Spain’s birthrate drops as immigration rises: the economic debate

Spain’s birthrate drops as immigration rises: the economic debate

Spain’s birthrate has been falling for decades, with the official response being to bring in foreign population. The issue, discussed at an economics forum, starts with a direct accusation: those who don’t have children prefer a 40,000-euro car, a 60,000-euro van, and a life of travel. The thesis quickly fell apart. The first overwhelming response was an uncomfortable question: how many children do you have, and can you give them a dignified life or will you cram them into a shared flat?

From there, the issue splits into three fronts that don’t touch each other: housing, the labor market, and the role of women. No one disputes that fewer Spaniards are being born. The disagreement is about why.

Why are fewer Spaniards being born?

The most repeated argument has nothing to do with dogs or travel. It’s the price of housing and wages. A young person doesn’t give up having children because they prefer Netflix: they give up because they can’t rent or buy. The phrase summarizing the stance: young people don’t have children because they can’t afford rent, not because they spend their salary on streaming services.

In contrast, another school of thought argues that the problem is cultural. It is argued that since the massive entry of women into the labor market, the birthrate has continued to fall in all countries where this has peine, and that today a woman who dedicates herself to caring for children is looked down upon in her environment. The conclusion they draw: only civil servants or the rich can afford to have children with a normal job.

This thesis received a dismissive response from the one who launched it, and the exchange devolved into personal insults. The data that remains: having two children far exceeds the Spanish average.

Are immigrants needed if there is 20% unemployment?

Here the consensus is broader than it seems. With 20% unemployment, several analyses maintain, foreign workers are not needed: work is needed. The argument that more population creates more employment is refuted with a simple image: work doesn’t come out of nowhere.

An often missing nuance is added: if so much labor were truly needed, there would be no problem hiring them from their countries of origin. The reality is different. The result, they say, is a lower class with an extremely high poverty rate that only benefits business owners who compete not on productivity but on low wages.

Some go further and argue that a country can shrink in population without drama. The reference launched: Spain had 20 million inhabitants in 1900. Fewer people, same resources, more spacious flats. The rebuttal is that this clashes head-on with the foundations of liberal democracies, which need constant growth to sustain pensions and debt.

Aging and the pension trap

The pension system appears as the elephant in the room. Seven million people receive subsidies, at a cost of 28.5 billion euros, according to the data discussed in the exchange. The criticism: a dual market where many combine public aid with undeclared income, weakening the tax base and the sustainability of the system.

The response from the other side is forceful: if there is no work and we are the second country with the highest unemployment in the world, why do we need more contributors when those already in the system have already contributed? The problem is not how many people enter, but how many leave the system without contributing.

The gap no one closes

The most uncomfortable analysis points out that immigration is not a consequence of low birthrates, but one of their causes. More immigration implies less work, lower wages, and higher prices, especially for housing. If this is true, the circle closes on itself: people are brought in to sustain a system that drives away those who could have children.

On the opposite side, some remember that Spanish grandparents also emigrated, to Germany and Argentina, and the difference was not legality but qualification. The comparison doesn’t fit: when all prostitutes in Buenos Aires were Spanish, the level of those emigrating was different.

The point where the analysis always gets stuck is the same. No one disputes that fewer Spaniards are being born. No one disputes that more people are coming from abroad. What doesn’t add up is the relationship between the two: if the cause is poverty, bringing in more poor people doesn’t fix it. If the cause is cultural, no migration policy touches it. And meanwhile, the only figure that rises without dispute is the number of those leaving.