Russian Withdrawal from Kyiv Doesn't Mean Russia is Losing the War

Russian Withdrawal from Kyiv Doesn't Prove Russia Will Lose the War

Some predictions age poorly. When some claimed Russian fuel reserves would last only three days, three months had already passed, and the front lines were still shifting. This type of analysis, seeing every Russian retreat as a definitive defeat, has long struggled with the calendar. Wars aren't decided by a map on a specific date, but by who can endure longer than the other.

The facts don't support the narrative of collapse. The initial offensive from the north, south, and east resulted in the conquest of the Sea of Azov: a land corridor of fertile land and gas fields, stretching from Russia to beyond Crimea, past the Dnieper River. Russia holds Kherson, a large part of Zaporizhzhia, areas of Kharkiv, and a bridgehead on the other side of the river.

Why Did Russia Withdraw from Kyiv and Its Surroundings?

Because the initial objective wasn't the capital. The most common interpretation in the West—assaulting Kyiv, failing, and retreating—starts from a premise that subsequent developments disprove: once the south was consolidated, the northern withdrawal aimed to reduce casualties and avoid overextending lines. Not every retreat is a rout. And if Russia had wanted all of Ukraine, one must ask why it didn't mobilize for that from day one. The calculation doesn't add up.

The cost was indeed high. There are reports of a thousand tanks lost and around twenty thousand casualties in the initial phase. This figure is used as proof of incompetence, but the casualty count doesn't indicate who is winning, only who pays the price first. The scenario painted in the analysis is not of a broken army, but of one changing its objective rather than its pace.

Operation Mars: When Losing 70,000 Men Wasn't Failure

Historical parallels are constantly brought up. Operation Mars, the Soviet attempt to tie down German troops who couldn't reinforce Stalingrad, resulted, according to figures used in analysis, in about 70,000 dead and 145,000 wounded against about 40,000 enemy casualties. Seen in isolation, a bloodbath. Seen in context, a maneuver that fulfilled its function within a larger operation.

Here lies the point that clashes with Western doctrine: a battle can be lost, and a war won. The examples of Vietnam and Afghanistan are cited time and again as reminders. The power that wins every engagement but loses the ultimate objective exists, and it's not precisely Russian.

Chess or Poker? Why Russian Logic Doesn't Fit the West

The most common diagnosis is a difference in mindset. The West thinks in fixed deadlines, clear objectives, and accountability; the Russian war operates on diffuse horizons where time favors the one who endures the longest. Those expecting victorious headlines every week fail to grasp a strategy that advances and retreats to strike again when the rival relaxes.

The added problem isn't Russian. It's Western. NATO governments depend on electoral cycles, public opinion, and annual budgets. A war of attrition doesn't fit that framework. The complete calculation, with figures of equipment and casualties broken down phase by phase, shows a difference between cost and outcome that surprises those who only read the headlines.

The Arctic, the Silent Reason for NATO's Expansion

While Ukraine was being discussed, another game was being played in the north. Sweden and Finland's application responded less to the steppe and more to the ice: control of the Arctic, where Russia has significant gas infrastructure. If the antiestéticar were Russian invasion, it wouldn't explain why two wealthier and militarily advanced countries now need a defensive umbrella.

The last disquieting figure is that of well-being. It's repeated ad nauseam that we live in the best era in history, with public debt around 115% of GDP and rising. When the bill comes, we'll see where one lives better. No one quite figures out why.