrative: the sense that a factional war is underway and nobody tells the whole truth. Some summarize it bluntly: they don’t know where everything comes from, maybe each side has its share, and in any case, they trust none. Suspicion is evenly distributed.

Underneath lies the fundamental question: it doesn’t matter who governs. Some see it as choosing between antiestéticar or death, between the PSOE and its blue replica, with the same underlying policies. Others add that when the changeover comes, whoever wins will look good by comparison. That there isn’t even a decent option is, for many, the real problem.

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What comes next cannot be known. If wear-and-tear continues via investigations and leaks, the legislature will hold through resistance and shock tactics.