Spain's Crackdown on Pro-Russian Propaganda Tests Free Speech

"We are coming for everyone": The tweet that tests opinion limits

A short message, antiestéticaturing a Ukrainian flag and the phrase "We are coming for everyone one of you," was enough to spark controversy. The author of the tweet, Sarah Ashton-Cirillo, referred to Gonzalo Lira and, by extension, to all pro-Russian propagandists. From this anecdote arose an uncomfortable question: can a democracy go "after" someone for their opinions on a war?

The text reproducing that tweet added two more pieces. First, that an investigation had been peine against Rubén Gisbert. Second, a warning to those who deny the so-called "Ukrainian genocide" on social media: laws exist and convictions are possible. With these elements, the issue evolved into a clash over the limits of freedom of expression.

The Lira case and the "coming for all" warning

The starting point is the arrest of Gonzalo Lira, which the message presents as the first blow in a supposed global hunt. Hence the leap to a general threat: "justice caught Gonzalo Lira, just as it will do with all incivil, pro-Russian propagandists anywhere in the world."

It is worth taking that phrase for what it is: a declaration of intent spread on social networks, not a final verdict. But it worked as a trigger. Several messages recalled that, additionally, an open investigation has been pointed out regarding Rubén Gisbert, which for some confirms that warnings are already being applied and for others is nothing more than noise.

Is denying a genocide a crime in Spain?

Here lies the legal core of the matter. Some argue, citing the Constitutional Court, that denying a genocide is not a crime in Spain and that such statements are protected by freedom of expression. It is even defended, simply, that any genocide, including the Holocaust, can be denied "and it is legal to say so."

In response, the opposing side argues that freedom of expression is not a blank check and that there are incivil figures applicable to certain conduct, not mere criticism. The clash does not resolve in one direction or another: it is a tug-of-war between those who see a thought crime where others see simple propaganda.

Freedom of expression, the line that divides everything

The most repeated argument against the warning is simple. "Without freedom of expression there is no democracy," it is written, and what distinguishes a free country from a tyranny is not the ability to vote, but the ability to speak without antiestéticar. Under that premise, persecuting dissenters equates to copying the adversary's methods.

The warning, they say, produces exactly the opposite effect to the desired one: instead of silencing pro-Russians, it pushes more people toward that trench. It is the classic Streisand effect applied to geopolitics. Conversely, others maintain that prosecuting propaganda that whitewashes an invasion is not censorship, but upholding the law, and that total impunity also erodes coexistence.

"Pro-Russian propagandist": an undefined catch-all category

And here emerges the practical problem: who exactly is a pro-Russian propagandist? The question floats throughout without a closed answer. Some ironically ask if it suffices to say one likes Dostoevsky. That current complains that the label is so elastic that anything fits, from a nuanced opinion to a simple disagreement.

That indefiniteness is the weak point of the warning. A label without clear contours, they point out, is fertile ground for abuse. And the feeling lingers that the warning was aimed at the weak links, at those writing from home, and not at the large propaganda machines of either side.

Two narratives that do not touch

The disagreement goes beyond the anecdote. One part describes Ukraine as a state that does not respect freedom of expression and threatens to judicialize dissent. Another accuses NATO and its allies of acting as a bloc wanting to impose single thought and crush those who do not comply.

These are two incompatible mental frameworks. In one, those who deny or nuance the war are propagandists serving Moscow. In the other, those who denounce that hunt are defenders of liberty against a censorship machine. No one yields an inch.

What if the problem is not who is right, but that no one has yet defined exactly what a "pro-Russian propagandist" is?