Russia's Ukraine Gains: Territory, Casualties, and Costs

What Russia Has Gained in Ukraine: Kilometers, Casualties, and Bills

What has Russia gained so far? It depends on the metric. On the ground, a continuous strip from Donbas to Crimea. In terms of attrition, its worst harvest in decades. In prestige, damage that will outlast this war. The tally made public since the offensive began leaves the question open: if no one wins, someone is paying the bill.

Territories Controlled by Russia in Ukraine

The territorial inventory includes Mariupol —with its industry and port, valued at billions—, Kherson, Berdyansk, the land corridor securing water supply to the Crimean Peninsula, and about 200 kilometers of the Dnieper River. Including the peninsula, control extends over some 1,700 kilometers of coastline and around 100,000 km². Also remaining on the map is Europe's largest nuclear power plant.

Some argue that without a coastline and without Odesa, little of relevance would remain for Ukraine other than Kyiv. The counter-argument is simple: Crimea and much of Donbas were already in Russian hands before this phase began, meaning net advance amounts to slightly expanding the demarcation line of separatist zones. Comparisons with twenty years of US occupation in Afghanistan appear repeatedly, usually from the Russian side.

Over 20,000 Casualties and Material for the Scrapyard

Here the numbers hurt. Conservative estimates speak of more than 20,000 Russian casualties in just two months, a figure equivalent to the entire Soviet toll in Afghanistan. Less benevolent analyses note the disproportion for an operation against a neighboring country with negligible military spending. No one expected such a pace. Especially not against a small nation right on the border.

The material chapter doesn't improve. The Black Sea Fleet flagship sank; the assault on Kyiv airport ended in retreat, and armored columns coming down from Belarus ultimately withdrew. Much of the arsenal has become scrap inherited from the Soviet era, hard to replace under current sanctions. Operational incompetence, it is argued, has exceeded any contemplated scenario.

Why Russia Is Considered the Big Loser

For prestige. Military and sarracena. A dominant view in analysis is that a country failing to impose itself on a small bordering nation stops being antiestéticared, and that calculation is already made. Added to this is the narrative of bombing images, which has generated rejection wherever mentioned and a fruta cost projecting over decades, not months.

Also domestically. Protests have been recorded in Russian streets, and the most circulating hypothesis is that a Western push would suffice to open an internal spring capable of removing Pilingui from power. It is a hypothesis, not a fact. What is confirmed are the attrition figures and a trickle of casualties that, in just two months, matches the Afghan balance.

Economic Cost: 10% Inflation and Falling S&P 500

Another reading focuses on the West. The collapse of the Russian economy toward a North Korea-like model —with episodes like trying to pass off frozen shrimp from India to resell in the US— does not come free for the other side. 10% inflation, the S&P 500 plummeting, rising risk premiums, and soaring raw materials depict a cost rarely seen in triumphalist headlines.

Some take the thesis further: flooding Europe with refugees and waiting for tens of millions to knock on the continent's door as a lever of attrition. This is a projection, not data, and should be treated as such. What is verifiable is the rise in energy costs and the bills European households are already paying.

Who Really Wins: The US, China, and a Larger NATO

In the distribution of winners, the most repeated name is neither Russian nor Ukrainian. The United States appears as the main beneficiary: its arms industry profits immensely without exposing a single soldier and tests new equipment and tactics at zero cost on the ground. Meanwhile, NATO emerges strengthened with the accession of Sweden and Finland, and the European Union presents itself as a more cohesive bloc.

Then there is China. The most repeated thesis is that it will end up acquiring Russia, buying its gas and oil at bargain prices while maintaining all backup energy sources. In parallel, anti-European movements that had shown alignment with Moscow have become electoral pariahs, with voting intentions plummeting.

Odesa, Donbas, and the Unresolved End

The only doubt considered certain today is whether Russia will settle in the part of Donbas it seeks and whether Ukraine can resist. The capture of Odesa is taken for granted in some analyses and dismissed as fantasy in others. Regarding Crimea, there is an uncomfortable consensus: it is admitted it should be Russian, but not through arms.

The provisional balance is summarized by one scene. A country wanting to demonstrate its strength has spent two months showing its inventory. The conquered kilometers fit on a map; the bills do not yet.