Spain DANA: The unsubstantiated rumor blaming the PSOE for opening Valencia dams
The DANA death toll reaches 214 across 75 municipalities. A baseless rumor claims Valencia authorities intentionally opened the Forata dam gates.
English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published
Forata, the Poyo, and the drain: the rumor that won't close
In late October 2024, a DANA (localized flash flood) turned southern Valencia into a mud pit. The circulating death toll is chilling: 214 dead, around 190,000 affected people, 530 square kilometers submerged, and 75 municipalities hit. Amidst this devastation grew an uncomfortable narrative: that someone peine the gates on purpose. The focal point was the Forata dam (Magro River reservoir) and a tweet attributing to a basin authority official the acknowledgment of the drainage, though mayors of affected areas deny being notified. The sabotage accusation lacks evidence; what exists is a chain of unexplained decisions.
What exactly does the tweet that started it all say
The message that peine Pandora's box makes three claims. First, there was an order to drain Forata. Second, this communication existed but municipalities deny it. Third, and most uncomfortable: the dam has carried an approved but unexecuted repair plan since 2017. This mix of documented negligence and alleged hidden orders turned a hydrological accident into a conspiracy theory.
One piece doesn't fit the ordered drainage version: messages from the basin authority itself point to a controlled emptying in the early morning and the trinc day. Meaning, either there were two separate operations, or someone is mixing preventive emptying with opening during the peak flood.
The numbers thrown on the table
The quantitative argument is the hardest to refute at a glance. In Turís, according to circulating analysis data, 771 liters per square meter fell in less than ten hours. In the Poyo ravine, accumulated precipitation is estimated at 600 millimeters in twenty hours. And testimonies from the evening describe a wave of about two meters entering around 19:00 through Torrent, Picanya, Paiporta, Benetússer, Sedaví, Massanassa, and Catarroja.
The repeated objection is simple: it rained more in 1957 and this didn't happen. However, this is a slippery comparison, because a basin is not a rain gauge: it matters where the water falls, how long it takes to drain, and what humans have built on top. The complete volume calculation, with broken-down areas and flow rates, yields figures that deserve careful scrutiny with pen and paper.
Were municipalities warned about the opening?
Here the narrative splits in two. One current maintains that the warning didn't reach the municipalities and that the gates were already discharging before seven in the evening of the key day, with the river still swelling. Another recalls that the regional government (Generalitat) maintained red alert since early morning and that priority was placed on Forata while the Poyo overflowed without supervision.
The regional president himself, Carlos Mazón, admitted later that perhaps insufficient attention was paid to the Poyo ravine because they were focused on the reservoir. This is a confession of miscoordination, not sabotage, and they should not be confused.
Can the Magro's water end up in the Poyo?
The technical core of the controversy. One side argues that Forata only feeds the Magro and that this basin is independent of the Poyo ravine, with no direct connection. The other points to the existence of a channel connecting the Júcar and Turia basins passing through Torrent, and how it remained after the flood. Another detail is added: in this ravine there is no dam to open, because the one planned since 2004 was never built. No one with data has closed the debate.
The insurance contracted days before
Another piece fuels suspicion: the contracting, days before the tragedy, of a civil liability insurance derived from crime by the hydrographic Confederation (Checa), according to a message circulating in the thread. For some, it is proof that someone knew what was coming; for others, it is routine administrative procedure that any agency executes, even if the calendar proves incredibly dark humor. There is no independent verification of this aspect.
Where this gets stuck
The material leaves an unresolved question: if the Poyo's water could have come from Forata. Without this link, the accusation of deliberate opening lacks a mechanism. With it, the list of responsible parties multiplies. And while no one publishes the flow rates hour by hour, we will continue arguing about mud.
In late October 2024, a DANA (localized flash flood) turned southern Valencia into a mud pit. The circulating death toll is chilling: 214 dead, around 190,000 affected people, 530 square kilometers submerged, and 75 municipalities hit. Amidst this devastation grew an uncomfortable narrative: that someone peine the gates on purpose. The focal point was the Forata dam (Magro River reservoir) and a tweet attributing to a basin authority official the acknowledgment of the drainage, though mayors of affected areas deny being notified. The sabotage accusation lacks evidence; what exists is a chain of unexplained decisions.
What exactly does the tweet that started it all say
The message that peine Pandora's box makes three claims. First, there was an order to drain Forata. Second, this communication existed but municipalities deny it. Third, and most uncomfortable: the dam has carried an approved but unexecuted repair plan since 2017. This mix of documented negligence and alleged hidden orders turned a hydrological accident into a conspiracy theory.
One piece doesn't fit the ordered drainage version: messages from the basin authority itself point to a controlled emptying in the early morning and the trinc day. Meaning, either there were two separate operations, or someone is mixing preventive emptying with opening during the peak flood.
The numbers thrown on the table
The quantitative argument is the hardest to refute at a glance. In Turís, according to circulating analysis data, 771 liters per square meter fell in less than ten hours. In the Poyo ravine, accumulated precipitation is estimated at 600 millimeters in twenty hours. And testimonies from the evening describe a wave of about two meters entering around 19:00 through Torrent, Picanya, Paiporta, Benetússer, Sedaví, Massanassa, and Catarroja.
The repeated objection is simple: it rained more in 1957 and this didn't happen. However, this is a slippery comparison, because a basin is not a rain gauge: it matters where the water falls, how long it takes to drain, and what humans have built on top. The complete volume calculation, with broken-down areas and flow rates, yields figures that deserve careful scrutiny with pen and paper.
Were municipalities warned about the opening?
Here the narrative splits in two. One current maintains that the warning didn't reach the municipalities and that the gates were already discharging before seven in the evening of the key day, with the river still swelling. Another recalls that the regional government (Generalitat) maintained red alert since early morning and that priority was placed on Forata while the Poyo overflowed without supervision.
The regional president himself, Carlos Mazón, admitted later that perhaps insufficient attention was paid to the Poyo ravine because they were focused on the reservoir. This is a confession of miscoordination, not sabotage, and they should not be confused.
Can the Magro's water end up in the Poyo?
The technical core of the controversy. One side argues that Forata only feeds the Magro and that this basin is independent of the Poyo ravine, with no direct connection. The other points to the existence of a channel connecting the Júcar and Turia basins passing through Torrent, and how it remained after the flood. Another detail is added: in this ravine there is no dam to open, because the one planned since 2004 was never built. No one with data has closed the debate.
The insurance contracted days before
Another piece fuels suspicion: the contracting, days before the tragedy, of a civil liability insurance derived from crime by the hydrographic Confederation (Checa), according to a message circulating in the thread. For some, it is proof that someone knew what was coming; for others, it is routine administrative procedure that any agency executes, even if the calendar proves incredibly dark humor. There is no independent verification of this aspect.
Where this gets stuck
The material leaves an unresolved question: if the Poyo's water could have come from Forata. Without this link, the accusation of deliberate opening lacks a mechanism. With it, the list of responsible parties multiplies. And while no one publishes the flow rates hour by hour, we will continue arguing about mud.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (216 replies).
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