PSOE won't vanish: Math behind Sánchez's refusal to resign

PSOE survives even if Sánchez holds on for two more years

Can a party facing open corruption cases disappear due to exhaustion? This question has dominated Spanish political analysis since the Koldo case brought to light audio recordings that, unlike previous leaks, have not been denied. The thesis gaining traction among skeptical analysts is counterintuitive: forcing Pedro Sánchez out does not ensure the PSOE’s disappearance and may even fortify it. The precedent of Mariano Rajoy’s PP—convicted leadership, convicted party, yet still winning 89 seats in 2019—serves as an uncomfortable mirror for those expecting an electoral hecatomb.

The Koldo case and why these audios are different

The difference between the Koldo case and other scandals hitting the PSOE lies not in severity, but in evidence. The recordings offer something previous leaks lacked: implicit acknowledgment. No one has denied their authenticity. This makes the material tangible, leaving no room for biased interpretation, and explains why the debate has shifted from “you too” accusations to focusing on the party’s survival.

Some argue that Sánchez’s resignation would be the worst scenario for his interests: the party would reorganize, change faces, and preserve its clientelist network in town halls and regional strongholds. The other reading, dominant among those urging him to hold firm, is that only a prolonged collapse drags down the entire apparatus. The bet is risky, and they know it.

The Rajoy precedent: Party conviction and 89 seats

The most repeated argument is historical. The PP was convicted as a party, its leadership sat in the dock, and yet it did not disappear. In 2019 it hit bottom with 89 seats; in 2016 the PSOE dropped to 85 and also survived. Veterans conclude that the Spanish party system has a scandal-absorption capacity that no crisis seems to break.

The counterpoint comes from another angle: electoral law. With closed and blocked lists, the leader controls MPs, who have no incentive to break with an indicted boss. A system like Britain’s, with single-member constituencies, would force each MP to answer to voters. Without such reform, internal impunity is guaranteed, and corruption ceases to carry an electoral cost.

Generational shift and dependent vote

Two factors alter the calculation. The first is demographic: the hard-core socialist base ages and does not reproduce at the same rate. The second is material. Part of the electorate depends on public transfers to make ends meet, and this link weighs more than any scandal. The logical consequence, according to this analysis, is that the party lasts as long as the payroll does.

The opposing view is identity-based voting: some vote PSOE with their noses pinched, without needing to share a single management achievement. That voter does not leave due to corruption, but due to identity exhaustion, which takes years to mature.

The 1978 regime and the thesis that damage is done

The most pessimistic reading argues that the PSOE’s disappearance is irrelevant because the problem is structural. The regime born in 1978, they claim, no longer exists as such: what remains is a shell maintaining appearances. In that framework, replacing the PSOE with another brand would change nothing, as demonstrated by the Podemos cycle, which ended up being absorbed and “Podemizing” the PSOE itself.

The sarracena of all this is uncomfortable for those hoping for a clean refoundation. The party does not die from a scandal. It dies, if at all, from an economic crisis forcing cuts or a conviction reaching the president’s family. Meanwhile, the strategy of letting it sink has only one problem: the ship is not theirs.