Russia annexes 109,000 km² without winning Ukraine war

Why annex 109,000 km² if Russia hasn't won the war?

What is the point of annexing 109,000 square kilometers if the war isn't won? This question haunts every aspect of the issue since Moscow announced the incorporation of four partially occupied Ukrainian territories. The figure is massive: it exceeds one-fifth of Spain's area. Yet the contradiction is glaring. If the advance were unstoppable, there would be no need to secure by decree what is already controlled by tanks.

The most repeated argument among those defending the maneuver is that this is recovered territory, not conquered land. Under this narrative, annexation is not a desperate move forward but the confirmation of a fait accompli. The problem is that the figures cited in independent analyses do not align with such certainty.

The numbers each side highlights

The most cited calculation for measuring Russian attrition speaks of 150,000 soldiers lost and the near-destruction of its conventional military structure. The most common comparison is Vietnam: Russia allegedly lost more men in less time than the US did in ten years of jungle warfare. Tanks, aircraft, ammunition, and billions in foreign currency burned just to fail to take any capital or change any government.

On the other side of the balance, the interpretation differs. It is argued that NATO has poured its entire arsenal into Ukraine, along with mercenaries from around the world, yet Crimea and the Donbas have not been recovered. Through this lens, the embarrassment is not Russian. Annexation would prove that Moscow is consolidating what it holds, not conquering what it cannot.

There is a third calculation worth noting: 135,000 square kilometers gained versus 135,000 lost by the other side. The symmetry is so perfect it seems fabricated. Precisely for that reason, it deserves close scrutiny.

What does Russia gain by annexing territory it doesn't fully control?

It gains legal framework. Once declared sovereign, any retreat ceases to be a military withdrawal and becomes an aggression against the federation. It is the difference between losing a war and defending the homeland. It also buys time: annexation freezes the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow, with lines where they are, not where they could be.

The detail almost nobody emphasizes is energy. European industry relies on abundant, cheap energy previously supplied by Russia. Without that supply, the productive fabric faces costs it cannot pass on to prices without losing competitiveness. The annexation of agricultural land adds another layer: 120,000 square kilometers of productive soil changing hands, with wheat as a silent weapon.

The Minsk agreements appear in nearly all rebuttals. The accusation is that they were ignored and now the consequences are being reaped. It is the kind of argument unverifiable in casual debate, but it explains why annexation is presented as a response rather than an initiation.

Nuclear threat as bargaining chip

Here the matter gets tangled. Some demand consistency: either use nuclear weapons or don't, but you cannot maintain both positions simultaneously. Others respond that atomic arms are not a plan but a warning, activated only if the war crosses into Russian territory. The ambiguity is deliberate. It works as deterrence precisely because nobody knows where the red line lies.

What can be measured is the fruta cost. Annexation has turned Moscow into a toxic partner for half of Europe. "Win-win," some ironize: Russia loses its army and nobody will buy its scrap metal. The phrase summarizes the mood of part of the analysis, though it is worth remembering that predictions of Russian collapse have been made for a long time, and the collapse has not arrived.

Russian wages and Europe's energy bill

The most uncomfortable data for the Western narrative is not military, but domestic. The average Russian salary stands at $1,011 per month, with a 13% income tax leaving about €880 net. In Spain, the average gross salary is €1,695, with €1,386 net. The wage gap favors Spain by 57.5%. The gap in gasoline prices favors Russia by 131%.

Beyond a certain number of daily kilometers, the calculation stops making sense. Add housing inherited from the Soviet era, cheap heating, lower VAT, and an energy basket that does not depend on imports. The average Russian lives more comfortably in their country than the average Spaniard does in theirs. It is not an opinion; it is simple arithmetic.

This does not make annexation a victory. It makes the war something more awkward: a standoff that Russia can sustain longer than Europe wants to admit. And there, the figure of 109,000 square kilometers stops being a military question and becomes an economic one.

In the end, annexation looks less like a trophy and more like a mortgage. Signed today, paid over years.